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Abstract
Electromagnetic (EM) threats are a specialised subset of offensive threats to the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and to information security 
(INFOSEC) in general. Two broad classifications of threat types; EM interceptors 
(interception of compromising Radio Frequency (RF) emissions) and EM disrupters (The 
use of high power RF to disrupt electronics) have been considered and the technical 
aspects of these threats have been assessed. The technical complexity amongst other 
factors required to mount an EM interceptor based attack has been shown by analysis to 
be significant.
The hypothesis of this thesis has therefore been focussed on the development of detection 
and diagnostic concepts analogous to those used to defend against conventional cyber or 
Computer Network Attack (CNA) threats for EM disruptive attacks. EM Disrupters 
which have been the focus of this study are likely to have a large impact on the 
availability of information systems but it has been shown that the effectiveness of the 
threat and therefore the risk posed to INFOSEC is extremely difficult to quantify. 
Nonetheless, it has also been shown through analysis and discussion that the 'Low Tech' 
perpetrator (well funded amateur) would be likely to be capable of building an effective 
EM disruption system.
Whilst effective countermeasures for EM disrupters exist it is suggested that it is difficult 
for INFOSEC professionals to recommend their installation for risk mitigation because 
the risk is poorly quantified.
A series of rigorous EM susceptibility experiments were conducted on computer systems 
to identify susceptibility trends and to assist with understanding the risk. A prototype 
Electromagnetic Disruption Detection System (EMDDS) has also been designed and 
developed. This detector uses similar principles to cyber type Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) and should therefore be understandable to non EM specialists. It has been 
shown that the EMDDS system can be used for responding to incidents and as part of a 
forensic evidence gathering process.
The results of this thesis have supported the hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
Information is a vital intangible quantity which is fundamental at all levels of society. 
Technology or more precisely the development of micro electronic devices has 
revolutionised the way that information is communicated, processed, stored, and 
displayed. We are now undoubtedly dependant on technology at many levels of society.
Information Security (INFOSEC) is a requirement of the modern world and Information 
Technology (IT) and more specifically computer systems and processes are an essential 
and integral part of our business and every day lives. Threats to the confidentiality, 1 
integrity,2 or availability3 of computer systems are extremely undesirable especially if 
these systems are used for security or safety critical applications. INFOSEC is a process 
encompassing all aspects of the man/technology interface, and as with any security 
process it is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain.
'Cyber' or Computer Network Attack (CNA) threats to INFOSEC, dominate the general 
perception of risks to INFOSEC. Cyber threats are considered here to encompass
1 Confidentiality - 'Ensuring thai information is accessible only to those authorised to have access'
2 Integrity - 'Safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of information and processing methods'
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malicious software, hacking or hacktivism, phreaking, network intrusion, Denial of 
Service attack, logic bombs and cyber terrorism [Jones and Kovacich, 2002]. The 
concept can be simplified to any malicious activity where both the source of the threat 
and the victim system (and perhaps the transport medium) are computer systems.
As an example, consider cyber terrorism where an accepted definition is:
o Terrorist use of computers as a facilitator for their activities
o Terrorism involving computer technology as a weapon or victim [Conway, 2003]
Malicious physical threats to INFOSEC such as criminal malicious damage or theft of 
property and accidental physical threats such as fire, flood and acts of God are also 
recognised risk factors.
Important INFOSEC standards have been developed which provide a framework for 
management of information security. These standards and practices are now well 
established and both generic standards (IEC 17799), Government guidelines [UKSP01, 
2000], and product specific standards now exist [Karygiannis and Owen, 2002]. The 
generic INFOSEC management standards set out to provide a comprehensive set of 
controls comprising best practice in information security. The standards are intended as 
guidance and only recommend INFOSEC process. In the UK strict compliance to these 
standards is not mandatory.
The assessment of risk is the fundamental principal of the INFOSEC approach used so 
that balanced and proportionate controls can be put in place [Jones and Ashenden, 2005]. 
The slightly modified risk model [Wik, 2002] shown in Figure 1 can be used as a guide 
to understanding the risks to INFOSEC.
3 Availability - 'Ensuring that authorised users have access to information and associated assets when 
required' [IEC 17799, 2005]
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Figure 1: Risk model
This model is not a mathematical expression but provides a clear interpretation of the 
factors which contribute to the overall risk. The term 'susceptibility' is used to describe 
any effect to the function, whereas the term 'vulnerabilities' is used to describe 
susceptibilities which have a detrimental impact on the function. This definition is subtly 
different to that used by the cyber community and is discussed in more detail is Section 
2.1.2.
For many years there has been considerable effort expended in:
o Understanding cyber and physical threats
o Risk analysis of cyber threats, in part through vulnerability and penetration testing 
o Providing indication of attack, through intrusion detection systems for example 
o Identifying and protecting critical systems, for example with the use of firewalls
o Development of forensic techniques for the diagnosis and hopefully prosecution of 
perpetrators
Still, 96% of the UK's very large businesses (>500 staff) reported a premeditated and 
malicious INFOSEC incident during 2005/2006 and the cost of the worst breach was on 
average £lm to £2m [ISBS, 2008].
Electromagnetic (EM) threats are an emerging and specialised subset of offensive threats 
to INFOSEC. Electromagnetic threats have been associated with hacker, criminal, 
terrorist, and information warfare goals such as espionage [Schneier, 2000], [McNamara,
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2003], and disruption or damage to information infrastructures [Schwartau, 2000], 
[Schwartau, 1994], [Wik and Gardner, 1999], [Levien, 2004], [Van Keuren and 
Wilkenfeld, 1991].
However, EM threats to commercial enterprises do not appear to be explicitly considered 
as part of the prevalent INFOSEC standards. It is conjectured that this is because the risk 
posed to business processes by EM threats is poorly understood and compounded by the 
inability of security professionals to detect and therefore respond and protect processes 
from this form of attack.
From reviewing open literature discussion about the attractiveness and efficacy of EM 
threats, it is apparent that the potential risk to INFOSEC from EM threats is centred on:
o Our reliance and dependence on information infrastructures
o The availability of components and the simplicity of constructing systems capable 
of launching effective EM attacks at all adversarial levels (It has been suggested 
that the expertise required to build an effective system is less than that required to 
build a car bomb)
o The increased vulnerability of information infrastructures primarily through the 
use of technology
o The inadequacy of existing protection measures and the lack of detection devices
o The insidious, remote and covert nature of EM threats. Some authors have asserted 
that EM weapons are ideal weapons for information warfare
It can be seen that many of these reasons are very similar to the arguments in support of 
the risk to INFOSEC from cyber type threats. It is therefore postulated that detection of 
EM threats in a similar manner to detection of cyber threats in the form of Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS), may be a useful tool for assessing risk, providing forensic 
evidence, and importantly to facilitate fast and proportionate recovery from malicious 
EM-initiated incidents.
Indeed due to the particular insidious and covert nature of EM threats a correct and 
timely response to an EM initiated incident is a key challenge.
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/. 1 Hypothesis and Approach 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that:
It is useful and possible to develop detection and diagnostic concepts analogous to those 
used to defend against conventional cyber or CNA threats for electromagnetic attacks.
1.2 Objectives and Thesis Structure
In order to satisfy the demands of the hypothesis the objectives of this thesis have been 
broken down into three stages:
Stage I - Understanding the technical feasibility of EM threats
Stage II - Understanding the susceptibility of information systems from EM threats
Stage III - Developing detection concepts which facilitate an effective response to 
malicious EM initiated incidents
1.2.1 Stage I - Understanding the technical feasibility of EM threats
In this first stage a comprehensive literature review and a subjective threat analysis was
undertaken
Objectives:
o Develop an understanding of the basic concepts of EM interaction
o Detail the principles of two EM threat classes
o Understand the features of EM threats
o Understand countermeasures/mitigation of EM threats
o Conduct simple analyses to determine the effectiveness of the different threat 
classes
o Prioritise threat classes to limit the problem space
Where possible the findings of the initial experiment or study phase have highlighted 
differences and similarities between EM and Cyber or CNA threat types.
Page 16 of 253
UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN______________________PHD THESIS
1.2.2 Stage II - Understanding the susceptibility of information systems 
In the second stage experiments were conducted in order to further refine an 
understanding of the threat and to enable the formulation of a requirements specification 
for EM threat detection.
Objectives:
o Conduct experiments to assess the radiated susceptibility of computer systems
o Conduct experiments to assess the radiated susceptibility of computer networks 
o Summarise findings so that detection concepts can be developed
1.2.3 Stage III - EM attack detection and incident response
In the third and final stage one of the concepts was developed into a proof of principle
demonstrator.
Objectives:
o Develop detection concepts based on conventional cyber type threats to INFOSEC 
which are therefore easily understandable to INFOSEC professionals
o Take at least one of these concepts through to a manufactured prototype
o To promote a synergy of understanding between conventional cyber and EM 
threats
o To postulate how EM detection can be used for forensics and incident response
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2 Stage I - The Technical Feasibility of EM 
Threats
2.1 Basics of Electromagnetic Interaction
2.1.1 Electromagnetic Interference Phenomena
The focus of this work covers the EM phenomena associated with the lower end of the 
EM spectrum i.e. the Radio Frequency (RF) and microwave regions (a few Hz to a few 









Figure 2: The Electromagnetic Spectrum
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All electrical and electronic systems, to some extent, produce and respond to EM 
phenomena, this factor is exploited to produce RF communications, and telemetry such 
as mobile telephony, satellite links and radar.
The phenomena of particular interest to this study are related to EM emissions and 
interference. The IEC definition of EM interference is:
'degradation of the performance of a device, transmission channel or system caused by 
an electromagnetic disturbance' [IEC 60050-161, 2006].
2.1.2 History of EM interference phenomena
Since the very first experiments in radio communication, conducted by Marconi in the 
late 1890's interference phenomena have been known to exist. However, technical papers 
on radio interference only began to emerge in the 1920's [Paul, 1992], coincident with 
the greater proliferation of radio transmitters and receivers. This was largely a co-channel 
interference problem since radio regulation of bandwidth was not enforced at this time. It 
is speculated that the German army intercepted emissions from the Allies on the 
battlefield as early as the First World War [Young, 2002].
Other natural EM interference phenomena also contributed to the problem at this time. 
Examples of natural interference sources are lightning (direct and indirect effects, 
sometimes referred to as Lightning Electromagnetic Pulse (LEMP)), static electricity 
(Electrostatic Discharge (BSD) and Precipitation static (P-static)).
Later, in the 1930's, radio interference from electrical apparatus such as electric motors, 
electric railroads, and electric signs began to cause major problems to radio reception. 
These systems could be termed emission sources or more specifically unintentional 
interference sources since the electromagnetic disturbance caused by them was not part 
of their main function. The disturbance was caused by some secondary effect such as 
harmonics produced by switching electrical arcs or self oscillation in resonant circuits.
Due primarily for the need for world trade, International co-operation on interference 
began with the formation of two standards committees in 1933. These were the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the Special Committee on Radio 
Interference (CISPR).
However, the most significant increases in interference problems occurred with the 
invention of high density electronic components such as the bipolar transistor (1950's).
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integrated circuits (1960's) and the microprocessor chip (1970's). During this period 
military concerns and requirements provided the thrust for development in this area 
[Kodali, 2000].
The introduction of semiconductors marked a new phase in the interference phenomena. 
Electronic circuits not only produced high levels of RF emissions but electrical and 
electronic circuits which were not receivers were also affected by the interference. The 
term used to describe electrical and electronic systems which are affected by EM 
interference is susceptibility, the IEC definition being:
'the inability of a device, equipment or system to perform without degradation in the 
presence of an electromagnetic disturbance'.
Two significant historical events which identified the potential of using the unintentional 
emissions from modern systems for espionage are the account by Wright [Wright, 1987] 
and the demonstration by Van Eck [Van Eck, 1985]. Wright discusses the interception of 
compromising emissions from the Telex wires of the French Embassy. This intercepted 
information was reputedly used by the British intelligence service to understand the 
French position regarding the European Economic Community.
Wim Van Eck, a Dutch telecommunications engineer, first published a paper and then 
demonstrated interception on the BBC's Tomorrows World television program. Van Eck 
showed that the video signal from video display units (VDU) when amplified to drive the 
display (Cathode Ray Tube, CRT) could be detected at significant range.
Two very important historical events which demonstrated the susceptibility of modern 
systems are the cases of the USS Forrestal [Leach and Alexander, 1995], and the result of 
a High altitude Nuclear detonation Operation Starfish, conducted by the US in 1962 
[Tesche, 1987]. A summary of these two cases is provided below, greater detail and 
further cases can be obtained in [IEC 61000-1-5, 2004].
"In 1967 off the coast of Vietnam, a Navy jet landing on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. 
Forrestal experienced the uncommanded release of munitions that struck a fully armed 
and fuelled fighter on deck. The results were explosions, the deaths of 34 sailors, and 
severe damage to the carrier and aircraft. This accident was caused by the landing 
aircraft being illuminated by carrier-based radar. The resulting EMI sent an unwanted 
signal to the weapons system. Investigations showed that degraded shield termination on 
the aircraft allowed the radar frequency to interfere with routine operations. As a result
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of this case, system level EMC requirements were revised to include special 
considerations for electro explosive devices. "
"The Starfish nuclear device, with a yield of approximately 1 MT, was detonated about 
400 km above Johnston Atoll during the night of 8th July 1962. The line of sight distance 
from the event detonation to the Hawaiian Island of Oahu was approximately 1400 km. 
On Oahu, problems were noted in the input circuits of radio receivers, surge arresters 
triggered unexpectedly on an aircraft with a trailing wire antenna, and 30 strings of 
streetlights reportedly failed simultaneously. "
These cases amongst others prompted the military and civil communities to become 
concerned about system emissions and susceptibility. Hence standards and testing 
regimes were introduced to try to mitigate these problems. Most of these phenomena are 
addressed by working towards Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC). The IEC 
definition of EMC being:
'the ability of an equipment or system to function satisfactorily in its electromagnetic 
environment without introducing intolerable electromagnetic disturbances to anything in 
that environment'.
On the 3rd of May 1989 the council of the European communities issued the 
electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) directive 89/336/EEC [BSI, 2003] as an attempt to 
address equipment EMC issues.
There are many EMC standards which apply to Information Technology Equipment 
(ITE) which are the principal victim/receptor systems considered in this thesis. Two 
product specific standards of interest to this work are [BS EN 55022, 2006] and [BS EN 
55024, 1998].
EN 55022 sets limits for the maximum emission level permissible from ITE together 
with methods of measurement. EN 55024 sets limits for the immunity requirement of 
ITE.
In essence the EMC directive aims to reduce degradation in performance of equipment 
and systems by minimising emissions and providing some level of immunity. It can 
therefore be considered as providing protection to systems from unintentional EMI and 
perhaps some basic protection from malicious EM threats.
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2.1.3 EM interaction - a simple model
At an engineering level all of the EM interference phenomena can be described via the




Figure 3: Source - Victim/Receptor model
Sources produce emissions. Emissions, in this context, are RF signals which emanate 
from the electrical and electronic components. Any conductor can produce these 
emissions through the movement of electric charges. These emissions if intercepted may 
reveal information about the source and this could include compromising or confidential 
information. A source can consist of electrical or electronic system including but not 
limited to:
o Integrated circuits (IC's)
o Electronic circuits





o Power Transmission lines
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In this diagram the victim/receptor can be susceptible to the emission or other forms of 
external interference. If the magnitude of interference is high enough all systems will 
demonstrate susceptibility. Victim systems could consist of:
oIC's
o Electronic circuits 
o IT Systems 
o Radio receivers 
o Domestic appliances
It can be seen from the diagram of Figure 3 that there are several paths from the source to 
the victim over which EM emissions and interference can propagate.
Path 1: Represents direct radiation from the source to the victim over the air. This is 
referred to as radiated interference. The emission propagates from the source via 
apertures, such as fan grille slots or via the system enclosure and enters the 
victim/receptor via apertures.
Path 2: Is also representative of radiated interference from the source however in this 
instance the interference is 'picked up' by the victim cabling, such as antenna, power, 
signal or control cables (e.g. network or keyboard leads). The interference that 
propagates to the victim/receptor along the cable is termed conducted interference. It 
should be noted that incorrectly shielded wires, and metallic pipes or conduits can act as 
an antenna.
Another term used to describe interference coupling to non antenna elements such as 
apertures, enclosures or cables is 'back door' coupling. This differentiates it from the 
coupling to actual antennas or electronic sensors, which is known as 'front door' 
coupling.
Path 3: Interference is radiated from an antenna or cables and couples to the 
victim/receptor via the aperture or enclosure.
Path 4: This represents a purely conducted disturbance where the emission from the 
source propagates to the victim through cabling. This cable could be the power line as
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shown or in practice any interconnecting cable (e.g. network connection) or conductor 
(e.g. a copper coolant pipe).
Path x: This path represents actual physical antennas and the source and receptors are 
specifically transmitting/receiving devices. This path is representative of normal radio 
communication (e.g. Wireless Local Area Networks (W-LAN), radio 
broadcast/reception). This distinction between intentional transmission/reception and 
unintentional transmission and unintentional reception is important and is discussed in 
more detail in Section 2.1.4.
The actual physical mechanisms of electromagnetics are best approached from an 
understanding of Maxwell's equations which govern all aspects of electromagnetic 
phenomena. However, since electromagnetic theory is complex only a brief overview of 
the pertinent aspects of the phenomena is considered necessary. Discussion concerning 
some of the underlying physical considerations which apply to EM interaction and the 
source victim/receptor model in the context of this thesis are discussed in Appendix A.
2.1.4 Malicious Electromagnetic Threat Types
It is not the intention of this work to concentrate on the myriad of subjective factors such 
as motivation, funding of threat agents, likely events to trigger an attack etc, which 
constitute threats to real systems [Jones, 2003]. Rather it is the intention of this study to 
assess whether EM attacks are technically feasible and to assess the risk posed to 
INFOSEC from a technological standpoint.
Malicious EM threats exploit the coupling paths shown in Figure 3 and discussed in 
Section 2.1.3, in one of two ways.
1. Interception of compromising emissions from the source, (i.e. emissions that can 
be decoded to provide information about the system), Figure 4.
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Compromising emissions
Figure 4: Interceptor model
The EM interceptor threat is broadly comparable with the cyber threat known as spyware 
[Hackworth, 2005] where it is the perpetrators intention to get unauthorised access to 
confidential information such as passwords.
2. Disruption of the Victim by generating interference levels above the immunity 




Figure 5: Disrupter model
The disrupter threat is broadly comparable in cyber space with a denial of service attack, 
except a disrupter is likely to deny service to hardware rather than just a website, 
software interface or process.
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2.1.4.1 Electronic Warfare
A distinction should be made here between the forms of threat described above which 
form the major part of this thesis and classical Electronic Warfare (EW) and electronic 
surveillance methods. EW specifically exploits intentional transmission and reception i.e. 
systems and equipment designed to radiate RF and those therefore that have intentional 
antennas (i.e. Path x, Figure 3). These could be communications systems such as radio 
broadcast or indeed Wireless Local Area Networks (W-LAN) or non-communications 
systems such as Radar and radio navigation systems. The EW exploitation of intentional 
transmission and reception systems is sophisticated in that it is conducted covertly to 
avoid detection.
This form of threat is not unknown in cyberspace [Silver, 2001], [Potter, 2003], 
[Woodward, 2004]. Indeed, the terms war driving, wireless jacks and cyber jacks indicate 
that hacking/assessment tools exist to exploit this particular point of entry into a system 
[Wepcrack, 2006], [Airsnort, 2006], [Netstumbler, 2006]. These threat types deliberately 
attack the RF communications channel where the radio frequencies of interest are well 
known and indeed published in open standards. The principal objectives of the attack are 
either to intercept information or to deny service to the communications channel 
(sometimes referred to as jamming).
EW purposefully and specifically exploits the RF communications path via antennas (in- 
band attack), generally in a covert manner. The main threats considered in this thesis are 
threats to information systems and process which in general are not deliberate emitters or 
receivers of RF radiation (out of band attack). However, the boundaries are blurred 
especially with the integration of low power emitters such as W-LAN, 802.lib, and 
Bluetooth into the heart of IT systems [Intel, 2006].
In Section 2.2 it is shown that an EM interceptor is capable of capturing any RF 
communication signals although general RF communication is not in many cases the 
specific source which is exploited. In Section 2.3 it is shown that EM Disrupters can also 
be used to intentionally or unintentionally jam, disrupt or even damage RF 
communications reception.
EM Interceptors and EM Disrupters potentially have the ability to affect the whole range 
of electrical and electronic technologies which support information systems and 
processes and are therefore the primary concern of this thesis.
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2.1.5 Background Summary
The concept of EM interaction and EM threats to INFOSEC has been introduced. Two 
broad classes of the threat have been introduced:
EM Interceptors - Possess the capability to capture and exploit compromising RF 
emissions from information systems and processes. A threat to the confidentiality of 
information
EM Disrupters - Possess the capability to disrupt and damage electronic technologies 
which underpin information processes. A threat to the availability of information
Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 discuss interceptor and disrupter concepts in greater detail.
2.2 EM Interception
In the Section 2.1.4 the concept of an EM interception based threat was introduced. The 
fact that any electrical and electronic system can act as a source which produces 
electromagnetic emissions was discussed.
2.2.1 Definitions and associated terms
EM Interception has been defined in a variety of different ways which essentially
describe the same phenomena.
One definition for this form of threat is:
'The interception of compromising radio frequency (RF) or EM emanations or emissions 
from electronic equipment' [Buchanan, 2003].
Other terms used or associated with this threat include TEMPEST, Compromising 
emanations (CE), electronic eavesdropping [McNamara, 2007], Van Eck Radiation, and 
Unintentional Emissions (UE) detection.
TEMPEST is further defined by the UK Communications and Electronic Security Group 
(CESG) as:
'The study of the emission of unintentional protectively marked data (usually 
Confidential and above) from an equipment or system. If these emissions were 
intercepted and analysed they could reveal compromising emanations and thus the 
protectively marked data.' [CESG, 2005].
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TEMPEST is regarded by some as a military or government agency acronym [NSA, 
2001] and has been the subject of much speculation in the civil community as the 
abundance of unofficial web based articles confirms. The term EMSEC is also used 
extensively. EMSEC can refer to Emissions or Electromagnetic Security. A definition of 
EMSEC is:
'The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorised persons 
information of value that might be derived from intercept and analysis of compromising 
emanations from other than crypto-equipment and telecommunications systems' [ITS, 
2004].
Clearly this is a very similar definition to the one previously but with a shift in emphasis 
to protection rather than detection.
Another definition from open source literature was found in a published declassified 
National Security Agency (NSA) standard [NSA, 2004]. Here the code word TEAPOT is 
discussed as:
'A short name referring to the investigation, study, and control of intentional 
compromising emanations (i.e., those that are hostilely induced or provoked) from 
telecommunications and automated information systems equipment.'
This term appears to imply that backdoors can be introduced to make it easier to carry 
out an interceptor attack.
2.2.2 Standards
Given the above discussion it is clear that potentially confidential or security classified 
information may be remotely observed using this method. Interception based threats are 
therefore of concern to the confidentiality of information and since confidentiality is 
breached some of the information integrity will be lost.
Government information security groups (such as CESG in the UK and the NSA in the 
US) have been aware of this issue for some time (since 1918, according to some 
sources). In particular nationally or militarily sensitive systems continue to be rigorously 
tested to TEMPEST standards [NSTISSAM, 1992], [AMSG, 2005]. Essentially specific 
systems are tested and engineered to ensure compromising emissions are well below a 
detectable level. These levels are classified but are likely to be below the limits specified 
in the various openly published EMC standards discussed earlier.
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2.2.3 Principles of the method
The techniques for intercepting emissions are not new and simple methods can be 
employed using fairly standard equipment. Referring to the model from of Figure 3, a 






Figure 6: The interceptor threat concept
In this diagram a vehicle containing the necessary reception, processing and storage 
equipment is used to remotely intercept radiated or conducted RF emissions generated by 
ITE systems housed within an installation.
2.2.4 Emission sources
The source of the emission can be any form of electrical or electronic system as 
discussed but of specific importance are those which are used for processing, storing or 
displaying information which is of unique value to the rightful owner. Examples which 
are particularly relevant to INFOSEC may include:
o Computer systems including displays
o Network hubs and routers
o Peripherals such as keyboards, mouse and graphics tablets
o Electronic locks
o Access card readers
o Biometric sensors
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o Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras
At the circuit board level the source of the emission signal will be a discrete active 
component such as an operational amplifier. Any current carrying conductor such as a 
printed circuit board (p.c.b.) trace can act like an antenna [Parker, 1996]. A moving 
electrical charge in a trace generates an electric current that creates a magnetic field. 
Time-varying magnetic fields create a transverse orthogonal electric field. RF emissions 
are a combination of both magnetic and electric fields. These fields propagate from the 
p.c.b. by either radiated or conducted means as shown in Figure 3.
Digital circuits for example are known to be a source of EM emissions covering a wide 
frequency range (broad-band). This is due to the fast rising and falling edges of digital 
waveforms (See Appendix A, Section 6.6). The magnitude of the emission can depend on 
factors such as, the choice of component, the clock frequency, the circuit layout (i.e. 
unintentional antennas), and shielding [Robinson, 1998]. For computer systems one 
study has shown that the primary source of emissions above IGHz is the Central 
Processing Unit (CPU) [Radu, 1997].
At the system level the source radiating structure is usually a cable for example the 
power cable supplying electrical power to the system. With modern ITE several cables 
can be connected including Mouse, Keyboard, network, or Modem/telephone cables, and 
these have been shown to be the main antenna structures [Hockanson, 1996]. Apertures 
on the source system such as fan slots, metal frames, such as Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) 
housings, and seams can also radiate the RF emission.
When the systems are networked the source of the emission may be formed by ground 
loops or in the power line return conductor circuit loops.
When the system is considered as part of an installation then re radiation of the emission 
can occur from other structures such as window frames, concrete reinforcing bars and 
metal pipes such as those which carry water to sprinkler systems.
A further source is that of intentional RF emitters, such as W-LAN systems, mobile 
phones etc. which are placed close to sensitive information processing systems. It is very 
possible for compromising information to 'cross couple' to these intentional RF emitters 
such that sensitive information is broadcast unintentionally, effectively 'piggy backing' 
on the communications signal [Anderson, 2008].
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According to Figure 6 any cables or other conductors connected to the source system can 
propagate the RF emission.
2.2.4.1 Compromising Emissions
Whilst RF emissions are well known to propagate from these sources it is only 
compromising emissions i.e. emissions containing compromising, confidential or 
otherwise valuable information which are of value to the perpetrator. The terms 'red' and 
'black' are used to differentiate between compromising and non compromising emissions 
respectively. Thus red signals contain compromising information and black signals 
contain non compromising (e.g. encrypted) information. The compromising information 
contained within a red signal may be difficult to reconstruct into meaningful data since it 
is likely to be encoded or possess an indeterminate modulation.
2.2.5 The interceptor system
In the simplest sense all that is required for the interceptor is:
o An antenna - to 'collect' the emission signals
o A receiver - to visualise, measure and perhaps amplify the emission signal
o Some form of signal analysis system - perhaps including a demodulator/decoder, a 
synchroniser, and processing algorithms to reconstruct and recover the information
o A storage device - to store the intercepted/decoded emission, this could in 
principle be something simple like a video tape recorder or a computer
According to the earlier model (Figure 3) there is also the possibility of detecting a 
compromising emission by connecting a suitable probe to a cable and therefore 
measuring the conducted interference signal. In this case the antenna is replaced by a 
suitable transducer such as a wire tap or current probe.
An example of a typical emission profile from two typical computer systems is shown in 
Figure 7. Photographs of the computers under test are shown in Figure 8.
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— Pentium 4, 1.4GHzCRT 
Pentium 4, 1.4GHz LCD




Figure 7: Emission profiles of a standard Pentium 4, 1.4GHz Computer with a CRT and an
LCD display
(a) PIV with CRT (b) PIV with LCD
Figure 8: Photographs of a standard Pentium 4, 1.4GHz Computer with a CRT (a) and an
LCD display (b) in the test facility
The graph of Figure 7 shows the differences in emission profile with the same computer 
connected to a CRT and Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) monitor.
This emission profile was measured using a standard EMC emissions test configuration 
based on Defence Standard 59-41 DRE01 [Def Stan 59-41, 1995]. The equipment used 
to detect the emission was:
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o A Singer-Stodart 41" active Rod antenna (1 to 25 MHz)
o A Chase VBA 6106 Biconical antenna (25 to 200 MHz)
o A Chase UFA 6109 Log-periodic antenna (200MHz to 1 GHz)
o A Rohde and Schwartz ESI EMC receiver (10 kHz Bandwidth 1 to 30 MHz and 
100 kHz Bandwidth 30 MHz to 1 GHz)
The measurements were taken in a semi-anechoic shielded room (compliant with the test 
standard) at a distance of 1 m. Also included on the graph is the corrected emission limit 
from EN55022 demonstrating that the system measured was compliant with the EMC 
standard.
The CRT monitor can be seen to have broad band emissions in the frequency ranges 1 to 
5 MHz, and 100 to 200 MHz. There are also interesting narrow band 'spikes' in the 30 to 
100 MHz band. The same computer with an LCD monitor shows a different 
characteristic with broad band emissions centred around 7 MHz, 16 MHz, 24 MHz, 
36 MHz, 47 MHz, 55 MHz, 75 MHz, 82 MHz, 110 MHz etc. In general the LCD display 
has emissions of greater magnitude than the CRT display in the frequency bands from 5 
to 8 MHz, 10 to 20 MHz, 24 to 96 MHz and from 300 MHz to 1 GHz. However, exactly 
what the source of these emission 'spikes' and broad band signals is and whether there is 
any compromising information carried with the emission requires very careful analysis 
and complex processing.
It is clear from this emission profile that detection of RF emissions at short range is 
easily achievable using standard EMC type equipment. However, the next stage in the 
interceptor process is reconstructing meaningful data from the detected emission and this 
is discussed in Section 2.2.6 by reviewing the open literature.
2.2.6 Interceptors - Open Literature Examples
There are relatively few, peer reviewed scientific or engineering level open literature 
publications on the topic of the interceptor threat probably because the topic is classified 
by many nations governments.
The earliest detailed account of interception is given by a Dutch engineer called Wim 
Van Eck. In this paper Van Eck found that the video signal from Video Display Units 
(VDU) when amplified to drive the display (CRT) could be detected at significant range
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(over 1km). The intercepted signal had to be decoded, demodulated, and synchronised 
with the source in order to retrieve the information contained. Thus an exact real time 
copy of the victim VDU could be retrieved at significant distance over the air. Van Eck 
realised that the emission did not directly emanate from the VDU but was effectively re- 
radiation from the power cable of the VDU which acts like an antenna. In his paper Van 
Eck not only described the method but provided circuit diagrams of his system. 
However, these diagrams were incomplete and were updated in a later article [Highland, 
1998]. Van Eck demonstrated the technique on a UK National television programme, the 
BBC's "Tomorrow's World". Van Eck's form of compromising emission is specific to 
modulated, wide bandwidth synchronised or rasterised signals typical of video display 
terminals and is also known as Raster Analysis or RAID [Atkinson, 2006]. These signals 
have a known frequency and are coherent. It is significant to point out that all of Van 
Eck's demonstrations and range predictions took place before the introduction of the 
European EMC directive which mandates a limit on emissions.
In 1989, Bevacqua et al [Bevacqua, 1989] published a paper which attempted to address 
issues related to the 'TEMPEST problem'. Bevacqua isolated the graphics card oscillator 
(clock) as the primary source of the compromising emission and provided an outline 
description of an Interceptor receiver made from 'commercial components'. The paper 
claims that reception of compromising signals was possible at distances up to 50m. 
However, the paper is very light on the essential details and no examples are provided. 
This paper also pre-dates the EMC directive.
In 1990, Smulders [Smulders, 1990], wrote an article about monitoring compromising 
emissions from computer serial peripheral interface cables based on the RS-232 standard. 
Smulders showed that 'data signals' could be intercepted at a distance of several metres 
from the cable even if shielded cable was used. However, Smulders did not demonstrate 
whether it was possible to recover compromising information from the data signal.
In 1991, Han Fang et al of Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, published a paper which 
appears to be part of a postdoctoral research thesis [Han Fang, 1991]. Han Fang isolates 
the emission sources which provide the most compromising information in order of 
decreasing magnitude as: the video cable, the video display device, the floppy and hard 
drives. Measurements of the video cable emissions were found to be 40dB above the 
ambient background environment noise. A basic analytical model is provided, although 
no details of the measurement system are given.
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Sebastiani [Sebastiani, 1998] provides details of the test equipment including 
instrumentation and shielded anechoic chamber specifications required to conduct 
TEMPEST testing. Details of some mitigation concepts are also provided, however most 
of the information is at a superficial level because of claimed security classification 
issues.
In 2002 the Chinese published another paper on the interceptor topic [Shiwei Dong, 
2002]. The primary emission source in this paper is identified as the CRT electron beam 
although it is claimed that useful synchronisation signals can be detected by the display 
deflection coils emissions. The paper hints at techniques which could be employed to 
reconstruct information from the intercepted signal but only provides superficial detail. A 
crude example is given.
The PhD thesis of Markus G. Kuhn [Kuhn, 2003] is perhaps the most detailed published 
account of the interceptor threat to date. In this document Kuhn explores the feasibility of 
interceptor attacks on a variety of types of computer display systems. This study is 
perhaps more relevant than some of the earlier references since it has been conducted 
after the introduction of the EMC directive and with modern technology. As discussed 
previously before the introduction of the EMC directive there were no controls on the 
level of emissions produced by equipment. Subsequent to the introduction of the 
directive in the early 1990's equipment emissions were required to be controlled and 
comply with an emission limit.
In his thesis Kuhn demonstrates the feasibility of mounting an interceptor attack on both 
analogue (CRT) and digital (LCD) displays. The thesis discusses the instrumentation, 
measurements, procedures and concepts used for the quantitative evaluation of 
compromising emissions.
Kuhn shows in some detail how to detect and more importantly recover information from 
an emission. Three separate demonstrations of the techniques used are provided. The 
subjects of the experiments are:
o An analogue CRT display connected to a Laptop computer 
o A digital LCD monitor which is incorporated within the Laptop 
o A digital flat panel display
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The instrumentation used included:
o A Log periodic antenna with an Antenna Factor of approximately 22dB/m in the 
UHF band
o A Dynamic Sciences Inc. DS-1250 specialist TEMPEST receiver4 set to a very 
wide video bandwidth (typically 50MHz or greater)
o A high quality, high stability signal generator for the generation of synchronisation 
signals
o An oscilloscope to carry out multiple captures of radio frequency emission to 
enable averaging
o Specialist custom built software algorithms that carry out pattern recognition in 
order to reconstruct the plaintext image from the captured emission
In addition to these instrumentation requirements it appears that it was necessary to have 
a detailed understanding of the system which was the eventual victim of the attack. In 
particular the type of video interface used and an understanding of the standards required 
to develop the video protocol.
For the analogue CRT display reconstruction of the intercepted signal was shown at a 
distance of 3 m. In this case it was necessary to connect a cable between the receiver and 
the video synchronisation output of the victim display in order to stabilise the 
synchronisation. This appears to have been necessary due to limitations in the 
instrumentation available, in that the synchronisation would drift outside the required 
limits during the frame averaging time. The period required to complete averaging with 
the instrumentation used was 10 minutes. In the case of a real interceptor attack it is 
likely to be unrealistic to attach a cable to the system which is to be the victim of the 
attack. This could effectively invalidate the advantages of the attack method.
For the digital Laptop display reconstruction of the intercepted signal was shown at 10 m 
with the victim display in a room separated from the interceptor. The attenuation of the 
plasterboard wall construction between the rooms was found to be 2-3 dB (see Appendix 
A, Section 6.3). In this case it was necessary to analyse the source of the emission by 
probing the hardware in order to understand how to reconstruct the image from the
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signal. This was achieved by connecting an oscilloscope directly to a cable within the 
laptop and varying colours and contrasts to find out how the pixel colour and pattern 
related to the emission. For the actual demonstration this cable was disconnected and 
synchronisation was achieved over the air. For a real perpetrator of an interceptor attack 
this implies that very specific knowledge of the victim system is required for a successful 
intercept to be accomplished. A custom written algorithm was used to cross correlate the 
first and last frame in the captured series.
For the digital flat panel display reconstruction of the intercepted signal was shown at a 
distance of 3 m. A detailed understanding of the Transition Minimised Differential 
Signalling (TMDS) link protocol (which is utilised by the display type) was necessary in 
order to reconstruct the signal.
In all of the cases above plaintext was used on the victim display. This text has a high 
differentiation between the text and the background. It is shown that different foreground 
background colour combinations and contrasts can make reconstruction more difficult.
It is clear from the discussions above that detection of RF emissions is fairly trivial but 
reconstruction requires detailed knowledge of the victim system and technical skill. 
Given the above discussion the level of sophistication, expertise, insider knowledge and 
time required to mount an effective interceptor attack is considered to be non trivial.
It should be pointed out that the emission phenomena are not restricted to display 
systems but are common to any digital electronic system as discussed previously. 
However, no open source information could be found which explored interception from 
other sources in any detail. It is possible to speculate that interception and reconstruction 
of emissions from other sources such as microprocessors for example would require a 
significant understanding of the protocol and message format employed.
Finally, no open source information could be found which exploited the conducting 
channel (cables etc.) as a propagation path to mount an EM interception attack.
2.2.7 Interceptor Analysis
It has been shown that it is not difficult or impractical to detect emissions from
information processing systems. The detection of emissions is routinely performed
4 The sales of these receivers are the subject of strict controls such that only users authorised hy National 
security agencies are able to purchase and use them.
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during EMC testing of equipment at ranges up to 10 m. If we consider Kuhn's most 
successful demonstration, interception and recovery of data from the laptop display then 
we can attempt to quantify the maximum effective range for detection.
In Kuhn's demonstration the available signal strength (Txavaiiab!e) = 39 dB^V/m at 10 m 
in a 50 MHz bandwidth. The actual measured signal amplitude is quoted as 12 uV or 
21.6 dBuV. This implies an antenna factor (see Appendix A, Section 6.4.2) of 
17.4 dB/m, from Equation 1.
4 — TV — R Y
^F ~ L A available ivA signal (T-m |\
Where, Rxsignai is the measured signal level from the base of the antenna in dBuV.
The receiver noise floor appears from the results to be at approximately 3 [iV or 
lOdBfiV. The Dynamic Sciences DSI - 1250 TEMPEST receiver [DSI, 2004] has a 
quoted receiver sensitivity of 6 dB above Johnson noise. The Johnson noise, which is 
also known as thermal and white noise level can be found using Equation 2 [Kennedy, 
1985].
. 2 ) 
Where, Vn is the noise voltage
K is the Boltzman constant (1.38x10"23 Joules) 
T is the absolute temperature in Kelvin 
Af is the measurement bandwidth 
R is the receiver impedance in Ohms
If we assume normal ambient temperature conditions of 18 °C, and a receiver input 
impedance of 50 Q, then the Johnson noise in a 50 MHz bandwidth is 6 (iV or 16 dB^iV. 
The absolute noise floor of the receiver is therefore, 6 dB + 16 dB|iV = 22 dB^iV. This of 
course assumes that there are no other environmental man made noise sources in 
proximity of the receiver.
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From [ITU-R P.372, 2001] the environmental noise floor in a business area is 26 
dE^V/m at the frequency of interest (75 MHz) in a 1 MHz bandwidth. In the 50 MHz 
bandwidth used this equates to a noise floor of 43 dBuV/m. By rearranging Equation 1, 
the noise signal in the receiver is 25.6 dBuV.
Since in his experiment Kuhn has a noise floor of 10 dBu,V this indicates that either some 
form of signal pre-conditioning was used (i.e. a low noise preamplifier) or cross 
correlation and averaging have been used to improve the signal to noise ratio by a factor 
of around 16 dB. It is likely that a combination of these elements was necessary.
By assuming that a 10 dB signal to noise ratio is required for successful interception and 
based on the recorded noise floor we can estimate the maximum expected detection 
range. We can assume that the interceptor is in the 'far field' region away from the 
source of the emission since the criterion for the far field boundary (see Appendix A, 
Section 6.2.2) is met for this frequency. Assuming free space propagation path loss (see 
Appendix A, Section 6.2.1) the maximum range for interception can be predicted.
The graph of Figure 9 therefore shows the predicted maximum range assuming that the 
same processing techniques are used and that additional physical barriers do not provide 




Figure 9: Predicted distance of interception
This shows that the predicted maximum detection range of the demonstration by Kuhn is 
approximately 20 m. If a greater level of signal pre-conditioning or further averages and
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cross correlation were used it would be possible to improve this figure marginally but 
more capture and processing time would be required.
However, if the barrier attenuation was greater than the 2-3 dB measured or any of the 
mitigation methods described above were used then the detection range would be 
significantly reduced. For example a thick concrete wall with an attenuation of just 8-9 
dB (see Appendix A, Section 6.3) would reduce the effective range by half.
2.2.8 Interception verses War driving.
It may be useful to compare the technical complexities of interceptor threats with threats
to W-LAN such as war driving, drive by hacking and wireless 'jacking' etc.
From the war driver's point of view:
o The receiver equipment required to intercept a W-LAN transmission is standard 
off the shelf package (e.g. PDA with W-LAN card), routinely available
o Operating this equipment in an office environment would not appear obvious and 
therefore would not draw unwanted attention allowing range and time advantages
o The source, format and protocol of the intercepted signal are well 
characterised/standardised since the object of the interception is a communications 
signal
o Freeware tools are available to crack encryption (if necessary) and reconstruct 
meaningful information from the intercepted signal such as packet sniffers
For an EM interceptor:
o The receiver equipment required is likely to be specialised or custom modified 
equipment with a wide bandwidth capability required for impulse detection. Other 
equipment such as oscilloscopes, signal generators, storage and processing 
facilities are necessary in some form
o Due to the quantity of equipment required, carrying out an EM interceptor attack 
outside of the victim installation, perhaps from a van parked in the street or an 
accompanying office building is the most viable option to minimise suspicion
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o Time and patience are required to successfully capture, cross correlate and time 
average the intercepted data to enable reconstruction of the RF emission into 
meaningful data
o It is not likely that the source of the emission can be interpreted purely from the 
intercepted signal. A specific victim must therefore be aimed at. Once the source is 
defined, intelligence concerning the format or protocol used must be gathered in 
order to develop reconstruction algorithms
o To the authors knowledge no software tools are explicitly available for 
reconstruction of information from non-communications emissions
Another important factor is that in either case useful information may not be intercepted. 
It is likely to take significant time an effort to sift the data for any useful information. For 
the interceptor this time is magnified by the need to reconstruct data from the intercepted 
emission.
2.2.9 Forensic Features of Interception based Threats
A very unique feature of an EM interception attack is that it will be invisible to the 
information system which is the victim of the attack i.e. because of the passive nature of 
the attack there will be no evidence of the attack at the scene of the incident. Those in 
rightful possession of confidential information will have no knowledge or sensation that 
the confidentiality has been breached perhaps until the information is revealed for 
surreptitious purposes such as blackmail. Indeed the interceptor provides many of the 
required parameters for a near perfect weapon for an information warrior; it is invisible, 
passive and insidious.
This form of threat to INFOSEC therefore is unlike many cyber/CNA type threats or 
physical threats from insiders. Physical threats will leave some form of evidence, 
unauthorised opening of computer files, loss of data, unauthorised reproduction of 
material, even fingerprints at the scene of the incident. If INFOSEC procedures are 
followed cyber/CNA threats such as spyware for example which attempts unauthorised 
download from a remote link, or even installation of malicious software should also be 
detected and evidence should therefore be obtainable from the scene of the incident.
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2.2.10 Mitigation/Countermeasures
Some mitigation methods, specifically for the interceptor threat have been suggested in
the literature. A good reference which covers most of the system design techniques is
given by Bai Tungyun [Bai Tungyun, 1997]. These and other techniques are listed
below:
o Physically separating classified information (Red) systems from unclassified 
(Black) information bearing systems
o Zoning of systems
o The use of fibre optics to replace copper cables removing unintentional antennas 
[Kline, 1991]
o Shielding the source of the compromising emission [Knobloch, 1998], [Bevacqua, 
1989]
o Testing of systems to assess the level of compromising emission and then advising 
on design changes to reduce the emission (TEMPEST testing).
o Altering the software to display low emission fonts, so called 'soft' TEMPEST 
[Kuhn, 1998], [Junjie, 2001]
Implementation of a physical security barrier or some form of non electronic perimeter 
control would also be very effective since the magnitude of the compromising emission 
diminishes with distance from the source.
It should be noted that many of these mitigation measures would provide some protection 
from the disruptor threat through reciprocity.
Methods for the detection and evidence collection of an EM interceptor based attack do 
not appear to exist in the public domain. The emphasis for security agencies appears to 
be in reducing the compromising emission to a practically undetectable or at least 
unrecoverable level.
2.2.11 Interceptor Summary
It is not difficult or impractical to detect radiated or even conducted emissions from 
information processing systems at close range. These measurements are carried out for 
all types of information processing systems as part of EMC compliance. The skill and
Page 42 of 253
UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN_____________________PHD THESIS 
challenge for the interceptor lies in the problem of reconstructing meaningful data from 
the intercepted signal.
All of Van Eck's experiments were conducted before the introduction of the European 
EMC directive which mandates strenuous emission limits. Even though the emission 
signal levels measured by Van Eck are not given it seems likely that the detection range 
postulated by Van Eck (in the order of kilometres) would not be possible today due to 
emission limit constraints.
Kuhn has shown that detection and reconstruction of intercepted emissions from both 
modern (post EMC) digital and analogue display systems is possible even in an office 
environment where there are a number of systems of similar types polluting the 
spectrum. It has been shown by analysis however, that the range where detection and 
reconstruction is possible is limited to a few tens of metres. Very sophisticated 
techniques, relatively sophisticated instrumentation, intelligence of the victim system, 
and a great deal of technical skill and patience are required to recover the information.
Some articles assert that the complexity of developing and mounting an EM interceptor 
based attack is great. Further, a review of US National security policy for the secretary of 
defence, William J. Perry in 1994 [Smith, 1994] states that:
'In 1991, a CIA Inspector General report called for an Intelligence community review of 
domestic TEMPEST requirements based on threat. The outcome suggests that hundreds 
of millions of dollars have been spent on protecting a vulnerability that had a very low 
probability of exploitation.........The rationale is that a foreign government would not be
likely to risk a TEMPEST collection operation not under their control.'
The report went on to recommend that domestic TEMPEST countermeasures should only 
be employed in response to a specific threat. This document appears to imply that non 
domestic or overseas government offices such as Embassies still require TEMPEST 
protection.
Military and government departments appear to have a more relaxed attitude to 
interceptor threats probably because of several factors including:
o The introduction of EM emissions limits such as those required for the European 
EMC directive
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o The time required to mount an interceptor attack
o The proximity required to mount an attack
o The need for insider information about the system in use
o The need to develop decoding algorithms to reconstruct data
o The availability of cryptographic equipment to process confidential information
o The overall technical complexity of recovering compromising information
From the level of complexity described above it seems clear that only very well 
resourced individuals or groups (such as Nation State Actors (NSA)) could mount a 
successful interceptor attack. However, three areas of continued concern are likely to be:
1. The increasing complexity, flexibility and availability of low cost receivers, such 
as software reconfigurable radios, and wide bandwidth communications receivers
2. If effective stimulation of the information system to increase the magnitude or 
chance of recovery of compromising emission is possible by an insider, or some 
external influence
3. If confidential compromising information 'cross couples' to uncontrolled 
transmitting equipment, which is likely to increase the interception range
Point 3 is likely to be of particular concern since the trend in office environments is 
towards the use of wireless transmitter equipment such as W-LAN, Bluetooth etc.
Due to the technical complexity of the threat type the risk posed to commercial 
enterprises is likely to be low even though the impact could be very severe. For these 
reasons and others discussed above this thesis will mainly concentrate on the EM 
disrupter threat. It will be shown in Section 2.3 that it is perhaps far easier to mount a 
disrupter based attack and that the impact of disruption is of more immediate concern to 
INFOSEC.
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2.3 EM Disruption - Overview
In Section 2.1.4 the concept of an EM disrupter based threat was introduced. The fact 
that all electrical and electronic systems are potentially susceptible to electromagnetic 
interference was also discussed. This form of threat exploits the reciprocal condition of 
the EM interceptor threat. That is any source which produces emissions is efficient in 
receiving EM energy via reciprocity (see Appendix A). By employing high power RF 
transmitters it is possible to couple RF energy into victim systems and potentially cause 
disruption and damage.
2.3.1 Historical Perspectives
It is not clear when the concept of EM disruption was conceived although the first 
discussions concerning an RF 'death ray' are associated with Nikolai Tesla. Tesla 
attempted to build a very high power RF transmitting station at Wardenclyffe, NY, USA 
[Seifer, 1998] for long range radio communications. Later in 1940 when Tesla was 84 
years old he discussed the concept of a disrupter weapon with a journalist from the New 
York Times [New York Times, 1940]. Tesla's invention the 'magnifying transformer' or 
Tesla transformer is still used in some of the EM disrupter designs of today.
After Tesla, the concept returned to the science fiction domain since no technology was 
available to build a disrupter system. In the Second World War with the advent of Radar 
and the proliferation of long range radio communications high power transmitter 
technology started to become available for military use.
During the cold war there is significant evidence to suggest that the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU) researched disrupter concepts which apparently resulted from their recognition 
that they could not match the capability of Western electronics and that this could be a 
potential vulnerability for the West. [Schweitzer, 1997].
An unpredicted side effect of the 1962 Starfish high altitude nuclear test which was 
discussed in the introduction was the disruption, damage and power outage of electrical 
systems in Oahu, Hawaii, attributed to an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP). This disruption 
prompted a great deal of research into EMP phenomena especially in the areas of 
hardening and protection of military equipment and systems.
The EMP in this instance was produced by a nuclear weapon detonation high in the 
Earths atmosphere (>30km, so called exo-atmospheric). Exo-atmospheric nuclear
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detonations generate ionising radiation that interacts with the Earth's atmosphere causing 
the generation of scattered Compton electrons. It is the propagation of these electrons 
through the atmosphere that generates a virtual antenna producing the HEMP that covers 
several thousand square kilometres at the ground. This wide coverage of a very large area 
is very different to the other EM threat types listed
In order to effectively test system susceptibility to the perceived EMP threat, EMP 
simulators were built. Perhaps the largest example of an EMP simulator was the 
TRESTLE facility at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, USA shown in Figure 10.
I
Figure 10: The Trestle EMP facility
TRESTLE was the largest wood and glue structure in the world, the actual EMP pulse 
generator hardware is off picture at the bottom of the image.
In order to generate a simulated EMP event using non nuclear methods and indeed other 
nuclear weapons effects it was necessary to develop pulsed power sources. Pulsed power 
became a dedicated field of research which began around 1960 [Smith and Aslin, 1978]. 
The goal of pulsed power designers was to produce efficient pulsed power machines to 
drive a variety of sources including Electromagnetic launchers, Laser systems, and X-ray 
machines.
However, the advent of the USS Forrestal disaster in 1967 also discussed in the 
introduction is likely to have sparked military interest in EM disruption. Hardening and 
protection of military systems would have been the primary driver although it is likely 
that the effects encountered on Forrestal would have been a catalyst for some of the 
military to consider the advantageous offensive use of EM disruption.
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International conferences and meetings which discussed topics such as pulsed power and 
high power microwave sources and effects began some time after this event. A series of 
European and American Electromagnetics conferences (EUROEM and AMEREM), and 
the IEEE Pulsed power conference series have been discussing aspects of disrupter 
technology for over 20 years. The US National Radio science organisation and the 
International Union of Radio Science (URSI), Commission E hosted several meetings of 
the High Power Electromagnetics working group which discussed all aspects of disrupter 
phenomena including lethality in 1995, 1996, and 1997 [Gardner, 1997].
Around 1996 further impetus to the research field was provided when FSU scientists 
openly discussed explosively driven disrupter systems. The leading protagonist in the 
area appears to be Dr. Prishipenko [Merritt, 1998].
In 1997 URSI and the IEC Sub committee SC 77C started to develop standards 
concerning Intentional EMI (IEMI), an alternate name for malicious EM disruption, 
although this committee had already been developing standards and advice concerning 
BMP threats and mitigation to the civil community since 1980.
In 1991, 1997 and 1998 the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of the United States Senate 
held hearings concerning Radio Frequency Weapons and the infrastructure [Saxton, 
1998]. In 1997 and twice in 1999 the US Congress held hearings concerning the issue of 
Electromagnetic pulse threats to US infrastructure [Weldon, 1997], [Bartlett, 1999].
At EMC Zurich in 1999 a Workshop titled 'Electromagnetic Terrorism and adverse 
effects of High Power Electromagnetic Environments' was held which included five 
papers on the topic.
In 2004 the US has undertook a major re-evaluation of the US critical National 
infrastructure susceptibility to Nuclear EMP effects. [Graham, 2004]. Threat assessments 
for EM disrupters have also been provided to the US Congress [Wilson, 2004]. In August 
2004 the IEEE published a special issue with over 20 papers discussing aspects of IEMI 
[Radasky, 2004] and special sessions on IEMI continue to be an integral part of the EMC 
IEEE and EMC Zurich conference series.
2.3.2 Definitions and Associated Terms
Various terms are used to describe facets of the disrupter threat, and include, but are not
limited to:
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o Intentional Electromagnetic interference (IEMI)
o High Power Electromagnetics (HPEM)
o Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
o High Energy Radiated Fields (HERF)
o Radio Frequency Weapons (RFW)
o Directed Energy Weapons (DEW)
o Non Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (NNEMP or N~EMP)
o Radio Frequency Munitions (RFM)
o High Power Microwaves (HPM), - Hypoband
o Ultra Wide band (UWB), - Hyperband
o Damped sinusoid (DS), - Mesoband
The differences in the terms above describe some differences in the actual mechanism or 
deployment scenario for the threat. IEMI, RFW, DEW, HERF, and HPEM have been 
used to describe the general concept of using EM energy for disruption of electronic 
systems, networks and infrastructures. RFW and DEW seem to be the favoured terms of 
the military community, although DEW can also encompass Laser based weapons. 
Whereas, the terms EMP, HPM, UWB, and Damped Sinusoid are generally used to 
describe the actual EM signature or output waveform of the disruptor.
IEMI and HPEM are terms used by IEC SC77C which deals with high power transient 
phenomena. The definition of IEMI is:
'Intentional malicious generation of electromagnetic energy introducing noise or signals 
into electrical and electronic systems, thus disrupting, confusing or damaging these 
systems for terrorist or criminal purposes.'
A term used by the military and law enforcement communities is Non Lethal Weapons 
(NLW). NLW encompasses many different techniques for waging non lethal warfare, 
EM disruption is a small sub set of NLW but the term NLW appears to be less 
contentious than some of the other terms.
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EMP is generally used to describe a single intense pulse of electromagnetic energy. It is 
frequently associated with nuclear weapons as Nuclear EMP (NEMP) or High altitude 
EMP (HEMP). EMP produces instantaneous wide frequency coverage dependent on the 
pulse parameters. The term EMP can also be associated with the radiated disturbance 
from Lightning (LEMP). N2EMP is a term initially used by the HPEM community to 
describe non nuclear means of simulating the VHP induced transient response of cables 
exposed to HEMP.
RFM is a term used to describe an explosively driven EM disruptor. In this way the 
explosive energy is somehow converted or modified into EM energy or used to provide 
electrical power to microwave modulators. Other terms used to describe this RFM 
concept include E-bomb [Kopp, 1996], Lightning bomb or EMP/T bomb. Associated 
technical terms relating to the actual generation mechanism include Magneto Cumulative 
Generators (MCG), Flux Compression Generators (FCG) and Magneto Hydrodynamic 
devices (MHD).
HPM [Barker and Scamiloglu, 2001] is also known as narrowband [Prather, 2004]. 
Hypoband [IEC 61000-2-13, 2003] is a standardised term used by the IEC to describe 
this waveform. Hypoband waveforms comprise of a narrow bandwidth EM signal in the 
microwave frequency band (above 500MHz). However, there appears to be some 
confusion since in some circles HPM has been applied to all forms of disruptor 
technology [Walling, 2000]. Hypoband waveforms can be considered as similar to Radar 
waveforms. Generally they appear as a train of pulses at some repetition frequency, each 
pulse contains a burst of a fixed frequency.
The term UWB was initially used by the HPEM community . However the IEC have 
now created a standardised term, Hyperband, which more accurately characterises UWB 
like waveforms. Terms such as Transient Electromagnetic Devices (TED) and 'impulse' 
or 'spike' generators have been associated with this waveform type. Hyperband signals 
have a very narrow pulse width but have a characteristic high peak level. The 'spike' 
may be reproduced many times to form a train of pulses at some repetition frequency. In 
the frequency domain this appears as a very broad bandwidth at low amplitude because 
the energy is spread across a wide frequency range.
5 UWB is also associated with a new communications modulation scheme and is used in some Ground 
Penetrating Radar (GPR) applications for example archaeology or mine detection. However, these 
applications require different parameters from the UWB waveform than those required for disrupiors.
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The term Mesoband, a standardised term developed by the 1EC more accurately describes 
DS type waveforms. In the time domain these signal types appear as a damped ringing 
waveform. This can be reproduced to form a train of damped sinusoids at some repetition 
frequency. In the frequency domain DS waveforms have a broad energy content due to 
harmonics produced in the fundamental frequency. Due in part to the techniques used to 
generate damped sinusoids the centre frequency is generally below the microwave band 
and can be centred around the lower VHP band up to the microwave band (30MHz to 
500MHz approximately). Mesoband waveforms with centre frequencies in the VHP 
range can also be injected on cables to simulate the induced effects of EMP for 
susceptibility testing of electronic equipment [McConnell, 1989].
The IEC definitions for waveform classification stem from the diversity of waveforms 
which can be produced by disrupter systems and the inadequacy of other descriptions. 
The definitions are based around the frequency contributions of the waveform types and 
















Table 1: IEC classification based on band ratio
Band ratio is defined as the ratio of the highest and lowest frequency content of the 
waveform at 3dB down from the peak, Equation 3:
..............(Eq. 3)
Where, //, is the upper frequency where the amplitude is -3 dB of peak 
And // is the lower frequency where the amplitude is -3 dB of peak 
Percent bandwidth is then defined by Equation 4:
.(Eq. 4)
Page 50 of 253
UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN PHD THESIS
It should be noted that in most cases it is the technology and components used which 
primarily influence the type of waveform produced by the disrupter. Figure 11 shows the 
time domain representation for a single pulse of each waveform type.
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Figure 11: Time domain representation of each waveform type:
(a) Simulated EMP (t, = 1 Ons, Full width half maximum (FWHM) = 150ns);
(b) Simulated Hypoband (f = IGHz, pulse width = 25ns);
(c) Hyperband (tr = lOOps) 
(d) Mesoband (Centre frequency = 50MHz)
EMP is generally considered to comprise of a single pulse event but it is possible to have 
many pulses per second for Hypo, Hyper and Mesoband waveforms. This is known as 
repetition rating, the interval or more precisely the frequency of pulses is known as the 
pulse repetition frequency (p.r.f). Figure 12 demonstrates the effect of repetitive pulses of 
a Hypoband waveform in the time domain.
Page 51 of 253










Figure 12: Repetition rated Hypoband waveform (p.r.f = I kHz)
The time domain features of the waveform type have a large bearing upon the efficiency 
of the EM interaction. This is discussed in some detail in Appendix A, Section 6.6.
Figure 13 shows the pulse frequency spectra for the different EM disruptor waveform 







Figure 13: Frequency spectra of disruptor waveforms (Adapted from IEC 61000-2-13)
2.3.3 Principles of the method
Referring to the model from of Figure 3, a typical schematic diagram of the concept is
given in Figure 14.
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Figure 14: The EM disruptor threat concept
In this diagram a vehicle containing the necessary prime power and 
amplification/modulation equipment is used to generate high level EMI which can be 
used to stress and potentially disrupt or damage information processing systems housed 
within an installation by radiated or conducted means.
2.3.3.1 The Victim
The victim of EM disruption can be any form of electrical or electronic system. Unlike 
the EM interceptor threat it may not be necessary to precisely target information 
processing systems since secondary or cascade effects may be possible. For example 
consider that an EM disruptor could be used to activate an electronic fire alarm control 
unit to allow a thief to gain entry or perhaps activate sprinkler systems in a central 
processing facility causing flood damage to information processing systems.
In general the elements which could be subjected to an EM disruptive threat can be 
considered in a hierarchical sense based on their specific geometry and dimensions this is 
discussed in Appendix A, Section 6.1.
2.3.3.2 Disruption Mechanisms
The actual process of inducing disruption in an electronic system, the disruption
mechanism, is complex and the subject of much research [UIC, 2001], [UNM, 2001].
In order for an electronic system to be affected by an EM disruptive waveform it must 
clearly capture some energy from the waveform. This process is known as coupling and 
was discussed in relation to Figure 3 earlier and in more detail in Appendix A, Section 
6.5.
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In general the coupling efficiency (i.e. the amount of energy absorbed into a system) is 
increased when the wavelength of the impinging RF field is comparable with the 
dimensions of the coupling structure.
For infrastructures (cable lengths greater than a few km) the waveforms with the highest 
coupling efficiency are those with frequency content (in the tens of kHz) possessing 
wavelengths proportional to cable lengths such as HEMP and LEMP.
For an installation (e.g. an office building containing a computer network) the stress can 
couple through apertures such as windows and doors or through conductive utilities 
which penetrate the installation.
For a computer network the most likely coupling route is via the interconnecting cables 
such as network or power cables (cable lengths up to a few 10's of metres). The optimum 
waveform for coupling will have higher frequency content (a few MHz) than HEMP and 
LEMP, therefore VHP Mesoband waveforms are likely to be most effective.
At the system level (dimensions less than a few metres) the interaction is predominantly 
either aperture or cable coupling. The apertures on a system generally have a smaller area 
than the cable loops. It is therefore expected that microwave Hypoband and Hyperband 
type waveforms (frequency content greater than 1 GHz) will couple well to cables and 
apertures of small systems such as computer systems. The EM stress then penetrates 
inside the system to circuit boards and further to the sensitive electronic components.
The examples above are all representative of back door coupling to the system i.e. 
through unintentional antennas or apertures. Front door coupling through intentional 
communications and non-communications (such as radar) ports is also possible and was 
discussed in the context of EW in Section 2.1.4.1. Systems, networks, and even 
infrastructures can have antenna ports. The risk of damage to components at the base of 
the antenna port (i.e. the receiver) may be high because there is a direct conduit for the 
EM stress especially if the disruptor waveform frequency spectra are within the 
bandwidth of the antenna port. Even harmonics of the EM disruptor waveform have the 
potential to be highly stressing to the parasitic elements of a receiver.
For back door coupling the actual mechanism in which the EM energy interacts with a 
circuit or system and causes upset is also very complex [Gaudet, 2004]. The most 
popular theories are based on:
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o Rectification of non linear elements on the circuit which can be actual component 
junctions or parasitic elements
o Intermodulation whereby several non linear structures create a beat frequency in 
the pass band of the device [Chase, 1975]
o Altering logic levels by generating offsets
o Altering logic states by introducing glitches
o Changing power supply conditions
o Introduction of chaotic behaviour [Andreadis, 2004]
o Damaging the semiconductor junctions by the avalanche effect or power supply 
follow through, or other thermal effects [Camp, 2002]
o Any combination of the above
At the circuit level therefore, the level of upset is dependent on the circuit operating 
voltage level (power supply), the logic or switching level, the operating frequency range 
of the devices (clock speed and bandwidth) and the number and type of potentially 
rectifying elements (i.e. component density).
The trend for semiconductor technology is moving towards lowering the supply 
requirements and switching logic levels and increasing the operating frequency and 
component density on the chip [ITRS, 2005]. Some graphs showing the predicted trends 
adapted from the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) are 
shown in Figure 15 and Figure 16.
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Figure 16: Predicted trend in Power supply requirements for devices and circuits
These trends have prompted some [Baffreau, 2002], [Kohlberg, 2002], [Armstrong, 
2001] to predict that systems will become more susceptible to interference and disruption 
in the future.
In general it is very difficult to predict the coupling and disruption mechanisms of the 
victim. This is because of the large uncertainty, number of variables or degrees of 
freedom related to the EM interaction. It is not presently considered possible or practical 
to predict with any degree of certainty the EM coupling, propagation mechanism, and 
circuit response of a complex victim system. Some reasons for this complexity are 
discussed in Appendix A and other uncertainties are provided in IEC 61000-1-5. These 
are listed below:
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1. The status of the system logic state and pending operations at the time of EM 
illumination
2. The coupling efficiency of the stress into the system, due to the large number 
of important parameters, whose values are unknown or variable
3. The unknown or time-varying orientation and distance of the system with 
respect to the EM source
4. Variations in the system susceptibility level for nominally identical systems
Another potential source of uncertainty for disruption at system level is that commercial 
standard systems supplied by the same manufacturer and from the same assembly line 
may look identical from the outside but have very different devices on the circuit boards 
within.
2.3.3.2.1 Upset and Damage
Two broad classes of induced effect from EM disruption are possible for the victim 
system, upset or damage, although in a functional context there are many shades in 
between. Upset is sometimes referred to as soft kill and damage as hard kill.
For the examples in the introduction the effect of the disruption from the Starfish BMP 
event was loss of power to houses caused by damage to the power transmission system. 
Whereas, the effect of EM disruption on Forrestal was damage to materiel and the deaths 
of servicemen caused by EM induced upset of missile launch electronics.
Consider the trivial example of a notebook computer as a target for the EM disruptor. 
When the notebook is exposed to EM stress the user may experience a range of induced 
effects such as; mouse or keyboard malfunction (irregular mouse movement, false 
keystrokes); hard disk latch up; through to switch off or shutdown. Further, on 
investigation the user may find corrupted data, or even damage which may have rendered 
the notebook unusable.
However, there is another dimension to the effect concerning the impact on the system 
function. If the notebook was being used to surf the internet then mouse deflection may 
only be an inconvenience to the user of the notebook. But if the same effect was 
experienced when the notebook was being used for some critical function (i.e. 
manoeuvring a robot arm on a vehicle production line) then the consequence could be
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greater. For example mouse deflection could cause the arm to smash into the vehicle 
potentially damaging the robot and costly downtime for the production process.
In general more EM stress is required to produce damage than that required to initiate 
upsets. A six point scale has been proposed to quantify disrupter effects [Ross, 2004]. 









No immediately observable effect
Effects present during illumination 
by disrupter
Soft reset - operator intervention 
required
Hard reset - operator intervention 
required




Victim functions are normal
Effects observed but do not require 
corrective action
No need to cycle power on/off
Need to cycle power on/off, limited 
downtime dependent on system 
function
Technician required to fix fault, 
increased system downtime
System inoperable / replacement 
required
Table 2: Disruptor effect scaling
In summary then the effects induced in a system exposed to EM disruption are complex. 
The induced effect on a system is at least dependent upon:
o Victim system type
o Victim system function
o 'Stressing' features of the disruptive waveform
  Frequency
  Bandwidth
  Coupling Efficiency
  Magnitude
  Rate of Rise
Energy
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For deployed EM disrupter systems in 'real world' scenarios other factors such as the 
propagation or path loss, structural attenuation and illumination volume are also very 
important factors which add to the complexity of the issue (see Appendix A).
2.3.3.3 The EM Disrupter Source
The essential elements of an EM disruptor source can be simplified to the list below:
o Access to some form of prime power
o An energy storage mechanism
o A modulator - to develop the EM waveform
o An antenna - to radiate the high power EM waveform or a transducer to inject a 
high voltage or high current RF waveform into a conductor
There are a large variety of components which can be used in many different ways in 
order to achieve an EM disruptor system design. The main goal for all of these systems is 
to achieve very high peak or average power (stress) which is subsequently delivered to 
the victim system. It is important to recognise and discuss these variations in order to 
develop analytical expressions and as a tool to develop further discussion. It is also 
important to realise that the technical capability of the disruptor designer and the scenario 
for which the disruptor will be deployed will affect the choice of component.
2.3.3.4 Technical Capability/Scenario
The technical capability can be considered at two extremes. The lowest capability group 
will be referred to as 'Low Tech' where this applies to a well funded amateur, hobbyist 
or hacker with access to commercially available components and some workshop space. 
The highest capability group will be termed 'State of the art' where this refers to 
National Government (usually military) research departments with all available resources 
and state of the art facilities. It is expected that other adversaries such as criminals, 
terrorists, and NSA's will have a capability somewhere between these extremes.
For a Low Tech EM disruption source commercial availability of components, cost, and 
technical skill will influence the design. For a State of the art EM disruption source it can 
be assumed that the EM disruptor simulator systems built by government research 
agencies and discussed in the open literature (at conferences etc.) are likely to be 
representative of the state of the art.
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Schriner [Schriner, 1998], postulates three different scenarios for improvised or Low 
Tech disrupters whereas for military use other scenarios have been considered [Stark, 
2004]. A condensed set of scenarios for deployment of disrupters can be considered to 
be:
1. Man portable systems - for close 'hand en-placed' deployment (i.e. an EM 
disrupter which can be taken inside an installation and which can therefore 
expose a system unimpeded)
2. Mobile systems - for example housed within a van or tracked vehicle (i.e. 
similar in principle to the concept shown in Figure 14 which have to 
overcome range limitations and the attenuation of the installation structure 
(see Appendix A)
3. Fixed installations - in military parlance these could be large platform i.e. 
ship based, or fixed land based stations for suppression of enemy air defence
4. Deliverable non re-usable disrupter systems - such as RFM where the 
disrupter is delivered to the target/victim and destroyed in the process
These scenarios undoubtedly affect the choice of components for the disrupter designer 
since parameters such as size, weight, concealment, power requirements, etc. will have 
an impact on the overall disrupter design. The choice and availability of components will 
in turn affect the likely range and effectiveness of the disrupter.
2.3.3.5 EM Disruptor Source elements
2.3.3.5.1 Prime Power and Energy Storage
This could be the domestic power (mains) supply, batteries, portable or fixed generators, 
explosives or any other means6 of generating the electrical energy required to eventually 
radiate from the antenna. The type of prime power deployed is obviously dependent on 
the scenario in which the disruptor will be used, the average power requirement of the 
modulator and the overall efficiency of the system.
For man portable disruptors some form of portable power must be used if access to the 
domestic supply is not possible. Batteries are the most likely prime power component for
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the man portable scenario. Batteries can also be considered as energy storage devices but 
in many cases it may be necessary to have a storage stage.
For mobile systems it may be possible to use the vehicle electrical system to provide 
prime power for longer (if the engine is running and trickle charging the system). 
Alternatively a portable petrol or diesel generator could be used.
For fixed installations the domestic or even an industrial electrical supply could be 
accessed to provide the prime power requirements for the source.
Typically capacitors or inductors or some combination of these components such as a 
Blumlein or Pulse Forming Networks (PFN) or Pulse Forming Lines (PFL) [Martin, 
1996] may be used to shape the energy for delivery to the modulator.
2.5.3.5.2 Modulator
The term modulator is used here to represent the key component or group of components, 
which convert the steady state prime power to an EM waveform capable of being 
radiated by the antenna.
The simplest form of modulator is a high power switch which effectively 'dumps' the 
electrical energy from the energy store into the antenna. Other forms of modulator can 
include relativistic tubes (Gyrotrons, Klystrons, Reltrons, Vircators and in particular 
Magnetrons), Marx generators, Tesla transformers and complex solid state systems. The 
number and variation of modulator types is large, a brief summary is provided here:
For Low Tech modulator designs high power tube technologies which are used for RF 
broadcast or radar applications are readily available for public sale. Tubes like the Eimac 
8974/X-2159, which is capable of producing 2 MW peak power in the low VHF band (30 
MHz) [Eimac, 2005] and the Burle 4664 tube capable of producing 3 MW at 540 MHz 
with a 3 % duty factor [Burle, 2005] would be available to the amateur/hacker. However, 
the level of technical sophistication required of the engineer to incorporate these tubes 
into a working system is likely to be high. Very high power Klystron modulators up to 50 
MW are available for very specialist applications such as the Compact Linear Collider 
(CLIC) at CERN [Pearce, 2000].
6 For many EM disruptor system types these prime power and energy storage elements may he combined. 
for example an RFM may use explosive (chemical energy) to provide prime power, store energy and even 
effectively modulate the EM signal.
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The modulator in a typical microwave Hypoband system will probably be based on 
conventional or relativistic tube technology OBenford and Swegle, 1992]. Example HPM 
modulator types include, Travelling Wave Tube (TWT) amplifiers, Magnetrons, 
Backward Wave Oscillators (BWO), Magnetically Insulated Line Oscillators (MILO), 
Gyrotrons, Klystrons, Reltrons, and Vircators. The limitation with tube oscillators is that 
they are resonant cavities i.e. their dimensions and structure only allow modulation to 
occur over a narrow range of frequencies. Of the tube types above the Magnetron is 
perhaps the most common and most well known since it is the principal component in 
domestic microwave ovens. Indeed Low Tech microwave Hypoband disrupters have 
been manufactured using microwave oven magnetrons or even ex-military radar 
magnetrons. The Vircator however is considered to be the most versatile microwave 
Hypoband modulator type since it is able to be tuned to several different frequencies 
within a narrow range (up to ~ 10% of the centre frequency) [Benford, 2004].
A photograph of a high power relativistic magnetron is given in Figure 17.
Figure 17: High Power magnetron and pin cathode
Microwave Hypoband modulators can be engineered to produce repetitive pulses, 
however, due to the large average power requirements and general inefficiency of the 
process (~ 20 % to 30 %) the repetition frequency is generally limited to a few hundred 
Hertz at most. The pulse duration is dependent on the prime power availability and the 
tube type. Pulse widths of a few hundred nanoseconds are achieved with very high peak 
power tubes (1 GW), wider pulse widths (a few tens of micro seconds) are available with 
lower peak power systems. Microwave oven magnetrons, work with a 50 % duty cycle 
(i.e. the energy is 'on' half of the time), but the peak output power is limited to about 1 
kW.
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A typical VHP Mesoband system can be implemented using very similar technology to 
that required to simulate HEMP waveforms. The most common configuration is a Marx 
generator with an oil or gas spark gap switch at the output which discharges the stored 
energy in the Marx into an antenna [Kekez, 1989]. A Marx generator is a parallel charged 
n element resistor/capacitor energy storage system, the parallel elements are connected in 
series to effectively sum the energy in the parallel stages. By adjusting the configuration 
of the spark gap it is possible to change parameters such as rise and fall time which affect 
the bandwidth of the signal produced. However, the oscillating frequency of the radiated 
waveform is primarily a function of the antenna geometry. A limitation of spark gaps is 
that the repetition rate is limited by the physics of the breakdown process within the 
spark gap. The highest repetition frequency presently achievable is 5 kHz [MacGregor, 
1997].
Hyperband modulators can also employ Marx generators. Other modulator types can 
include Tesla transformer or solid state switches can be used. A Tesla transformer is a 
high-voltage, air-core, self-regenerative resonant transformer that generates very high 
voltages at high frequency. Solid state technology such as Integrated Gate Bipolar 
Transistors (IGBT), Drift Step Recovery Diodes and Transistors (DRSD and DRST), 
Stacked avalanche switches, Silicon Avalanche Shapers (SAS), Semiconductor opening 
switches (SOS) and Photo Conducting Solid State Switches (PCSS) are discrete silicon 
components which can be employed in arrays and circuits to develop the UWB 
waveform [Richardson, 2000], [Kardo-Sysoev, 2000], [Agee, 1998]. The unique 
requirement for Hyperband modulators is the need to generate very fast rise time pulses, 
since the rise time of the pulse is directly related to the highest frequency in the pulse 
frequency spectra. Many Hyperband systems employ some form of pulse sharpening, 
such as fast spark gap switches or ferrite loaded shock-lines [Brooker, 1999] to improve 
the rise time of the pulse. A limitation of the Marx variants of UWB modulators is that 
they rely on spark gap switching which limits the highest repetition frequency 
achievable. Solid state systems can have repetition frequencies up to 600 kHz. Low Tech 
Hyperband modulators have been developed using Tesla or other step-up transformers.
The combination of a prime power source, an energy storage device and a modulator is 
known as a pulsed power system.
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2.3.3.5.3 Antennas
Some properties of antennas are discussed in detail in Appendix A, Section 6.4. In most 
practical cases the basic requirements for EM disruptor antennas are:
a) To efficiently convert the EM modulated waveform to a radiated waveform
b) To deliver the maximum stress to the victim which implies that the antenna 
must have gain or directivity
c) To faithfully radiate the waveform characteristics, such as rise time, pulse 
width etc. or to enhance or create modulation of the waveform through 
radiation
d) Not to generate a voltage gradient which exceeds the air dielectric breakdown 
(nominally 3 MV/m)
e) To be able to handle the power output of the modulator
f) To have an input feed which is impedance and geometry matched the output 
feed of the modulator
The antenna gain or directivity (discussed in more detail in Appendix A, Section 6.4) 
ensures that the majority of the stress generated by the disruptor is delivered to the victim 
system, enhancing the stress at the victim and therefore maximising the probability of 
disruption. Antennas with poor directivity such as dipoles and monopoles are not ideal 
since the energy is radiated in all directions in the plane of the antenna. However, highly 
directive antennas (gain SOdBi to 40dBi) are usually large especially at frequencies up to 
a few GHz. Large antennas are difficult to conceal and portability would be an issue for 
the man portable scenario. Some photographs of typical antenna geometries are given in 
Figure 18.
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(a)
(c)
Figure 18: Some examples of different disrupter antenna types
(a) Standard Waveguide horn
(b) 2.4m offset horn fed parabolic reflector
(c) Co-axial fed Hyperband TEM horn with dielectric lens
(d) Hyperband IRA
In the microwave frequency region (above 500MHz) the most practical form of antenna 
used is the waveguide horn or an array of horns [Rahamat-Samii, 1992]. The waveguide 
horn has good efficiency and directivity and the input to the antenna is usually a 
waveguide structure which matches the output of the microwave modulator. It is also 
feasible to construct rudimentary waveguide horns with Low Tech means.
The horn may be filled with a dielectric material for very high peak power sources where 
the electric field stress at the antenna feed point may exceed the breakdown of air or have 
a dielectric lens to shape the wave front. For frequencies above a few GHz a dish 
reflector may be used together with a feed horn in order to achieve greater gain or 
directivity. At frequencies below IGHz the size of the horn becomes large and other
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antenna schemes such as log periodic or array antennas can be used to provide 
directivity.
For Hyperband waveforms the antenna must be broad band and capable of handling very 
high peak voltages. The preferred antenna types are the Transverse Electromagnetic 
Mode (TEM) horn [Holzman, 2000] or the Impulse Radiating Antenna (IRA) [Farr, 
1999]. A TEM horn is simply an open ended parallel plate waveguide with flared plates 
at the end which act as an impedance gradient to attempt to match the modulator output 
impedance to air. An IRA consists of a parabolic reflector with a TEM feed. Very good 
directivity is possible from an IRA.
2.3.3.5.4 Transducers
According to the earlier model (Figure 3) there is also the possibility of using conducted 
rather than radiated means of disruption. In this case the antenna is replaced with a 
suitable probe which can inject high voltage or high current RF pulses onto power, 
telecommunication or signal cables, or indeed other conductors.
In most practical cases the basic requirements for EM disrupter transducers are in many 
ways similar to the requirements for antennas, some difference are highlighted below:
a) To efficiently convert the EM modulated waveform to a conducted current or 
voltage
b) To faithfully reproduce the waveform characteristics, such as rise time, pulse 
width etc. in the victim system conductors
c) Not to generate a voltage gradient which exceeds the dielectric breakdown of 
the conductor of the surrounding dielectrics such as the soil
Three main injection mechanisms can be considered:
Point injection - i.e. a suitable probe is brought into direct contact with the victim 
conducting channel
Capacitive coupling - e.g. an electrostatic charge is built up on a plate or similar 
structure and induces an opposing charge in the victim conducting channel
Magnetic induction - This could either be a 'lossy' cable laid along in parallel with the 
victim conducting channel or a current injection probe or transformer which is placed
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around the victim conducting channel where the latter forms the secondary of the 
transformer.
2.3.4 Complete EM Disrupter Systems
Complete EM disrupter systems employing all of the elements, prime power, energy 
storage, modulator, and antenna/transducer have been discussed in the open literature. 
For example Orion is a state of the art UK based microwave Hypoband simulator 
operated by QinetiQ. An annotated photograph of this simulator is given in Figure 19.
Figure 19: The Orion Hypoband simulator
2.3.4.1 Low Tech - Radiated Disrupter Systems
Plans, descriptions and demonstrations of Low Tech disrupter systems are available on 
the Internet. The systems discussed in these open forums range from HPM, and UWB 
like systems through to RFM like systems. A short summary of some of the web sties is 
provided in Table 3.
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Site URL
http://strike-










http://ww 'w.amazins 1 .com/
cmp.htm
Description
Contains diagrams of how to construct an E-bomh
Sells plans and kits of crude hut potentially high power RF sources, 
including access to 'Microwave EMP (long range weapon) research 
papers' for $25. The site also offers military specification magnetrons.
Tesla Technology Research site, claims to be the world's leading 
manufacturer of Tesla Coils. The site has information on designing 
and building Tesla Coils and guides on purchasing a Tesla Coil 
system, component assembly, and individual parts. Also contains links 
to other Tesla related sites.
Shows how to design HERF weapons from microwave oven 
magnetrons and also has videos of the design and effects on a 
computer victim. The site mentions other effects on fluorescent tubes 
and motion detectors. Pictures and discussion of the David Schriener 
source which was demonstrated at Infowarcon are included. Since 
visiting the site in February 2004, the site has been removed by the 
author (September 2004)
Designs of an Electromagnetic gun (microwave oven magnetron 
based) amongst other weapon concepts such as rail guns and laser 
weapons
Describes how to build three types of HERF or EMP 'guns' . These are 
an omnidirectional RF burst device, an RF gun, and a microwave gun.
Two designs of EMP/Shock generators, plans available for $20, or a 
1.8GW version available to rent at $1500 per month or buy for $7495. 
Appears to be based on arc welder type technology with a simplistic 
reflector antenna
Table 3: Complete Low Tech disruptor systems
A quick review of the designs offered above shows that they are unsophisticated and 
rudimentary using well known voltage multiplication circuits or concepts borrowed from 
other high voltage generation systems (such as car ignition systems). Some if not all of 
the designs could result in personal injury to an amateur/hacker designer during 
manufacture let alone during operation.
The Low Tech microwave Hypoband like disrupters are mostly based around a IkW 
Microwave oven magnetron with a home-built waveguide horn. The microwave oven 
magnetron requires a few hundred Watts prime power and therefore must be mains 
power driven. This source could feasibly be deployed in the man portable scenario if 
mains power was readily available near to the victim system. A battery and inverter 
could be used but the burst time would be significantly limited.
The Schriner TED system was the subject of a US military 'Live Fire Test' of RF 
weapons at the Naval Air Warfare Centre Weapons Division (NAWCWD), Valley
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junction test range, China Lake [Henderson, 1998]. The TED system was manufactured 
from commercially available components based on an automotive ignition system and an 
oil cooled spark gap switch which appears to have been the primary output switch. The 
radiating antenna structure was a home made TEM horn. Although not explicitly 
discussed in relation to the Schriner TED source rise times of 100 ps, with E-field 20 
kV/m at 10 m and a 1 kHz pulse repetition frequency are discussed in the Henderson 
article.
For a well motivated and well funded amateur complete fixed and mobile ex-military RF 
broadcast and search radar systems are available on the internet. One site offers a 
complete 1.3 GHz 2MW search radar (AN-FPS-71) which would require a fixed 
installation and a compete mobile 1.2 to 1.3 GHz 500 kW system [RRIC, 2004].
2.3.4.2 State of the art - Radiated Disrupter Systems
The state of the art the systems which are described in the open literature are not 
disruptors but are used to simulate high power RF environments for susceptibility and 
EM effects research or for EM hardening and protection research or even for HIRF 
clearance of civil and military aircraft. This research is invariably conducted by National 
government defence organisations, often in partnership with Universities. Indeed it is 
clear from the open literature that countries such as Canada, China, France, FSU, 
Germany, Sweden, US, and UK operate high power disrupter simulator systems. Two 
very useful references have been found which summarise state of the art world-wide DS, 
UWB, and HPM activities [Sabath, 2004].
2.3.4.2.1 RFM
For RFM the goal is convert chemical or explosive energy into radio frequency energy. 
The most widely discussed mechanism to achieve this is the MCG which can be use to 
drive a switch or antenna directly or alternatively to drive a HPM tube such as Vircator 
or MILO [Novae, 1998]. The MCG (and variants such as Helical FCG, MCG, and MHD) 
is essentially an explosively driven variable inductor. The inductor is wound on an 
explosive former, and electrical energy is stored in the inductor. When the explosive 
charge is activated the inductor diameter expands which compresses the magnetic flux in 
the inductor causing magnification of the energy. RFM systems are effectively 'one-shot' 
disrupter systems although it is possible to conceive that multiple devices could be used 
together producing a larger overall stress or a pseudo repetition frequency.
Page 69 of 253
UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN___________________ PHD THESIS 
Although there is much speculation about individual component parts of complete RFM 
systems, schematic diagrams of complete systems, and quoted peak power outputs (~ 1 
GW) very few references to actual deployable systems could be found in the open 
literature.
2.3.4.2.2 HEMP Simulators
HEMP simulators simulate over a small volume one of the waveform components which 
is generated by a high altitude nuclear explosion. HEMP simulators used non nuclear 
means to generate this waveform and are primarily used to validate the hardening and 
protection of military equipment to the HEMP environment. In most cases these 
simulators are driven by a Marx generator which feeds a PFN or PFL through a spark gap 
switch to the antenna. Generally the antenna is formed into a bounded wave or parallel 
strip line construction [IEC 61000-4-32, 2002]. In this way the electric field is 
predominantly contained within the bounds of the simulator and not freely radiated. 
Examples of HEMP simulators are the TRESTLE simulator shown in Figure 10 and the 
QinetiQ HEMP simulator.
The QinetiQ HEMP simulator is housed within a separate wooden building designed 
specifically for the minimisation of RF reflections. The simulator consists of a Marx 
generator, PFN and bounded wave antenna. The working volume is 4m wide by 4m deep 
by 4m high and the field has good uniformity within this region.
The IEC 61000-4-32 document titled 'EMP Simulator compendium' has specifications 
for over 39 simulators from over 13 countries around the world.
2.3.4.2.3 Hyperband Simulators
An example of a state of the art Hyperband disrupter simulator is the JOLT system 
discussed by Baum amongst others [Baum, 2004]. JOLT is a large UWB simulator which 
appears to have been developed for a mobile scenario although the prime power 
requirements are not discussed. The simulator comprises of a rectangular capacitor 
energy storage section, a 22:1 step-up pulse (Tesla) transformer which up converts the 50 
kV stored in the capacitors to 1.1 MV, a compact gas filled spark gap switch to transfer 
the transformer output to a peaking section and peaking switch (an oil filled spark gap). 
The antenna employed is a Half-IRA with a TEM feed. The JOLT source is capable of 
producing a 150 ps rise-time impulse with a pulse width of approximately 400 ps, 
providing an approximately flat spectrum from 500 MHz to 2 GHz. The measured peak
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E-field is 80 kV/m at 85 m. The maximum achievable repetition frequency appears to be 
600 Hz, burst limited to one thousand pulses. The source appears to be burst limited to a 
few seconds because of prime power constraints.
Other examples of Hyperband systems are the Radan compact modulator from the 
Russian Academy of Sciences in Ekaterinburg, Russia. This modulator utilises solid state 
switches and gas filled spark gaps to deliver 180 kV with a 150 ps rise time, a 1 ns pulse 
width at a maximum repetition frequency of up to 1 kHz. The modulator is 'desk-top' 
size and has a co-axial output which can be used to feed conventional antennas. Due to 
the compact nature of the source it may be possible that this source is capable of 
performing in the 'mobile' scenario.
A very compact, very high repetition rate UWB system is the HRR32 manufactured by 
Diehl Muntionssystem. The prime power is provided via batteries which fit within the 
packaging dimensions but this limits the operating system time to 20 minutes. 
Alternatively a mains powered 24 volt power supply can be used allowing the system to 
run continuously but this limits portability. An inverter supply of some sort must be 
incorporated but specifications are not provided; this is likely to be solid state. The 
system uses 32 parallel spark gaps each running at a very high repetition rate. This 
produces a random p.r.f. with a maximum measured p.r.f. of 1 MHz, and an average of 
600 kHz. The HRR32 uses monopole antennas (which also act as a tripod stand for the 
system) to radiate the UWB waveform.
Other compact solid state UWB modulators are manufactured by Bournelea and Kentech 
in the UK, FID GmbH and Diehl Muntionssystem of Germany, and Diascarb Research in 
Kiev, Russia.
2.3.4.2.4 Microwave Hypoband Simulators
The prime power source for the UK Orion Hypoband simulator consists of two, three 
phase 100 kW electrical generators and a 500 kW diesel generator. The lOOkW generator 
drives the charging system PFN where the output of the generator is converted to a 30 kV 
DC supply. This supply is then coupled into the power modulator where the DC voltage 
is stepped up to 1 MV. The primary modulator is a magnetron. In the magnetron 
approximately 10% to 20% of the electrical power is converted to RF power resulting in 
-300 MW of microwave power extracted from the magnetron. The antenna consists of a 
waveguide feed horn and an offset fed parabolic reflector. The antenna is designed to 
provide 26.7dB of gain over the Orion operating frequency range. The complete
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specification for the Orion source is given in Table 4 [Kerr, 2004]. This highlights some 
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This is the minimum across the entire 
operating bandwidth.
This number is specified as a minimum 
across the target area at 75m range.
Ensures full illumination of large targets.
This is limited by the magnetrons not the 
pulsed power supply.
Few HPM system can achieve >10Hz.
Determined by thermal relaxation.
Cooling the magnets down from room 
temperature is a multi-stage process.
This time allows for reconfiguration of all 
relevant software and hardware.
All systems must be booted and diagnosed 
for problems.
Series of simple shut down procedures.
The magnets have to be refilled with 
Helium every three days.
expected
Time is required to retune and optimise the 
system.
To move between each magnetron 
operating frequency requires a two 
day turn around.
This matches with the impedance of the 
magnetrons.
In 50ns steps.
Table 4: Complete specification for the Orion HPM simulator
This detailed specification with the inherent restrictions on operation is typical for many 
of the state of the art Hypoband systems.
The Microwave Test Facility (MTF) is a Swedish Hypoband simulator which is used for 
HIRF certification of military aircraft. The MTF is installed in a 12 m container and has a 
separate prime power unit which is an AC diesel generator. The system consists of five 
separate klystron type microwave tubes, with centre frequencies of 1.3 GHz, 2.86 GHz, 
5.71 GHz, 9.3 GHz and 15 GHz. The maximum pulse width of the output pulse is 4.5 us, 
with a maximum pulse repetition frequency of 300Hz. Repetition frequencies of up to 
I kHz are possible whilst keeping within the average power constraints of the system. The 
antenna used is a waveguide horn or alternatively a special type of high gain reflector 
antenna (Cassegrain) can be used for the 2.86 GHz and 5.71 GHz frequencies. At 1.3 
GHz the peak E-field is quoted as 30 kV/m at 15 m. At 2.86 GHz, using a special pulse 
compression system, up to 80 kV/m at 15 m is quoted. The maximum burst length is 
limited to 10 seconds.
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The German Hypoband simulator known as Supra utilises a thyratron switched PFN- 
Marx which drives a Super-Reltron microwave modulator. Four Super-Reltron tubes 
cover the frequency range 0.675 to 1.44 GHz although it is planned to add four other 
Super-Reltron tubes to increase the maximum frequency to 3 GHz. The maximum pulse 
width is 300 ns with a maximum p.r.f. of 10 Hz. The system is limited to 100 pulses per 
burst. Specially designed dielectric filled waveguide horns are used to radiate the HPM 
signal into an anechoic chamber. The peak E-field is quoted as 70 kV/m at 15 m. Other 
Hypoband simulators of note which have been discussed in the open literature are:
o The French Hyperion system [Sabath, 2004]
o The Chinese 1.1 GHz, lOOHz p.r.f. Backward Wave Oscillator with a centre 
frequency of 9GHz [Changhua, 2002]
o The Russian Rosa and Ranets-E 500MW, 9GHz mobile HPM systems [Guoqi Ni, 
2005]
o The Indian Kali-1000 system, which has been used to drive a Vircator at 3 to 
7GHz [Rao, 2002]
2.3.4.2.5 VHP Mesoband Simulators
A Mesoband system has been described by Kekez [Kekez, 2003]. This system comprises 
of a DC power supply, compact eight stage 600kV inductor charging Marx modulator 
with a circular rail spark gap switch in a co-axial geometry. The source produces a 1 ns 
rise time into a matched resistive load. The spark gap geometry appears to be used as the 
radiating antenna element. The DS source produces the characteristic damped sinusoid or 
ringing waveform with a duration of approximately 70 ns to 1 [xs with centre frequencies 
of 31 MHz, 86 MHz, 146 MHz and 249 MHz depending on the charging stage 
configuration used. At a distance of 1.7 m from the source the maximum E-field recorded 
was 145 kV/m at 31 MHz (70 ns pulse width). The highest pulse repetition frequency 
appears to be 50 Hz. The system is a laboratory demonstrator which may be capable of 
being deployed in a mobile or deliverable scenario.
Two other state of art Mesoband sources are the DS110 and DS350 developed by Diehl 
Muntionssystem in Germany. The DS110 is a compact suitcase sized system which can 
use batteries for prime power. The source uses solid state technology to develop an input 
to a very compact Marx generator modulator. The output of the Marx is connected to a
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multi-turn cylindrical coil antenna which can be tuned to vary the centre frequency of the 
radiated waveform. The centre frequency is nominally 375 MHz with at least a 20% 
bandwidth. The peak field normalised to 1m is quoted as 125 kV/m. This source is 
clearly applicable to the man-portable scenario.
The DS350 is a larger variant of the DS110 using similar components. The antenna of 
this source is a multi rod dipole antenna where the length of the rod elements can be 
varied to change the effective centre frequency of the radiated waveform (nominally 100 
MHz). The peak E-field normalised to 1 m is quoted as 300 kV/m and the maximum 
p.r.f. at the highest output level is 50Hz. The DS350 is specified as a laboratory DS 
simulator but it is possible to conceive of the source in a fixed or mobile scenario.
2.3.4.3 Radiated Disrupter Systems - Summary
The key parameters of the Low Tech radiated disrupter systems are summarised in Table 
5. Parameters for State of the art disrupter simulators are given in Table 6. Some 
parameters have been calculated / assumed.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN PHD THESIS
2.3.4.4 Conducted Disrupter Systems
As stated previously EM conducted disrupters exploit the conductive paths to the victim. 
Simplistically any high voltage generator or pulsed power system can be used to drive 
high voltages or high current into conductors such as cables attached to or adjacent to the 
victim system.
For Low Tech conducted disruptors no complete systems could be found in the open 
literature. However, Tesla coils have been manufactured with outputs up to 14 Million 
Volts at 85 kHz. Other Low Tech examples could include Tazers or car ignition systems.
For the state of the art many systems such as damped oscillatory wave, surge, and even 
lightning impulse generators exist for EMC, lightning and HEMP testing. An example of 
one type is the Electrical Fast Transient (EFT) generator test set. This generator is 
capable of producing a 4kV impulse with a rise time of 0.5 ns and a pulse width of 50 ns. 
Another example is the Repetitive Random Square wave Pulse Generator (R2SPG), 
developed for military conducted immunity tests in the United States [Hoeft, 1994]. The 
generator parameters are not provided. More powerful mobile conducted HEMP 
generators have been developed in the FSU [Golikov, 2002]. These mobile simulators are 
known as 'Zenit-A', and 'Zenit-K'. Table 7 shows the specifications for the two sources.
Output Parameters
Voltage pulse amplitude
Voltage pulse rise time
Voltage pulse width
Current pulse amplitude 
(short circuit)
Current pulse width 
(short circuit)
Zenit-A
100 to 800 kV
10 to 80ns
0.5 to 5 us
20 kA
Up to 1 us
Zenit-K
10 to 35 kV
3 to 10 us
Up to 100ms
Up to 80 kA
Up to 70 us
Table 7: Very powerful mobile conducted simulators
There appears to be less discussion in the literature concerning EM disruptors which 
exploit the conductive channel to the victim. This seems counter-intuitive since it has 
been shown (Appendix A, Section 6.2.3) that the conducting channel may offer lower 
path loss (less attenuation) than the radiating channel.
2.3.5 Summary of EM Disrupter Sources
From the discussion above the following summary has been drawn:
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o The main design goal for the disrupter designer is to optimise the energy delivered 
to the victim system
o A secondary goal is to optimise and faithfully radiate or inject the modulated pulse 
characteristics
o The type of components and primarily the modulator type used define the 
disrupter type
o The disruptor can produce a single pulse or repetitive pulse trains although the 
latter is likely to be limited to a burst of a few seconds duration
o The capability of the disruptor manufacturer can vary from Low Tech through to 
state of the art
o Four classes of deployment scenario for EM disrupters have been considered, 
although the man portable and mobile scenarios are more likely for the lower 
capability groups
o There is sufficient 'open source' discussion to derive parameters for Low Tech and 
state of the art EM disruptor systems
o Low Tech disruptor designs are available on the Internet, however, a review of the 
designs shows that they are unsophisticated and rudimentary and even dangerous 
for an amateur to attempt to manufacture
o High voltage or high current pulse generators capable of exploiting the conductive 
channel have been summarised but fewer examples have been found in the 
literature
Some of the quoted unique features of EM disruptor weapons over conventional weapons 
are:
o Deep magazine - a military term referring to the fact that the ammunition 
(effectively electrical energy) is available as long as the prime power is available
o Speed of light attack - the disruptor wave front will propagate through air or along 
cables at the speed of light compared with conventional ballistic ammunition
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o Rapid re-targeting - It is possible to engage several targets in quick succession by 
moving the antenna
o Non Lethal - Does not kill people7
Direct inter-comparison of sources from different classes of EM disrupter is difficult 
because of:
o The different characteristics of the waveform types produced 
o The effect these characteristics may have on the victim system 
o The deployment scenario of the disrupter
This section has highlighted the complexity and in some cases the operational constraints 
of complete Low Tech and state of the art EM disrupter systems and simulators.
2.4 EM Disrupter Effects/Susceptibility Open Source Data
2.4.1 Radiated Disrupter Effects
Sub system level susceptibility i.e. the susceptibility of discrete components and circuits 
is widely discussed in the open literature [Sonnemann, 2003], [Demoulin, 1995]. 
However, a component or circuit response to EM disruption is difficult to interpret from 
a system level effects study because the circuit coupling will be severely modified by the 
system enclosure. Indeed EMC design allows for the incorporation of containment or 
shielding at the enclosure or system level. The shielding provided by the enclosure is 
likely to have a large bearing on the overall system susceptibility threshold. 
Susceptibility evaluation at the sub system level therefore invalidates or at least does not 
account for some of the protection measures built in to the design of the overall system. 
Also, information systems are the focus of this study therefore system level effects will 
form the majority of this discussion.
There are very few openly published papers which discuss in sufficient details system 
susceptibility to high power EM simulators. The few published accounts appear to be 
military led research programmes aiming to understand electronic system susceptibility 
to High power EM for hardening, protection and survivability purposes.
7 In this context we are comparing EM disruptors with conventional munitions. Certainly high power RF 
exposure can harm humans and potentially lead to long term health effects. ___
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The earliest accounts in the open literature discussing susceptibility and effects of 
systems are, unsurprisingly centred on HEMP interaction [Lee, 1986]. However, this data 
largely pre-dates the use of complex digital systems and microelectronics used for 
information systems. This and other discussion [Middlestead, 1987] does allude to the 
fact that HEMP can induce susceptibilities in satellite systems although no absolute 
values of satellite system effects are provided.
Aircraft electronic (avionics) systems have also been the subject of extensive 
susceptibility studies [Larsen, 1998], [Fuller, 1990]. The reasons for this appear to be due 
to several factors.
o Avionics generally employ 'high end' electronics
o Electronic flight control systems perform safety critical functions and must 
therefore have a high degree of immunity from interference
o The EM environment in which the aircraft is required to operate is severe, due to 
airport radar, high power RF broadcast transmitters etc.
Military and civil aircraft are evaluated for EM immunity at extremely high levels up to 
several kV/m in the microwave band. This is interesting since it highlights the fact that 
safety critical systems can be protected from high power EM environments. However, 
the relevance of avionics susceptibility to information systems susceptibility is difficult 
to interpret.
The first highly relevant article containing upset thresholds of computer systems was 
published in 1999 [LoVetri, 1999]. In this paper standard EMC type TWT amplifiers 
were used to illuminate three separate tower computer systems via a standard double 
ridge waveguide horn antenna. This test configuration broadly simulates microwave 
Hypoband type waveforms.
The distance between the antenna and the System Under Test (SUT) was 1 m, the 
maximum achievable peak field level was quoted as 100 V/m. A variety of modulation 
types and antenna polarisations were used. The SUT was exercised, processing data and 
video images and reading/writing to the hard disk. A variety of upset types or effects 
were observed including.
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o Loss of data
o Reset (where the computer re-started automatically) 
o Disk Write error (reported by the operating system) 
o Loss of hard disk access (reported by the operating system, power down required)
o Power down (computer shuts down)


































































































Table 8: Minimum radiated susceptibility threshold of computers, after LoVetri et al 
*AM - Amplitude modulation with 80% modulation depth
**Pulse - 217Hz, 50% duty cycle (2.3ms Pulse width)
***CW - Continuous wave i.e. no modulation applied
This table is therefore indicative of upset thresholds for computer systems from a 
microwave Hypoband type disrupter.
Other important sources of susceptibility data are provided by Backstrom [Backstrom, 
2004] of the Swedish Defence Research Organisation, Camp [Camp, 2004], of the
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University of Hanover, Germany and Nitsch [Nitsch, 2004] of the German Ministry of 
Defence (MoD).
Backstrom has evaluated a variety of systems for susceptibility against Hypoband (HPM) 
using the MTF facility described earlier and other conventional techniques. Systems 
tested appear to include, motor vehicles, computers, monitors, card readers, missiles, 
radios and telecommunications systems. Of these it is remarked that flat screen monitors 
were damaged at lOOV/m at a pulse repetition frequency of 1 kHz and a pulse width of 
0.5 ms (50%) duty cycle, the centre frequency appears to be 140 MHz. The card reader 
was disturbed at 80V/m using the 1.3 GHz MTF, the upset type was to 'lock out' users 
[Backstrom, 2002].
For the motor vehicle (a 1993 model) it was observed that engine stopping occurred at 
500 V/m at 1.3 GHz to 3 GHz with a 5 (is pulse width and 200 Hz pulse repetition 
frequency. Damage occurred at 15 kV/m (1.3 GHz) and 25 kV/m (2.86 GHz). Damaged 
components included engine control units and relays [Backstrom, 1999]. General 
observations by Backstrom include:
o System susceptibility effects are more prominent for HPM in the 1 to 3 GHz 
region than the 5 to 15 GHz region
o Upset in the 1 to 3 GHz region starts to occur around a few hundred V/m 
(theoretically evaluated at 300 V/m)
o Permanent damage in the 1 to 3 GHz region starts to occur at 15 to 25 kV/m 
o Permanent damage can occur with the system turned off (un-powered)
o Damage to Telecommunications receiver components (Front door coupling) at 
field strength of 2kV/m
Backstrom uses the 300 V/m (upset) and 15 kV/m (damage) values as a benchmark for 
system susceptibility to microwave Hypoband type waveforms. However, it must be 
assumed that these magnitudes are only valid for the modulation scheme and the 
particular test configuration used.
Nitsch, has evaluated the susceptibility of Logic devices, Micro-controllers, computer 
Motherboards, computer systems and networks. Hyperband (UWB), EMP, and 
Hypoband waveforms have been generated although specific details of the generator
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system are not provided. The Hyperband and EMP tests have taken place in a TEM 
waveguide, E-Field strengths of 50 kV/m for EMP and 100 kV/m for the Hyperband 
waveform were achieved. The Hypoband tests appear to have taken place in a 
reverberation chamber where the maximum field achievable is 4 kV/m. As stated 
previously the most interesting data for this study is that for computer systems and 
networks. The computer systems appear to have been tested to Hyperband waveforms 
only. Three different specifications of computer system (386 25 MHz, 485 33 MHz, and 
486 66 MHz) were tested. However, the hard disk for these systems was removed for the 
test and an external cable was attached to monitor the Direct Memory Access (DMA) 
controller and Programmable Interval Timer (PIT) module. This cable is likely to have 
violated any EM shielding provided by the system enclosure.
The upset criteria are not precisely defined but appear to relate to incorrect program 
function after interrogation. The upset threshold (Nitsch uses the term breakdown 
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Table 9: Minimum radiated susceptibility threshold of computers after Nitsch et al
This data appears to indicate that the more modern systems are more susceptible to the 
Hyperband threat. However, it is very unclear whether the computers evaluated for this 
study were complete systems (i.e. whether the computer motherboard was within an 
enclosure).
For the computer networks study only the cable was illuminated with the EM stress with 
the computer terminal systems effectively screened using absorber walls. This situation is 
very unlikely to occur in a realistic scenario since the systems connected to the network 
will be at least partially illuminated. The results of the minimum upset thresholds for 
various conditions are as shown in Table 10.
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Table 10: Minimum radiated susceptibility threshold of networks after Nitsch et al
Again the actual repetition rate at upset is not given. However, it is stated that the number 
of lost frames increases linearly with increasing repetition frequency. The range of 
repetition frequencies available is 1 Hz to 200 Hz [Mojert, 2001]. It was also observed 
that shielded network cable types, Shielded Twisted Pairs (STP) offer more protection 
than unshielded types.
In another study [Nitsch, 2005] Nitsch evaluated the susceptibility of complete computer 
systems to EMP and Hyperband, again with the TEM simulator. Table 11 provides a 
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Table 11: Minimum radiated susceptibility threshold of computers to HEMP and UWB after
Nitsch et al
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Nitsch points out that the effective susceptibility threshold of the SUT's is affected by the 
pulse characteristics of the waveform. Indeed the susceptibility threshold for the fast 
risetime, narrow pulse width Hyperband pulse is lower in all cases than the susceptibility 
threshold for the slower rise time longer duration BMP pulses. This is perhaps counter 
intuitive since the effective energy in the Hyperband pulse is much less than that of the 
BMP pulse. However, it is shown that due to the higher frequency content of the 
Hyperband pulse the waveform couples more energy into the SUT geometry i.e. the 
Hyperband waveform has a higher coupling efficiency for the specific SUT geometry.
Camp, has evaluated the Hyperband waveform susceptibility of micro-controllers and 
different generations of computer motherboards from 8088, 5 MHz technology through 
to Pentium III, 500 MHz technology. The same TEM simulator used by Nitsch was used 
for this research. The general trend observed by Camp is a reduction in the susceptibility 
threshold for the newer technologies, from 21.6 kV/m for the 8085 to 3.2 kV/m for the 
Pentium III. This trend appears to concur with the prediction that as technology moves 
forward devices become more susceptible. However, it should be noted that these tests 
were carried out on exposed motherboards which were not integrated within an 
enclosure. It is well known that containment or shielding is an effective EMC design 
technique which could perhaps mitigate this fact.
Liu Di-Chen et al [Liu Di-Chen, 2003] from Wuhan University in China have conducted 
a radiated susceptibility study of computer systems. The EM disrupter simulator used for 
this study appears to be a lightning impulse generator with the parameters (tr = 2.6 (is, 
tfwhm = 50 (is). The radiating structure appears to be a simple sphere-sphere spark gap. 
The type of computer, age and specification are not provided but the following effects 

















Table 12: Minimum radiated susceptibility threshold of computers to DS alter Liu Di-Chen
et al
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The principal conclusions of this paper are:
o The computer case or enclosure offers a fair degree of shielding to the system 
o The field penetration is primarily through the mains cable or through apertures 
o Upset is much more likely to occur than damage
Hagbae Kim et al [Hagbae Kirn, 2000] have studied the effects on computer systems 
which are part of an unspecified real time industrial control process. In this instance the 
computer is used to receive and process sensor inputs and thereby modify the operation 
of the control process. It is well known that standard off the shelf computer systems are 
now widely used for a variety of control functions from Nuclear reactors to sewage 
processing plants. The experimental investigation took place in a reverberation chamber, 
where the entire control system was illuminated. It was observed that upsets occurred at 
low levels at 525 MHz and 550 MHz, frequencies corresponding with the harmonic 
length of the control cable. The susceptibility levels are difficult to interpret since they 
are in terms of the power used to drive the chamber and the probability of upset. 
However, the principal effects observed by Kim are temporary transient functional upsets 
leading to closed loop errors.
All of the studies above have attempted to assess the system level susceptibility from 
available sources and simulators. There appears to have been no effort or at least none 
revealed in maximising the efficiency of the susceptibility process by developing 
optimised waveforms. However, one recent study [Jeffrey, 2004] has attempted to 
optimise disruption to Ethernet network traffic. Jeffrey et al introduces the concept of 
Hardware Invariant Protocol Disruptive Interference (HIPDI). As the name suggests the 
aim is to develop an efficient protocol disrupter which is not influenced by the hardware 
(terminal equipment and cabling). By analysing the fundamental operating frequencies of 
100BaseTX Ethernet the authors of the paper identified critical frequencies and 
modulation schemes which optimise the degradation of the network traffic. This 
approach has perhaps more similarity with EW jamming techniques. It was found that 
specifically for Unshielded Twisted Pair (UTP) - Category 5 cable running 100BaseTX 
Ethernet the frequencies 33, 65, 72 and 86MHz, using 100% 15kHz square wave AM 
modulation were the most efficient at causing degradation of the network traffic. 
However, It should be pointed out that the experiment considered differential mode 
illumination (where the individual wires of the cable were split out) and illuminated in an
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optimum configuration. The authors point out that the more realistic scenario is common 
mode illumination (where the whole cable is illuminated) and where the efficiency will 
be strongly influenced by the coupling efficiency of the cable and the common mode to 
differential mode conversion loss. Still, this paper represents a higher level of 
sophistication above the other susceptibility studies discussed since there has clearly 
been an attempt to optimise the waveform parameters.
2.4.2 Conducted Disrupter Effects
There is very limited data available on system upset levels from conducted transients. 
There is some susceptibility data at the sub system level for older systems [Vick, 1997], 
[Lutz, 1992] However, modern system level susceptibility is of more relevance to this 
study as discussed earlier. Two separate groups have published limited system level 
conducted susceptibility data.
Metatech Corp. in the US [Radasky, 2001] used an EFT generator to inject pulses onto 
the mains cable of a Pentium specification computer. It was found that 2 kV was 
sufficient to cause disruption (effectively in the form of network denial of service). The 
source or load impedance is not given but the data quotes an associated current of 11 
Amps giving an associated impedance of 180 Q. The associated peak power for the EFT 
pulse is 22 kW at the 2 kV susceptibility level assuming a line impedance of 180 Q.
Another study was conducted by the Naval Surface Warfare Centre, also in the US. The 
data here is more limited but for this test a Repetitive Random Square wave Pulse 
Generator (R2SPG) was used to inject on the mains lead of an Advanced Technology 
(AT) specification computer system. It was found that 13.4 Amps peak to peak was 
sufficient to cause disruption in the form of 'latch-up' of the computer. The source or 
load impedance for this experiment is not given. Both of the experiments above were 
conducted by injecting on the mains lead of the computer in very close proximity (less 
than 1m) from the SUT. The associated peak power for the R2SPG pulse is 32 kW, 
assuming a line impedance of 180 Q, as before, most of the energy is located at 3.5 MHz
There appears to be no open source data providing details of system upset via cable 
injection or other conducting channels, within realistic scenarios i.e. injection on an 
actual installation.
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2.4.3 Disrupter Effects Summary
From the above discussion and the discussion from Section 2.3.3.1 concerning 
susceptibility of information type systems it is possible to draw the following 
conclusions:
o System level effects are complex and manifest in many ways. The information 
system function (i.e. how it is used and what it is used for) will have a profound 
effect on the overall impact of the disrupter
o Although the effect varies in severity (temporary upset through to damage) the 
severity appears to be broadly correlated to the magnitude of the stress
o The magnitude of the electric field is not a metric by itself which can be used to 
describe the susceptibility threshold of the system since different disruptor 
waveform parameters (for example Hypoband verses Hyperband) require wildly 
different E-field magnitudes for upset of similar systems
o There is not a sufficient amount of independently corroborated effects data to 
make firm conclusions about upset and damage levels
The system level effects discussed above have been evaluated in simulated environments 
and not related to 'real world' scenarios i.e. the impact of the installation for example has 
not been considered. However, it is also not practical, possible or even desirable to 
conduct realistic 'real world' EM susceptibility investigations.
Even though simulated and controlled investigations have been conducted it appears that 
it was always necessary to modify the system configuration to conduct the investigation. 
It is well known within the EMC community that the uncertainty or inaccuracy of even a 
well controlled susceptibility type investigation can be as large as ± 6 dB [Lab34, 2002] 
(i.e. for a measured susceptibility threshold of 300 V/m the actual susceptibility threshold 
could lie anywhere between 150 V/m and 600 V/m).
2.5 Open Source Accounts of Disruptor Action
Qualified accounts in the open literature describing the effective use of EM disruptors on 
electronic systems in realistic scenarios are almost non existent. However, as discussed in 
the introduction there are many factual accounts of disruption to electronic systems from 
what could be termed as unintentional disruptors such as the Forestall disaster.
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Unintentional disrupters are high power EM systems, such as Radar, RF broadcast 
transmitters, and natural phenomena such as Lightning.
Schwartau gives a very vivid but undoubtedly fictional account of an EM disrupter 
scenario in his book 'Information Warfare - Chaos on the electronic superhighway'. In 
this account a US Navy aircraft fitted with a microwave Hypoband (HPM) disrupter 
downs another aircraft which refuses to respond to radio communication, in the air. 
Given the proximities involved the disrupter is much more likely to catastrophically 
affect the host Navy aircraft (known as fratricide) than any aircraft at range. Schwartau, 
does however point out a unique feature of the disrupter phenomena, that of 'plausible 
deniability' of use.
Many accounts highlight the alleged use of an 'HPM Bomb' by the US military, to defeat 
an Iraqi Radar during operation Desert Storm in January 1991. These accounts are 
perhaps misinterpreted from reports concerning the widespread use of High speed 'anti 
radiation' missiles (HARM) such as the AGM-88, which can 'lock on' to radar and other 
RF emissions [Isby, 1999]. The warhead is a conventional explosive device.
Another account relates to US and NATO use of an BMP or HERF weapon during the 
Serbian conflict of 1999. This disruptor was allegedly used to disable Serbian 
communications and create power outages. Again, it is probable that this story is a 
misinterpretation of reports referring to the first use of special 'soft bombs'. These are 
based on the BLU-114/B which simply dispensed carbon filaments shorting out overhead 
power lines [Bender, 1999]. To add to the confusion both of these forms of weapon have 
been termed by the military as 'electronic attack' where this relates more to the target of 
the attack rather than the weapon type.
Schriener, a contributor to the US Senate Joint Economic Committee hearings on RFW 
publicly demonstrated his Low Tech TED disruptor on US National television [Sawyer, 
1999], and other demonstrations have also apparently taken place at INFOWARCON 
'99. During these demonstrations a variety of systems have been targeted. These 
demonstrations on the whole are fairly unconvincing since they are clearly conducted at 
short ranges (a few metres), in line of sight of the disruptor and it is possible that some 
victim pre-selection may have also taken place.
There are several unconfirmed accounts of instances where disrupters have been used 
against civil systems [The Sunday Times, 1996], [Rosenberg, 1997]. The Times article
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indicates that disrupters were used to blackmail a UK financial institution. However, the 
wording in this article is obscure and could perhaps refer to a more conventional 'cyber' 
threat.
Another account alludes to the use of an EM disruptor to effect gambling machines 
(called Pachinko machines) by a Japanese criminal group. Allegedly a suitcase based 
microwave disruptor was placed next to the pachinko machine, which caused the 
machine to pay out. Apparently the perpetrator was eventually caught [CSSC, 2004]. 
Most of the evidence appears to be anecdotal and even if the story is factual the 
perpetrator was in very close proximity (possibly in contact) with the victim system.
Clear, convincing and documented evidence of disruptor action and effects has not been 
obtained to date. It is speculated that this is likely to be in part due to a lack of awareness 
of this form of threat and a lack of deployed detection systems.
2.6 EM Disruption verses Cyber Denial of Service (DoS)
From the above it is perhaps apparent that EM disruption is comparable with cyber type
DoS attacks, such as SYN Flood or SYN Ack attacks.
From the cyber DoS attackers' point of view:
o The equipment required to mount a DoS attack is simply the hackers own 
computer perhaps with some freeware or custom software
o A network can be attacked from a great distance perhaps even from the other side 
of the world. The attack can be considered to be in band i.e. via internet, wireless, 
or wired connections
o The victim of the attack will be a corporate network or perhaps a web site 
o A good hacker will know if the attack has been successful
o To launch a Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack the lone hacker must cooperate with 
other hackers or enlist 'zombie' computer slaves
o The effect on the network is non permanent, the network is recoverable once the 
attack is identified and the channel is closed or filtered
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For an EM disruptor:
o The equipment required to mount an EM disruptor DoS attack is fairly 
sophisticated, requires a level of expertise to build together with facilities for 
manufacture
o For an effective DoS attack the EM disruptor has to be in proximity (excluding 
HEMP) to the victim system. The proximity depends on many factors such as the 
capability of the disruptor source and the level of attenuation offered by the 
installation (see Appendix A, Section 6.3). The attack is out of band, propagation 
of the threat to the victim is either through the ether (radiated) or via any 
conductors
o All types of electronics can be affected by the attack for example electronic access 
systems, fire alarm systems, and environmental control systems. These could 
essentially produce a DoS type effect
o The uncertainty in causing the desired DoS effect is high and the perpetrator will 
likely have no sensation of whether the attack was successful
o The HEMP threat whilst extremely technically sophisticated could produce a very 
large scale DDoS attack
o The effect can be permanent if damage occurs at least until damaged components 
are found and replaced
2.7 Features of Disruptor based Threats
Given the above discussions it is clear that electrical and electronic systems could 
malfunction as a result of applied EM stress from a disruptor. This form of threat is 
clearly of concern to the availability of information, where information bearing systems 
or their supporting infrastructure could be upset or damaged.
From the victim information systems perspective, a disruptor system can be: 
o Invisible or at least remote 
o Insidious 
o Indiscriminate
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o Non lethal to humans
Crucially, a user of information systems hardware which is subjected to EM disruptor 
action is unlikely to have any sensation or perception of the EM stress even at 
magnitudes exceeding RF exposure guidelines for human health [Heynick, 1996]. The 
user is perhaps more likely to blame faulty hardware, software or manual error, rather 
than an external EM influence. There is some evidence to suggest that certain individuals 
can 'hear' modulated microwaves and that others may be 'hyper-sensitive' to EM stress 
but the exact cause is inconclusive.
The effect of the disruption on the victim information system is: 
o Unconventional




The overall impact of the effect and therefore the risk posed by disrupters depends on the 
information system function.
It should be noted that from the perpetrators perspective a potential disadvantage in the 
remote use of an EM disruptor is that there may not be remote indication of whether an 
attack was successful. Another risk from the perpetrators perspective is that of fratricide, 
i.e. the use of the disruptor may upset or damage the perpetrators own electrical or 
electronic equipment. This is particularly relevant to the mobile scenario since the mobile 
platform could cease functioning unless hardened against the fratricidal effects.
2.8 Mitigation/Countermeasures
Mitigation measures for disrupters can vary from a simple extrapolation from standard 
EMC techniques such as shielding and filtering to more rigorous and therefore costly 
approaches [Kopp, 1997]. In principle shielding and filtering can be employed at any 
level of the system from component through to infrastructure. In the simplest sense this 
involves controlling points of entry. Other techniques employed can include:
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o Zoning of systems
o The use of fibre optics to replace copper cables thus removing potential coupling 
paths
o Shielding
o Good electrical earth bonding [Rawson, 1997]
o Fitting of Transient Voltage Surge Suppressors (TVSS), Metal Oxide Varistors, or 
Gas discharge tubes, to suppress high level transients on cables [Lee, 1993]
o Filtering power and communications lines
o Designing in hardening at the system design stage
o Using software techniques such as fault trapping, maskable interrupts, and 
watchdogs [Coulson, 1998]
Implementation of a physical security barrier or some form of non electronic perimeter 
control together with appropriate filtering would also be very effective since the 
magnitude of the disruptor stress waveform diminishes with distance from the source. It 
should be noted that many of these mitigation measures would provide some protection 
from the EM interceptor threat discussed in Section 2.2 through reciprocity.
One area of particular concern however, is the protection of electronics from front door 
coupling and in particular RF receiver electronics. There have been some very recent 
studies which appear to be starting to address this problem for Hyperband (UWB) 
disrupters [Krzikalla, 2004], BMP [Kaelin, 2004], and Hypoband (HPM) [Jonsson, 
2004]. This is of particular relevance to INFOSEC because of the widespread 
proliferation of wireless devices.
Methods for the detection and forensic investigation of an EM disruptor based attack do 
not appear to exist in the open literature.
2. 9 EM Disruptor Analysis
The aim of this section is to analyse the threat potential of EM disrupters based on the
information gleaned from the open source literature discussed above.
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2.9.1 Analysis of Radiated EM Disrupters
RFM sources will not be considered in this analysis because real data do not appear in 
the open literature. This is possibly because of the technical complexity of effectively 
radiating the output from RFM systems or because of the constraints on prime power or 
packaging into a deliverable system. The operational concept or deployment scenario for 
RFM systems is also difficult to grasp since many of the advantages of EM disrupters 
(insidiousness, remoteness, plausible deniability, non lethality) would be negated by the 
use of an explosively driven system.
Another claim for RFM is that shielding is defeated by the explosive action allowing the 
EM disruption to penetrate EM hardened enclosures. However, since the blast 
shockwave travels close to the speed of sound and the EM wave front will arrive at the 
target/victim at close to the speed of light this concept is invalid except perhaps for a 
multiple RFM strike. These factors probably limit the use of such devices to NSA, but 
most probably war fighting applications.
This analysis will also not consider data for the HEMP threat. This is primarily because 
the perpetrator is required to have a very high level of technical expertise and nuclear 
warhead and ballistic missile technology in order to generate an effective HEMP 
waveform. HEMP will have a catastrophic effect on infrastructure. HEMP is therefore a 
very low probability event with infrastructure wide implications which will be excluded 
from further system level analysis.
It is clear from the discussion concerning published radiated susceptibility testing of 
computer systems that the actual susceptibility level is much greater than the EMC 
immunity level for the equipment. This immunity is provided through compliance with 
the EMC directive (nominally 3V/m for non industrial applications over a limited 
frequency range). It is also apparent that the modulation and disrupter waveform type 
have a bearing on the susceptibility level.
From the discussions in earlier sections (and those provided in Appendix A) it is clear 
that the uncertainties involved in the propagation, coupling, and upset of electronic 
systems is very large. Still it is useful to have a benchmark which somehow describes the 
effectiveness of EM disrupters. In order to generate a benchmark the open source data for 
sources will be compared with the open source data for effects.
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Backstrom presents a very succinct set of tables to estimate the 'distance of action' for 
Hypoband disruptor threats. 'HPM Weapon' is taken to refer to a state of the art 
Hypoband disruptor and the term 'HPM sabotage' is taken to refer to the use of Low 
Tech Hypoband disruptor. The tables are based on many Hypoband tests of cars, 
computers and general 'un-shielded' (i.e. no special protection measures) electronic 




























Table 13: Estimated distance of action for State of the art Hypoband disrupters adapted from
Backstrom et al


























Table 14: Estimated distance of action for Low Tech Hypoband disruptors adapted from
Backstrom et al.
* May cause permanent functional damage
These tables are useful and are based on real effects data. However, the following stated 
assumptions are used to derive the distances.
o The upset and damage thresholds are based on peak values obtained using the 
specific modulations of the Swedish MTF sources (300 V/m and 15 kV/m 
respectively)
o The antenna gain is taken from a reflector antenna with 1 m diameter (gain 25 dB 
approx.)
o The HPM Van appears to be based on a 10 MW radar transmitter
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o The HPM suitcase could actually be a Mesoband source
Clearly given the earlier discussions (Table 5 and Table 6) the source power quoted in 
Backstrom's tables represents an extrapolation of around an order of magnitude in the 
present capability of state of the art and Low Tech sources.
In order to evaluate the range effectiveness of the state of the art and Low Tech sources 
evaluated in this study a similar set of tables will be developed.
The most complete (i.e. where most parameters are known) system susceptibility data 
from earlier has been used to develop the graph of Figure 20. This graph shows the 
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Figure 20: Minimum upset threshold for disruption computer systems as a function of peak
field strength
Table 15 shows the minimum upset and damage thresholds for each disrupter class in 















Table 15: Minimum Radiated susceptibility upset threshold for computer systems derived
from open source data
There is no data for system damage from Hyperband waveforms this is probably because 
the damage threshold is either exemplified by very high peak field strengths (100's of 
kV/m) or because there is insufficient energy within the narrow pulse to cause damage.
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It appears from this graph and table that Hyperband (UWB) and Mesoband (DS) are far 
less effective than Hypoband (HPM) waveforms however, this is an incorrect conclusion 
since we know that peak E-field strength by itself is not purely deterministic of upset and 
damage.
It has been shown that perhaps a more effective, but not comprehensive, means of 
expressing the output of EM Disrupters (RFDEW) is to use the terms peak and average 
power flux density (expressed in terms of W/m2) [Nielsen, 1994]. The power density 
describes the amount of energy per second delivered to the system over an equivalent 
area (see Appendix A, Section 6.2.1). The average power density is calculated by de- 





Where Save is the average power density in Watts per metre squared
E is the peak electric field required for an effect in Volts per metre
Z0 is the free space impedance (120rc) in Ohms
And duty cycle is a dimensionless function of the pulse width (seconds) 
multiplied by the repetition frequency (Hz)
These equations have been used to derive the upset threshold in terms of the effective 
average power density (Save). Figure 21 presents the same data as Figure 20 but this time 
in terms of effective average power density.
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Figure 21: Minimum upset threshold for disruption computer systems as a function of
average power density
This figure shows the minimum effective average power density required for upset for 
computer systems using available data. The Hyperband (UWB) waveform now appears 
to be more efficient than the Hypoband (HPM) disruptor types, a reversal of the earlier 
peak E-field analysis. This interpretation of effectiveness could be more realistic since it 
is known that the coupling efficiency for Hyperband waveforms is much greater than 
Hypoband waveforms because of the very broad instantaneous bandwidth of the 
Hyperband pulse.
It should be noted that the Mesoband (DS) data has a high uncertainty component since 
the source drive parameters have been used to derive the upset thresholds rather than the 
radiated waveform parameters.
Table 16 shows the minimum upset and damage thresholds for each disruptor class in 















Table 16: Minimum Radiated susceptibility upset threshold for computer systems in terms of
average power density
The data of Table 16 can be used as benchmarks for upset thresholds for computer 
systems for each of the different waveform types.
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The same average power density equivalence approach as that taken for the effects data 
can be applied to the disrupter source data presented in Table 5 and Table 6. A reduced 

































Table 17: Maximum far field equivalent average power density for Low Tech and state of the
art sources
(i) For derivation of this term see Appendix A, Section 6.4.4
This table represents the maximum average power density produced by each disruptor 
class. The maximum was found by considering both the peak voltage (r. Efar) value and 
the modulation type. Further, the maximum achievable pulse width and p.r.f, were 
selected to form the duty cycle factor although it is known that in some cases that this 
cannot occur due to prime power limitations. Burst length limitations have also been 
ignored.
Some of the state of the art sources (especially Orion and the MTF) are clearly not 
feasibly deployable as mobile systems. However, an assumption has been made that 
these systems could be deployed as mobile systems in the near future. These systems 
have therefore been classed as mobile systems in the table above. Given these 
assumptions the data presented in Table 17 represents a realistic prediction of the 
maximum power density which could be produced by disruptor sources.
Based on these assumptions the following estimates of the free space (see Appendix A, 
Section 6.2.1) effective range, Table 18 through to Table 22 have been calculated.
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Table 19: Predicted free space line of sight effective range of Low Tech Hyperband EM
disrupter systems
















Table 20: Predicted free space line of sight effective range of state of the art Hypoband EM
disruptor systems
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Table 21: Predicted free space line of sight effective range of state of the art Hyperband EM
disrupter systems




















Table 22: Predicted free space line of sight effective range of state of the art Mesoband EM
disruptor systems
It can be seen from this simplified analysis that mobile Low Tech disrupters are likely to 
be able to upset computer type systems at free space line of sight ranges up to a few 
hundred metres whereas mobile state of the art disrupters are likely to upset computer 
systems at several kilometres.
Clearly and rather obviously Low Tech sources have a lower effective range than state of 
the art sources. As stated previously it is expected that terrorist or criminal perpetrators 
will have a capability between the two capability extremes (Low Tech and State of the 
art). Damage seems to be a very unlikely consequence of disruptor action especially for 
back door effects discussed here.
These estimated maximum effective distances require strong qualification since many 
assumptions have used in their development. Some of these assumptions and sources of 
uncertainty are listed below:
o The magnitude of the coupling efficiency of the victim computer system is not 
known and it is not possible to quantify the bounds on coupling efficiency from 
the data given. However it has been shown (see Appendix A, Section 6.5) that the
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coupling efficiency for a victim system reduces by 20 dB/decade change in 
frequency outside of the systems resonance region. This represents a reduction in 
effective range by a factor of 100 for disrupter sources when the resonant region is 
not know.
o The inherent uncertainty in measurement of peak E-field and modulation ( at least 
± 6dB approx. discussed earlier)
o Other contributing uncertainties of the experimental set-up used to derive the 
susceptibility data, such as test set-up, SUT layout and condition, simulator 
repeatability and SUT type/specification
o The metric used for these calculations is the average power density only rather 
than other factors such as the peak field strength. As stated the actual mechanism 
of disruption is very much more complex, Goransson [Goransson, 1999] has seen 
variations at device level of up to 16dB
o This analysis has been based on back door coupling to computer systems and not 
on other electronics systems that form part of information systems infrastructure. It 
has been shown by Backstrom amongst others that for front door coupling damage 
is possible to RF receivers at km ranges. It is possible to speculate that sensors 
which use electronics as the sensing mechanism, such as modern digital imaging 
devices (e.g. CCTV) and many biometric sensors could also be susceptible to front 
door coupling.
o The prediction assumes clear line of sight propagation with no influence from the 
external surroundings. A barrier such as a brick or concrete wall, the interaction of 
reflections from the ground and other structures, or other 
mitigation/countermeasures previously discussed could easily provide an 
attenuation of 10 dB (see Appendix A, Section 6.3). This reduces the predicted 
maximum effective range for mobile Low Tech sources to just a few metres and to 
a couple of hundred metres for mobile state of the art sources. Clearly the amount 
of attenuation offered by installations and indeed the system enclosure is useful for 
understanding margins and further defining the risk posed by EM disrupters.
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o Since the minimum susceptibility values and maximum source values have been 
used the maximum effective range is likely to be less than that stated given the 
coupling efficiency argument amongst others.
These estimates compare fairly favourably with published data including the estimates 
provided by Backstrom if the source extrapolation is taken into account. Still it is 
apparent from the analysis that Low Tech and state of the art disruptors have the 
possibility to be effective either as portable sources at close range to the target/victim i.e. 
deployed inside an installation probably within line of sight of the victim, or as mobile 
sources directly adjacent to the installation i.e. within a few metres of the outside of the 
installation.
2.9.2 Analysis of Conducted Disruptors
The analysis of conducted disruptive threats is more complex than the radiated case
[Mansson, 2007]. This is because:
o The attenuation, ambient noise, impedance and propagation characteristics of the 
propagation channel (cable type etc.) are very complex
o There is very limited susceptibility data available 
o There is very limited disrupter source data available
For these reasons a series of experiments are necessary to explore the conducted 
disrupter propagation path and this is outside of the scope of this thesis.
2.9.3 EM Disrupter Summary
A potted history of the developmental routes of EM disruptor technology has been 
provided. There has been an attempt to capture all of the various terms related to classes 
of disruptors and to describe the key parameters of the different classes.
EM disruptor source technologies from components to complete systems have been 
discussed. It has been shown that the disruptor can be of the radiated type (i.e. uses an 
antenna) or of the conducted type (i.e. injection onto cables) although the latter case 
appears to be less mature.
The term Low Tech has been used to describe the typical capability of a well funded 
amateur, hobbyist or hacker with access to commercially available components and some
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workshop space. The term state of the art has been used to describe the capability of 
National Government research departments with all available resource and state of the art 
facilities.
Further, it is expected that the technical capability of other adversaries such as criminals, 
terrorists, and NSA's will lie somewhere between these extremes. It is clear from the 
discussions that all of the essential components and even complete EM disrupter systems 
are available for the Low Tech perpetrator.
Four deployment scenarios: Man portable, mobile, fixed and deliverable have been 
considered. However, portable and mobile systems have been the focus of analysis 
because most data was available for these types.
There is some limited open source data on the susceptibility and effects of EM disrupters 
on information systems and this has been summarised. Upset mechanisms and effects are 
very difficult to quantify and compare leading to a very high degree of uncertainty. The 
manifestation of the upset is also complex which means an effect is not selectable, and 
there is a high dependence on the system function. It is suggested that the technical 
complexity and security implications of gathering and presenting this information 
probably impede the spread of knowledge.
Qualitative analysis has shown that the maximum effective range is therefore very 
difficult to quantify and is dependant on many uncertain factors as discussed. However it 
has been shown that the likely maximum clear line of sight effective range for radiated 
Low Tech disrupters is less than that for the equivalent state of the art disrupter. It has 
also been shown that the estimated distances would be severely reduced by surrounding 
structures amongst other factors.
Still it is apparent from the analysis that Low Tech and state of the art disrupters have the 
possibility to be effective either as portable sources at close range to the victim, i.e. 
deployed inside an installation probably within line of sight of the victim or as mobile 
sources directly adjacent to the installation i.e. within a few metres of the outside of the 
installation.
System damage seems to be a very unlikely consequence of radiated disrupter action for 
back door effects but perhaps more likely at short ranges for in band front door effects to 
RF receivers and electronics sensors. These facts are confirmed in the open literature.
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Conventional mitigation/countermeasures are probably effective at reducing the likely 
effective range of the sources discussed although experimentation and further analysis 
are necessary. Specific methods for the detection and evidence collection of an EM 
disrupter based threat do not appear to exist in the public domain. There is clearly 
insufficient data to develop a specification for an EM disrupter IDS.
Clear, convincing and documented evidence of disrupter action and effects in 'real 
world' scenarios has not been found to date. This is likely to be in part due to a lack of 
awareness of this form of threat, and a lack of deployed detection systems. Undoubtedly 
though, the potential impact to information security could be just as catastrophic as 
classical 'cyber'/ CNA type threats and other physical threats.
2.10 Stage I - Summary
It has been shown that the Electromagnetic (EM) spectrum can be used to exploit the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information systems. Whilst this is clearly the 
case EM threats are not explicitly considered in the INFOSEC guidelines.
This study has sought to define EM threat types and the effectiveness of the threats in 
order to assess the risk to INFOSEC. Accordingly three broad classes of the EM threat 
have been considered and discussed, these are:
o Electronic Warfare - A threat to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information systems by exploiting the intentional communications channel
o EM Interceptors - Which potentially pose a threat to the confidentiality of 
information systems by exploiting intentional and unintentional RF emissions
o EM Disrupters - Which potentially pose a threat to the availability of information 
systems by exploiting victim electronics susceptibility to high level EM 
interference via intentional and unintentional RF reception
From reviewing the literature it is clear that the discussion concerning the risks to 
INFOSEC from EM threats are centred on several factors. These factors were given in 
the introduction and are reproduced here together with qualifying evidence statements.
/. Our reliance and dependence on information infrastructures
Undoubtedly, we have become reliant on information infrastructures or more precisely 
the electronic systems containing micro-electronic components which facilitate the
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modern information infrastructure. The potential vulnerability that this reliance creates is 
not exclusive to EM threats.
2. The availability of components and the simplicity of constructing systems capable 
of launching effective EM attacks at all adversarial levels
For interceptor based threats it has been shown that detection of emissions is relatively 
simple. However, very sophisticated techniques, relatively sophisticated instrumentation, 
victim system intelligence, and a great deal of technical skill and patience are required to 
recover the information. Given these findings it is likely that only the most adept with the 
best resources could mount a successful interceptor attack. Interceptors have some 
commonalities with the cyber war driving threat.
For disruptor based threats it is clear that components and even complete systems are 
readily available. A scale of increasing capability of the perpetrator from Low Tech 
through to state of the art has been assigned and discussed. All of the essential 
components and even complete systems are available for the Low Tech perpetrator. The 
effects of disruptor attacks have some commonalities with 'cyber' DoS attacks.
3. The increased vulnerability of information infrastructures primarily through the 
use of technology
For EM interceptor based threats it has been shown that at close range (tens of metres) 
detection and reconstruction of intercepted emissions from both modern (post EMC 
directive) digital and analogue display systems is possible, even within an office 
environment where there are a number of systems of similar types polluting the 
spectrum. It has been shown that modern digital display systems are perhaps more 
vulnerable than older analogue systems.
For EM disruptor based threats there is limited data on the susceptibility of information 
systems and a great deal of variability or uncertainty concerning upset mechanisms. This 
makes susceptibility and effects data very difficult to quantify and compare. The 
manifestation of the upset has also been shown to be complex with a high dependence on 
the system function. Depending on the system function, upset of electronics can 
undoubtedly lead to catastrophic consequences. Many authors assert that as technology 
advances with higher speed microelectronic devices operating at ever lower voltage 
levels that systems will become more vulnerable to EM disruptor action. Whilst these 
technology trends are true, supporting evidence which mirrors this trend in system level
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susceptibility is scarce. The increasing susceptibility argument is clouded by the inherent 
uncertainties in gathering the data as discussed.
4. The inadequacy of existing protection measures and the lack of detection devices
Whilst it is true that INFOSEC practices do not explicitly consider EM threats many of 
the measures proposed for protection from cyber and physical threats will provide some 
benefit in protecting systems from EM threats. The introduction of EMC directives 
provides some basic protection since it mandates minimisation of emissions below a 
certain threshold and that systems should have some immunity from EM interference.
It has been shown that there are many mitigation or countermeasure types which are 
routinely available and that these measures are likely to be very effective. However, 
applying protection for protections sake is not a cost effective option. Understanding and 
balancing risk is a central theme for INFOSEC management.
The use of EM threat detection systems (in concept similar to Cyber IDS) could be a 
useful first step in providing awareness and understanding the risk to INFOSEC from 
EM threats. These detection systems could be used to identify where to apply protection 
measures in a cost effective manner effectively acting as a de-risking element. The 
deployment of EM threat detectors could be a useful first step towards a 
diagnosis/forensic aid for EM attacks. Specific methods for the detection and evidence 
collection of EM threats do not appear to exist in the public domain. There is clearly 
insufficient open source data to develop a specification for an EM threat IDS.
5. The insidious remote and covert nature and the effectiveness of EM threats
For an EM interceptor threat a very unique feature is that it will be invisible to the 
information system which is the victim of the attack. Those in rightful possession of 
confidential information will have no knowledge or sensation that the confidentiality has 
been breached perhaps until the information is revealed for surreptitious purposes such as 
blackmail. However, the predicted practical range for Low Tech interceptor attack is only 
considered to be a few tens of metres and very dependent on the capability of the 
perpetrator and the attenuation provided by surrounding structures such as the walls of 
the installation. There are however, several key areas of potential vulnerability which can 
be exploited and these have been discussed.
For EM disrupter threats it is clear that any type of electrical and electronic system could 
potentially malfunction as a result of applied EM stress. Information bearing systems or
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their supporting infrastructure could be upset or damaged (although for the majority of 
systems damage has been shown to be unlikely). The unique features of EM disrupters 
are; insidiousness, unpredictability, indiscriminate, non perceivable by humans, non 
lethal to humans, un-attributable and plausibly deniable.
Whilst there is limited, clear, convincing and documented evidence of disrupter action 
and effects in 'real world' scenarios have not been found to date. It is speculated that this 
is likely to be in part due to a lack of awareness of this form of threat, and a lack of 
deployed EM disruption detection systems.
Analysis has shown that the effectiveness of EM disrupter threats is very difficult to 
quantify and is dependant on many uncertain factors. Still it is apparent from the analysis 
that Low Tech and state of the art disruptors have the possibility to be effective either as 
portable sources at close range to the victim system or as mobile sources directly 
adjacent to the installation.
System damage seems to be a very unlikely consequence of radiated disrupter action for 
back door coupling but perhaps more probable at short ranges for front door coupling to 
RF receivers and other electronic sensors such as biometric sensors.
Undoubtedly, the potential impact to INFOSEC from EM interceptor and disrupter 
threats in general could be just as catastrophic as classical 'cyber'/ CNA type threats.
However, due to the level of complexity it seems clear that only very well resourced 
individuals or groups could mount a successful EM interceptor attack. For this reason 
and for others discussed above and in order to make further studies more manageable the 
bulk of the remaining thesis will concentrate on the radiated disruptor threat only.
The need to further understand the risk to INFOSEC posed by EM disruptor threats is 
evident and the experiments defined in Stage II are therefore necessary in order to prove 
or reject the hypothesis of this study.
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3 Stage II - The EM Susceptibility of 
Information Systems
3.1 Aims and Objectives
The aim of the second stage was to conduct experiments in order to further refine an 
understanding of the threat and to enable the formulation of a specification for EM threat 
detection measures.
Objectives:
o Conduct experiments to assess the radiated susceptibility of computer systems 
o Conduct experiments to assess the radiated susceptibility of computer networks 
o Summarise findings so that detection concepts can be developed
3.2 Radiated Susceptibility Test methods
Susceptibility testing is complex and requires suitable equipment such as signal sources,
amplifiers, antennas and measuring devices, together with a suitable environment to
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produce the radiated stress without affecting the measuring equipment or indeed other 
electronics in the vicinity. Most of the susceptibility tests discussed in Section 2.4 made 
use of a disruptor source or simulator to radiate the system. Usually, this is conducted in 
the open air at facilities which are remote from civilised areas. However, this technique 
has many disadvantages as discussed the main ones being the limited frequency and 
modulation coverage of the simulators and the uncertainty in the measured data.
An alternative technique is to produce the required radiated stress in a more controlled 
environment such as an anechoic chamber or a GTEM cell [IEC 61000-4-3, 2006]. These 
environments are essentially enclosed room like structures with very good shielding 
properties in which the radiating antenna and System Under Test (SUT) is housed. 
Anechoic material known as Radar or Radio Absorbent Material (RAM) is used to 
reduce reflections from the walls of the chamber so that the field from the transmitting 
antenna predominates.
This test configuration is most commonly used for EMC immunity and susceptibility 
testing. However, this technique still has many disadvantages:
o In practice the inaccuracy or more precisely the measurement uncertainty 
associated with the measurement of the stress level on the SUT is still large ±6 dB
o The SUT must be rotated in order to illuminate each side 
o The repeatability is poor
o It is difficult to achieve the high stress levels necessary to induce susceptibility 
using conventional EMC type amplifiers since the RAM absorbs some of the 
radiated power
An alternative and fairly new technique is to use a reverberation chamber [IEC 61000-4- 
21, 2003]. A reverberation chamber is a shielded room or closed cavity similar in 
construction to an anechoic room but without any RAM. This allows for the E field from 
a radiating antenna to reflect around the chamber causing constructive and destructive 
interference. In this way 'hot spots', regions of high peak intensity and 'nulls', regions of 
field cancellation are formed within the chamber. The chamber is equipped with a 
mechanical tuning/stirring device whose dimensions are significant fractions of the 
chamber dimensions. When the chamber is excited with RF energy the resulting multi- 
mode electromagnetic environment can be 'stirred' by the mechanical tuner/stirrer (i.e.
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the hot spots and nulls are circulated around the chamber. A photograph of the QinetiQ 
Large reverberation chamber is shown in Figure 22.
Figure 22: Large Reverberation chamber QinetiQ Farnborough (room H) 
A snap shot of the variation of the spatial field intensity is shown in Figure 23.
Figure 23: Variation of spatial field intensity inside the QinetiQ Farnborough reverberation
chamber (room H)
This 2D image shows regions of varying field intensity with the highest intensity field 
(hot spots) shown as red. The image was captured by placing a heat sensitive film 
(coloured region of the image) within the chamber and viewing the heat induced by the 
RF field via a heat sensitive camera. The images show the effect of four different stirrer 
on the position of the hot spot within the chamber.
Reverberation chambers have a number of advantages for system testing namely:
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i) The field strengths available are much higher per watt of input power than a 
conventional anechoic room or GTEM cell
ii) The peak field strengths at different locations within the room are more 
uniform (time averaged over one paddle/tuner rotation) than is possible whilst 
employing an anechoic chamber/room or GTEM cell
iii) The SUT will be subjected to the peak field levels in a multitude of 
polarisation's and angles of arrival which is prohibitively time intensive in an 
anechoic room or open field test site. It has been argued that this is more 
representative of the true EM environment when the system is within its 
intended operating environment [Borgstrom, 2004] i.e. the radiated field will 
be scattered by conductive objects (such as components of desks tables and 
the building structure including the ground)
iv) All parts or faces of the system will experience the peak field levels over the 
time for one paddle or tuner rotation. Therefore the particular orientation of 
the SUT cables has less bearing on the susceptibility threshold
v) The repeatability is better than conventional anechoic techniques due to time 
averaging which produces a more consistent test method
vi) Most importantly the uncertainty is lower than that of anechoic techniques. 
Some [Arnaut, 1998], [Musso, 2003] have quoted the expanded uncertainty of 
the reverberation technique to be of the order of, ± 1.5 to ±1.8 dB at a 95% 
confidence level
The disadvantages of the reverberation chamber technique are:
i) For mode stirring (i.e. continuous stirrer rotation), the duration that the peak 
field dwells on the SUT can become an important factor if the cycle time of 
the SUT is long
ii) Some authors find it conceptually difficult to relate the susceptibility levels 
recorded using the reverberation method to anechoic, GTEM and open area 
techniques. This is largely because the technique has only very recently been 
accepted by the community
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iii) The size of the smallest dimension of the chamber dictates the lowest usable 
frequency at which the chamber can be used
iv) The pulse risetime which can be used is limited by the Q- factor of the 
chamber this restricts the pulse modulations which can be used
v) The directivity characteristics of the SUT are not preserved. This means that 
the critical illumination angle cannot be revealed and any 'enhancement' in 
SUT coupling efficiency is cancelled out [Freyer, 2000]
Reverberation chambers have been shown to be a useful environment for achieving a 
thoroughness of exposure which is difficult to achieve in practice with any other test 
method.
If further understanding of how a reverberation chamber operates is required then [Hill, 
1998] gives a good overview of the subject.
3.3 Reverberation Chamber Susceptibility Test Configuration 
The QinetiQ reverberation chambers were the main facilities used to provide a 
reproducible EM test environment for susceptibility testing. A photograph of a computer 
under test within the small reverberation chamber is shown in Figure 24.
Figure 24: Computer in the QinetiQ small reverberation chamber (room G)
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The two chambers used have the following dimensions and minimum frequencies8 as 


























Table 23: Chamber dimensions and minimum frequencies
The frequency range selected for the test was 400 MHz to 8 GHz. This was bounded by 
the dimensions of the chamber and test equipment limitations. The frequencies were 
stepped through using automatic frequency selection based upon 100 frequency steps per 
frequency decade, derived by Equation 6.
f = f./(fi+l) Jn ..(Eq. 6)
Where /  is the test frequency and n =1 to 100
// is the start frequency
And is the end frequency
From experience gained during previous tests the speed of the mode stirring paddle 
wheel was set at 3.25 revolutions per minute (rpm). This allows sufficient time for the 
EM field to dwell and upsets to occur if the field strength is sufficient to do so whilst still 
enabling all propagation and coupling modes to be assessed during a single test. The 
cycle time of the computer SUT's is in the order of nanoseconds compared with the 
millisecond dwell time of the peak field.
At each frequency the EM stress was set to some minimum low level well below the 
susceptibility threshold of the SUT. The EM stress was effectively allowed to dwell on 
the SUT for one revolution of the paddle. The magnitude of the electric field was slowly 
increased until an effect on the SUT is observed. The effect level (susceptibility threshold 
level) and susceptibility type were recorded via specially designed control software.
The applied stress in terms of E field can be derived from the following Equation 7:
1 for compliance testing against EMC specification DO160D/EDI4D
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£=?£. IH 
' l H .......(Eq.7)
Where Pr is the ensemble average antenna received power
r\a represents the efficiency of the antenna
and A is the wavelength
For the tests conducted two antenna types were used - a Log Periodic antenna for 
frequencies between 100 MHz and 1 GHz and a double ridged waveguide horn for 
frequencies between 1 GHz and 8 GHz. The Log periodic antenna has a quoted nominal 
efficiency of 0.75 and the horn antenna has a quoted nominal efficiency of 0.9 [DO160D, 
2000]. These factors allow for the calculation of the electric field within the chamber via 
Equation 7.
3.4 Susceptibility Testing of Standalone Computer Systems
3.4.1 Systems Evaluated
The equipment selected for testing comprised of standard commercially available 
computer systems housed in tower or desktop cases. Several models of computer system 
were evaluated from different manufacturers. The particular manufacturer of a computer 
under test has been obscured in order to protect the interests of the manufacturer. These 
particular systems were selected and tested based primarily on availability. Given the 
budgetary limitations and the potential for permanent damage to the SUT only older, 
used equipment was easily obtainable. However the variation of numbers and types 
enables trends to be developed covering variation in susceptibility with specification/age, 
technology type, batch and manufacturer.
A brief summary of the computer specifications evaluated is given in Table 24.
Page 115 of 253








































Table 24: Specifications of the computers evaluated
This table comprises eight separate computer systems. An example specification of the 
manufacturer Brand D computer is: Desktop Case, 667MHz Intel Pentium 3 Processor, 
64MB SDRAM, 10GB HDD, supplied with Windows 98 operating system.
3.4.2 Test Configuration
To have a reproducible EM test environment the computers were placed one at a time 
into the QinetiQ reverberation chamber. This allowed for the SUT to be completely, 
consistently and repeatedly evaluated with every EM illumination angle and polarisation 
covered equally.
The SUT's were tested in accordance with the QinetiQ reverberation chamber work 
instruction [P073, 2001]. Thus each of the SUT's were placed on a 4m long conductive 
test bench installed within the chamber. The 240 V AC mains supply for the computer 
under test was provided via a Line Impedance Stabilisation Network (LISN). The LISN 
provides a standard and consistent value for the mains supply impedance aiding test 
repeatability.
The same monitor, keyboard, mouse and cable layout were used for all computers tested. 
In this way only the differences in susceptibility of the computer main unit were recorded 
allowing a fairer inter-comparison. The peripheral wiring (mouse and keyboard cables) 
for these devices was spaced 50mm above the test bench on Styrofoam blocks so as to 
further enhance test repeatability.
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In order to further improve repeatability the processor and hard disk were set working at 
maximum capacity. Since it is extremely difficult to predict when this will occur in 
normal use the computers were exercised using a specialised test program written using 
Visual Basic. A screen shot of the test programme EMV_101.exe is provided in Figure 
25. This figure illustrates that the test program provided consistent 100% CPU usage.
] Wnda*K NI Tj* Mjoagg jJQgmcttq (Fainbotough)
Figure 25: Screen shot of EMV test program Version 1.01
This software continuously carried out a file read/write process on the hard disk. The 
monitor of the SUT was viewed from the instrumentation/control chamber with a fibre 
optic linked EM hardened CCTV camera so that the performance of the system could be 
assessed without compromising the integrity of the test chamber.
The computers were exposed to a simulated Hypoband (HPM) modulation of 30 (is pulse 
width a 1 kHz p.r.f. This modulation was selected since it was achievable with standard 
EMC amplifiers. In reality this modulation is representative of a typical Radar pulse but 
it has been shown that used radar components are available for the Low Tech perpetrator.
The types of effects observed were various and complex but in all cases the magnitude of 
the stress was increased to a point where manual intervention was required (i.e. where the 
SUT has to be manually reset). If no effects were observed the EM stress level was taken 
to the limit of the amplifier in use and recorded as a 'Pass'.
3.4.3 Susceptibility Criteria / Observed Effects
Computer systems are extremely complex and so are the modes of disruption and the
types of effects observed. Table 25 is a list of effects observed during evaluation.
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Crash with self restart
Shutdown with self 
restart
'Blue Screen'
Crash with manual restart









i-'op up menus, program closures, 
programs moved or deleted
Mouse, monitor or keyboard behave 
erratically
The computer stops processing and 
latches
The computer switches off, and attempts 
to restart without manual intervention
An exception error occurs resulting in the 
customary 'blue screen' error message
The computer stops processing and 
latches
The computer shuts down or switches off 
spontaneously
The computer may crash or shutdown
The computer may crash or shutdown
The computer may crash or shutdown
After Exposure to EM Stress
No Effect
Returns to normal function
Returns to normal function
Desktop function may be altered, missing 
or moved icons
Remove plug to reinitialise or manually 
reboot
The computer starts processing again or a 
soft reset (Ctrl-Alt-Del) is required
Once EM stress removed the computer 
restarts normally. During restart operating 
system detects abnormal shutdown, several 
files may be affected
The system, generally, can be re-booted 
without persistent effect
During restart the operating system detects 
abnormal shutdown, several files may be 
affected
The computer remains non-functional. 
During restart operating system detects 
abnormal shutdown. Several files may be 
affected
Investigation reveals permanent damage to 
a peripheral component i.e. monitor, 
keyboard, mouse etc.
During restart the computer reports a 
failure to find the operating system. Re- 
installation of the operating system cures 
the fault (expected minimum outage 2 
hours)
During restart the computer either fails to 
boot or a critical device such as the hard 
disk malfunctions (expected minimum 
outage 1 day)
Table 25: Observed effects
It is worth re-stating that the severity of the overall impact of the effect is dependent on 
the overall function of the system. For example if a process required precise positioning 
of the mouse pointer e.g. for controlling a crane arm and mouse deflection occurred due 
to the EM stress then the overall effect to the process could be catastrophic. It should also 
be noted that the effect observed at any specific frequency is unpredictable. As the stress 
is increased the effect may change from mouse deflection to shutdown in an 
approximately linear manner but it was equally observed that the first recorded effect 
could be any of those listed.
For the data displayed in the graphs below the susceptibility threshold recorded is 
representative of the cases when manual intervention was required. It was either 
necessary to manually re-start the test software or to carry out a manual soft / hard reboot 
of the computer system.
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3.4.4 Observations and Test Results
3.4.4.1 The susceptibility of a single computer
The graph of Figure 26 shows the susceptibility threshold recorded for the Brand C 486 




D Brand C 486 66MHz
100.0E+6 10.0E+91 .OE+9 
Frequency [Hz]
Figure 26: Susceptibility threshold of a Brand C 486 66 MHz computer
Each point on the graph represents a frequency where an effect requiring manual 
intervention was observed. Frequencies where no effect was observed are not marked. 
Failure to induce an effect only indicates that no effects were observed at the maximum 
output of the amplifier in use.
It can be seen from this graph that the susceptibility threshold increases as the frequency 
increases in the order of approximately 20dB / decade. This indicates that the region of 
highest coupling efficiency is at the lower end of the frequency range tested. As the 
frequency increases both the coupling efficiency and rectification efficiency are 
decreasing leading to an increase in the susceptibility threshold. In practical terms this 
means that a disrupter source operating at the 400 MHz end of the frequency range 
would be more effective than one of the same efficiency operating at 8 GHz for this SUT.
Consider the susceptibility threshold graph of the Brand I PIV 1.4GHz computer, Figure 
27.
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Brand I PIV 1,4GHz
100.0E+6 1 .OE+9 
Frequency [Hz]
10.OE+9
Figure 27: Susceptibility threshold of a Brand I PIV 1.4 GHz computer
It can be seen from this graph that there are greater regions where the effect requiring 
manual intervention was not achievable with the amplifiers used (no data points) 
particularly between 1.4 and 2 GHz. In general the susceptibility threshold is also higher 
than the Brand C 486 66 MHz computer.
3.4.4.2 The impact of batch variation on susceptibility
Three brand D Pentium 3 667MHz computers were procured simultaneously and tested 
consecutively. These computers appeared to be identical via visual inspection although 
the serial numbers were non-consecutive. The graph in Figure 28 shows the actual data 
taken for three nominally identical computers.
10000
10 
100.0E+6 1 OE+9 
Frequency [Hz]
10 OE+9
Figure 28: Susceptibility threshold of three same brand and specification computers
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Examples of the specific types of effect experienced are listed below:
o At frequencies between 1 and 1.25 GHz the most common failure mode was found 
to be computer shutdown with self restart/re-boot
o At frequencies above 1.25 GHz the most common failure mode was found to be 
computer crash with manual restart required
o Mouse deflection was observed intermittently and at lower field strength levels 
than the other failure modes
o Some minor monitor effects were observed below 1.5 GHz
o A definite increase in susceptibility (i.e. lowering of the susceptibility threshold) 
were observed around 2 GHz
In order to clarify the trends contained within the graph curve fitting was used to develop 
simple trend lines. Figure 29 shows different curve fitting options for the data set 
together with the curve fitting equation and the R2 correlation value.
10000 ^---777777777










Figure 29: Susceptibility threshold of three same brand and specification computers, raw data 
with different curve fits trend superimposed
(a) Linear curve fit R2 = 0.8379
(b) Power curve fit R2 = 0.6723
(c) 2nd Order polynomial curve fit R2 = 0.8379
(d) Exponential curve fit R2 = 0.7341
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The R2 value is the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient through the given 
data points. A value close to 1 represents very good correlation between the fitted curve 
and the data set and a value of 0 represents very poor correlation.
From this data it can be seen that the linear and 2nd order polynomial curve fits offer the 
best correlation giving an R2 value of 0.84. The power curve fit yields a correlation of 
0.67 and the exponential curve fit yields a correlation value of 0.7341. The linear curve 
fitting function in Microsoft Excel was therefore used for further analysis. Figure 30 
shows the trend lines in isolation
10000
100.0E+6 1 .OE+9 
Frequency [Hz]
10.0E+9
Figure 30: Susceptibility threshold of three same brand and specification computers, trend
only
This result is compared with a worst case assumption of the error in the measurement of 
±3dB around the mean of the data as shown in Figure 31.
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10000
100.0E+6 1 .OE+9 
Frequency [Hz]
10.OE+9
Figure 31: Susceptibility threshold of three same brand and specification computers, trend
compared with error bars
The variation of the trend around the mean is well within ±3dB. This not only 
demonstrates the good repeatability of the measurement method but also shows that the 
difference in the susceptibility of same brand nominally identical machines is minimal. 
However, testing of a larger population size would be required to improve the statistical 
value of this data set.
3.4.4.3 The impact of manufacturer type on susceptibility
Figure 32 shows the susceptibility profiles of two Pentium 4 computers which had
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Figure 32: Susceptibility threshold of two same specification computers from different
manufacturers
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It can be observed that the Brand C computer appears, in general, to be more susceptible 
than the Brand I computer. Through physical examination of the two computers it was 
clear that the Brand I computer possessed a slightly better build quality than the Brand C 
computer. The Brand I computer featured a finger-stock edged case, a metal back-plane 
and very small apertures around the fan housing. The Brand I computer was also more 
expensive than the Brand C system. Since the computer case can be used to provide a fair 
degree of shielding it is apparent that the techniques employed to improve shielding of 
the brand I system has an impact on the susceptibility threshold.
3.4.4.4 The impact of specification on susceptibility
In order to evaluate the impact of computer specification the remaining computers were
evaluated in the same manner. Only the data for one of the Brand D computers and one
of the 1.4 GHz specification computers (Brand C) has been included. Figure 33 shows








n Brand C 486 66MHz 
Brand E 486 100MHz
- Brand D Pill 667MHz 
Brand C PIV 1,4GHz 
Brand D Cel 2.6GHz
10.0E+91 .OE+9 
Frequency [Hz]
Figure 33: Susceptibility threshold of five different specification computers, raw data 
The types of effect experienced and other general observations are listed below:
o The most common susceptibility for the 486 computers was found to be shutdown 
with manual restart required.
o The most common susceptibility for the Pentium and Celeron computers was 
found to be computer crash with manual restart required.
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o Mouse deflection was observed intermittently and generally at lower field strength 
levels than the other failure modes.
o Pop up menu activation, program opening and closing and device failure messages 
also occurred.
o Above 2GHz the CDROM of the Brand C Pentium was found to activate with 
intermittent opening and closing.
o On several occasions the test program (EMV_101 .exe) was closed and moved to a 
different folder or location on the desktop. Some minor monitor effects were 
observed below 1.5GHz.
o Compared to the Brand D PHI 667MHz computer definite increases in the 
susceptibility threshold were observed for the PIV 1.4GHz computers around the 
clock frequency and the 1st harmonic, 2.8GHz. This probably indicates filtering at 
the processor clock frequency.
The graph of Figure 34 shows trend lines for the above data set in isolation, using the 
same curve fitting technique applied to previous graphs.
10000
1000 -
— Power (Brand C 486 66MHz)
— Power (Brand E 486 100MHz)
— Power (Brand D Pill 667MHz)
— Power (Brand C PIV 1.4GHz) 
Power (Brand D Cel 2.6GHz)
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Figure 34: Susceptibility threshold of five different specification computers, trend data
There is clear indication that for any given frequency the susceptibility threshold is much 
higher for the more modern, higher specification, computer types compared with the 
older variants. The trend of these graphs shows that modern higher clock speed 
computers are less susceptible than their older counterparts across the frequencies tested.
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There appears to be a minor exception to this trend for the most modern computer tested 
(Celeron) at frequencies above a few GHz. However, the trend at these frequencies for 
this computer is skewed by the large variation in the recorded susceptibility threshold 
data.
This is an important finding and is counter to the belief discussed in Section 2.9.3 that 
electronic systems will become more susceptible as technology progresses. However, it 
should be noted that for the Celeron the data spread around the trend line is greater than 
for the other computers and this has had the effect of skewing the trend line. Still the 
Celeron computer is still clearly less susceptible than the 486 specification machines. A 
more detailed discussion of these finding is given in the summary of this sub-section.
There is also indication from the above data however, that build quality has an impact on 
the susceptibility level. Another observation worthy of note concerns the type of failure 
modes recorded. In general the faster computers were found to have a more severe 
reaction to the EM stress. For the Pentium computers 'shutdown' was the most common 
effect observed. This was usually accompanied by file corruption. For the older 
computers mouse deflection and screen effects were more routinely and consistently 
observed leading on to 'crashes' and latching of the software. A contributing factor to 
this could be that the modern computers tested have an electronic "soft start and 
shutdown" process controlled by the operating system. Older machines were more likely 
to feature mechanical on/off switches.
At no point during these experiments was permanent physical damage caused to the 
computers tested. For the Celeron computer temporary functional damage was 
experienced at several frequencies whereby it was necessary to re-install the operating 
environment (Windows NT) when an 'un-mountable boot volume' error occurred.
3.4.4.5 Standalone Computer - Extended Lower Frequency Bound 
The opportunity arose to test one of the computers over an extended frequency range 
(100 MHz to 8 GHz). The brand D PHI 667 MHz computer was chosen since it would be 
the basis for the computer network susceptibility experiments. Figure 35 shows the 
susceptibility threshold of the PHI 667 MHz computer with the lower frequency bound 
extended down from 400 MHz to 100 MHz.
Page 126 of 253











Figure 35: Susceptibility threshold of brand D PHI 667MHz computer (100 MHz to 8 GHz)
It can be seen that over this extended frequency range the susceptibility threshold has 
levelled out with a knee point somewhere between 500 MHz and 2 GHz. Also indicated 
are points where damage was found to occur, which was not previously observed. It was 
found that the 100 MHz to 400 MHz frequency range was extremely damaging for the 
computer monitors used as part of the SUT. In total three monitors were permanently 
damaged by the EM stress in this frequency range. The damage threshold and 















Table 26: Monitor damage thresholds
The damage has not been investigated thoroughly but is symptomatic of monitor power 
supply failure. The monitor was changed to an LCD type which was found to be more 
robust over this frequency range so that testing could be resumed. It was found that the 
LCD monitor was generally more robust to EM disruption and that the monitor 
technology type had little bearing on the computer susceptibility threshold profile.
3.4.5 Summary of Standalone Computer Susceptibility Tests
The EM susceptibility of several computers with different specifications varying from
486 processor models to 2.6 GHz Celeron processor types have been evaluated. The
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mode stirred (reverberation) technique was used with 3 % duty cycle pulse modulation. 
The test results show very good repeatability for susceptibility measurements of 
nominally identical computers.
The trend of the data shows that modern higher clock speed computers are less 
susceptible than their older counterparts across the frequency range tested (i.e. a higher 
magnitude is required to induce the same effect for the modern computers). This is 
counter to initial expectations since lower power and faster integrated circuits are being 
used in greater density in the higher specification more modern computers. It has also 
been shown that build quality has an impact on the susceptibility level.
Initially it was considered that the immunity threshold of the computers evaluated was 
different because of the introduction of the EMC directive. However, EMC directives 
concerning immunity have not changed significantly during the manufacturing period of 
the various computers tested, 1996 through to 2005.
It is certain that the internal clock frequencies of the computers are increasing. The actual 
clock speed specified by the manufacturer (66 MHz through to 2.6 GHz) refers to the 
internal processor clock speed. This is slightly misleading since there is very little 
transmission of the clock signal at these frequencies because the clock signal is confined 
to the processor chip die. Since the CPU clock is confined there is little opportunity for 
interfering with the clock signal and invoking a susceptibility. The main clock and the 


























Table 27: Computer clock specifications
It is generally accepted that the magnitude of the RF emissions will increase by 20dB per 
frequency decade increase and it can be seen from this table that there has been a decade 
frequency change in the clock frequencies that will contribute to RF emissions. It is clear 
from published materials that this has prompted computer system and processor 
manufacturers to find ways to control and minimise RF emissions to achieve EMC
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compliance [Intel Xeon, 2000], [Intel P4, 2000]. Techniques that are used for the 
mitigation of computer emissions include:
o Dithered clock oscillators
o Differential clocking
o Multi-layer p.c.b. design
o Prevention of ground loops
o p.c.b. Edge stitching
o Finger-stock for enclosures
o Processor heatsinks
o Ground ring pads around p.c.b. vias (through holes)
Also of significance is the higher density of components on a single chip. In older 
machines the components would be distributed perhaps over several different p.c.b.'s and 
linked together. In newer computers with multi-layer p.c.b. technology the physical 
distribution of components is much lower and therefore they have shorter connections. 
This factor is likely to reduce the coupling efficiency of an external EM disturbance.
Effectively computer manufacturers are having to 'design in' EMC compliance in order 
to reduce circuit emissions that would likely disrupt their own circuitry and therefore 
system functions and causes them not to comply with EMC regulations. Since emissions 
of higher specification computers are actively being controlled by improved EMC design 
and because in simplistic terms the techniques for stopping RF getting out are the same 
as the techniques for stopping RF getting in. This appears to be improving the systems 
immunity (increased susceptibility threshold) via reciprocity.
The peak E field level required to produce a non trivial effect for a 2.6 GHz computer is 
almost an order of magnitude higher than the peak E field required for a 486 computer 
across the frequency range tested. An EM disrupter source with an operating frequency 
close to 2.4 GHz for example would need to produce a peak E field of 2 to 3 kV/m at a 
modern computer system to induce a significant effect compared with 300 V/m for the 
486. Obviously this means that for the same EM disruptor source the effective range for a
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modern computer system is less than that for an older computer system. This assumes 
that the optimum coupling angle is known.
However, it must be borne in mind that these discussions and assumptions are base on a 
very limited data set and much more susceptibility data must be gathered before 
statistically qualified trends can be established. It is also unclear whether the higher 
specification computers would be more susceptible than older specifications to other 
modulations and in particular narrow pulse width signals. It has been speculated that 
modern electronics may be able to respond more (increased susceptibility) to disruptive 
waveforms with narrow pulse widths and faster risetimes and therefore greater 
bandwidth [Watkins, 2005]. Very fast risetime (~ 100 ps) and narrow pulses are typical 
of the Hyperband class of EM disruptors.
This series of experiments has highlighted some of the potential difficulties associated 
with the setting of an EM detection threshold.
3.5 Susceptibility Testing of Network Components
3.5.1 Aim
The aim of this series of experiments was to assess the EM susceptibility thresholds of 
wired (as apposed to wireless) computer networks and network components. Specific 
threats to wireless networks were discussed in Section 2.1.4.1 and fall outside of the 
scope of this thesis for the reasons discussed. Undoubtedly it is when computers become 
interconnected via networks that their usefulness is magnified they are also known to 
become more vulnerable.
To this end a series of susceptibility tests were performed using an iterative approach. In 
this way networking components were gradually added to a standalone computer to form 
a fully functional network. The objectives of this experiment were to:
o Compare networked computer and standalone computer susceptibilities 
o Assess the types of effects induced 
o Assess the impact on the user 
o Identify critical components
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3.5.2 System components evaluated
Several simple network configurations were developed and implemented. The range of 
System components tested included:
o Brand D PHI 667MHz computers with internal 10/100 MBps Ethernet cards
o A 10/100MBps PCI Combo network interface card
o A Dual Speed 10/100MBps switching Hub
o A 56kBps Modem router
o 2 x 20m Category 5 Shielded Twisted Pair (STP) Ethernet cables
A proprietary network analysis program called LanMarkPro was used to ascertain the 
EM effects on the network operation. Additionally the bespoke software programme 
discussed above (EMV software) was used to exercise each computer in the network to 
provide a constant level of CPU utilisation. LanMarkPro is a Transmission Control 
Protocol / User Datagram Protocol (TCP/UDP) packet generator and capture program 
with sophisticated control and management protocols and is designed for network 
performance testing. The software provides two pieces of raw data, Throughput, and 
Packet Error Rate (PER). A screen grab of the LanMarkPro user interface is shown in 
Figure 36.
Figure 36: LanMarkPro software user interface
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3.5.3 Test Configurations
The same reverberation chamber which was used for the earlier standalone computer 
susceptibility experiments was used for this test series. An advantage of the reverberation 
chamber over other techniques in this particular case is that the effect of cable layout is 
far less critical to the measured overall susceptibility threshold. A photograph of a 
networked computer within the reverberation chamber is given in Figure 37.
Figure 37: Networked computer in the reverberation chamber
The brand I PIV 1.4 GHz computer used in earlier experiments was used to generate and 
monitor network traffic from the control room annexe via fibre optic cable to the hub. In 
this way the network monitor was isolated from the EM disruption. An IEEE 802.3u 100- 
Base-FX Advanced Network interface card was used to facilitate the fibre optic network 
connection.
The frequency range for each test was 100 MHz to 8 GHz. The 400 MHz lower test 
frequency was extended down to 100 MHz for these experiments. This was necessary 
because the aggregated system was larger and therefore lower frequencies should couple 
more efficiently. 100 MHz was chosen because this was the practical lower frequency 
limit of the reverberation chamber used as discussed earlier.
The same 30 |is, 1 kHz (3% duty cycle) pulse modulation was used as in the earlier 
experiments allowing direct comparison of results.
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3.5.4 Susceptibility Criteria / Observed Effects
As before for all tests the magnitude of the EM stress was gradually increased until the 
onset of an effect which required some manual intervention to re-set the status of the 
system. However, other effects specific to the network traffic were recorded:
o Network failures, i.e. Denial of Service (DoS) 
o Temporary and permanent damage to components
Although the LanMarkPro software provided indicators of network (Throughput and 
PER) it was found that the indicators changed very swiftly from showing normal traffic 
to complete network failure. Therefore, no data on gradual network degradation was 
collected.
3.5.5 Observations and Test Results
3.5.5.1 Core Network Configuration
Figure 38 shows a representation of the system configuration for the first computer 
network experiment. Only the core system components of a hub switch and the necessary 
interconnecting cable between the hub and the computer have been introduced to the 




20m Cat 5 STP
Figure 38: Core network configuration
For this test the network was exercised by sending packets from the control room 
computer via optical fibre. The network interconnection with the hub comprised of 20 
metres of Category 5 STP cable. The first part of the experiment sought to evaluate 
whether the connection of the network cable affected the computer susceptibility
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threshold. Figure 39 shows the difference in susceptibility threshold for exactly the same 








Figure 39: Standalone computer susceptibility threshold compared with exactly the same 
computer in a networked configuration
Interestingly it can be seen that there are only some minor differences in the 
susceptibility threshold for the networked and standalone computer configurations. This 
is further illustrated in Figure 40 where ±3dB error bars have been added to the stand 
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Figure 40: Standalone computer susceptibility threshold compared with exactly the same 
computer in a networked configuration, with error bars
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Over certain frequency ranges illustrated in greater detail in the Figure 41, the standalone 
computer appears to be significantly more susceptible i.e. a lower field strength is 
required for the same effect.
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Figure 41: Standalone computer susceptibility threshold compared with exactly the same 
computer in a networked configuration with highlights
This result seems counter intuitive because at these frequencies one would expect the 
networked computer to be more susceptible due to longer cable lengths and therefore 
increased coupling efficiency. However, one possible explanation is that the network 
ports become electrically isolated or revert to a high impedance state when network 
failure (DoS) occurs. Since the port is isolated a path of EM ingress is removed thus 
reducing the occurrence of upset and increasing the susceptibility threshold.
The next stage of the experiment was to compare the susceptibility threshold levels at 
which the computer became affected compared with the susceptibility threshold levels 
when the network was degraded. As stated earlier network degradation was not gradual 
and proceeded from 100% packet transmission to 0% transmission (effectively DoS) 
with very minor increases in the EM stress. Figure 42 shows the networked computer 
susceptibility threshold compared with the network failure level (DoS).
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Figure 42: Comparison of computer susceptibility with network susceptibility (DoS)
It can be seen from the graph that there are strong regions where effects to the network 
(DoS) preceded effects to the computer (i.e. the susceptibility threshold to cause network 
DoS is lower than the susceptibility threshold of the computer). There are particularly 
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Figure 43: Comparison of computer susceptibility with network susceptibility - highlighted
In these regions the network outage preceded effects to the computer by a significant 
margin. The resonant peaks below 700 MHz are likely to be due to coupling to the 
network cable or network hub switch power supply cable. It was noted that in this region 
the network took a long time to recover. This perhaps indicates that the effect could be
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due to thermal protection switching within the hub switch power supply. Increased 
susceptibility in the 3.16-4.26 GHz region indicates direct aperture coupling to either the 
hub unit or the hub power supply unit. The cable coupling region and hub aperture 
coupling regions are indicated in Figure 44.
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Figure 44: Comparison of computer susceptibility with network susceptibility (DoS) with 
predominant coupling regions highlighted
The hub or more correctly the hub power supply was damaged at 2.5 GHz with a peak 
field strength of 1.5 kV/m. Subsequent investigation revealed that the power supply was 
of a switched mode type. This type of supply is known to produce high levels of RF 
emissions and the evidence here suggests that they are also susceptible to EM disruption.
3.5.5.2 Small network configuration
Figure 45 shows a representation of the system configuration for a small network test
configuration.
Figure 45: Small network configuration
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For this experiment an extra computer was added to the network and exposed to EM 
disruption so that the iterative effect of larger numbers of computers in the network can 
be evaluated.
Figure 46 shows the susceptibility threshold for severe failure for EUTl and EUT2 and 
the network failure (DoS) level.
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Figure 46: Comparison of DoS and computer susceptibility
As with the core network configuration there are regions where DoS is achieved at levels 
well below severe failure of the computer. These regions are illustrated in greater detail 











Figure 47: Comparison of DoS and computer susceptibility with highlights
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In these regions the network outage preceded severe failure of the computer by a 
significant margin. These bands are similar but not identical to the core network 
configuration.
The susceptibility threshold for the two computers evaluated (EUT1 and EUT2) are fairly 
similar except for the region between 389-550 MHz where the susceptibility threshold 
for EUT2 is significantly lower. It is possible that due to the close proximity of the two 
computers within the chamber, one computer may have provided a degree of shielding to 
the other computer in this narrow region.
Figure 48 is a comparison between the DoS levels for the core computer network and the 
small network configuration.
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_ Network fail (small network)
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Figure 48: Comparison of DoS susceptibility threshold for the core network (1 BUT) vs. the 
small network configuration (2 EUT's)
It was observed that there were few differences in the susceptibility threshold for DoS 
but interestingly below 300 MHz the susceptibility threshold in key regions is higher for 
the small network case compared with the core network configuration.
Figure 49 shows the difference in susceptibility level for exactly the same computer 
when it is evaluated in standalone, core network and small network configurations.
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Figure 49: Comparison of the susceptibility thresholds for Standalone, core network and
small network configurations
It was observed that there was little difference in the susceptibility threshold for the 
computer in each of the different configurations. This observation was similarly observed 
for the earlier comparison, Figure 41. At frequencies below 400 MHz it appears that 
there is a gradual shift in fact an increase in the susceptibility threshold as more systems 
are evaluated. This effect was also observed earlier. A possible explanation for this 
possible trend was provided earlier.
3.5.5.3 Wide Area Network (WAN) Configuration
Figure 50 shows a representation of the system configuration for this experiment.
Figure 50: WAN configuration
For this experiment a router was added to the small network configuration. Unfortunately 
it was not possible to connect the router modem to a telephone socket completing the
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WAN connection because it was not possible to guarantee effective EM isolation (i.e. the 
telephone line violated the reverberation chamber shielding). The router was exercised 
however, by 'pinging' the devices Internet Protocol (IP) address via the hub network 
connection. It is possible to speculate that the router would be more susceptible if the 
telephone connection was in place because telephone cable types are unshielded.
The lower frequency range for this test 100 MHz to 400 MHz was completed last due to 
amplifier availability issues. Figure 51 plots the susceptibility thresholds at which loss of 
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Figure 51: Router / network DoS compared with the computer susceptibility threshold
At two frequencies 151 MHz and 3.5 GHz router damage occurred. The nature of the 
damage was different in each case. For the damage which occurred at the higher 
frequency (3.5 GHz) the router was switched to a 'Test' mode and the status of the router 
was then fixed despite several attempts to reset the device. This probably indicates that 
the EM stress caused direct damage to the internal circuitry of the router. A new router 
was acquired and testing recommenced. For the damage which occurred at the lower 
frequency (151 MHz) the router failed to function completely none of the status 
indicators were illuminated. This probably indicates that the route of EM ingress was via 
the router power supply cable. The power supply in this case was a separate unit, but was 
a linear AC transformer type rather than a switched mode type as was the case with the 
hub. Further inspection revealed that the router external power supply unit was still 
functioning. It is therefore likely that internal voltage regulators within the router were
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damaged. Another router was not available so testing was halted hence the absence of 
data between 151 MHz and 400 MHz.
As before there were regions where DoS was achieved at levels well below the 






Figure 52: Router - network DoS compared with the computer susceptibility threshold with
highlights
In these regions the router upset or network outage preceded effects to the computer by a 
significant margin. These bands are again similar but not identical to the small network 
configuration susceptibility test results.
3.5.6 Summary of Networked Computer Susceptibility Tests
A large range of effects were observed from network failure (DoS) through to permanent
component damage.
It was found that in many cases DoS (loss of the network connection) occurred at lower 
total average E-field strengths than the onset of other severe effects to the computer 
under test in some cases by a significant margin.
This means that less stress was required to deny network service, than to severely disrupt 
the computers core function. In some instances the stress required for denial of service 
was an order of magnitude lower than that required to induce the preset susceptibility 
criterion of the computer. The manifestation of the network failure appeared as a swift
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transition from a satisfactory network connection to complete network failure. Gradual 
degradation was not observed.
Once service was denied it was not possible to restart the network connection with the 
EM stress present. Once the EM stress was removed it was possible to re-initiate network 
traffic but only from the control computer terminal. This factor is significant since 
remote restarting of the network was not possible.
The cause of the network failures was most likely due to coupling to the peripheral 
network components (hub and router) via the power supply cable, the network cable and 
the peripheral enclosures. In particular the power supplies were found to be prone to 
damage. From a brief visual investigation the construction of the network components 
seemed less well engineered than the computer construction.
The tests above were conducted on a fairly robust system since Ethernet category 5 STP 
(shielded) cable was used in preference to unshielded types and the unshielded telephone 
cable for the router was left unconnected. It is speculated that Unshielded Twisted Pair 
(UTP) Ethernet category 5 cable (or lower categories) are likely to lower the 
susceptibility threshold for DoS further since the cable coupling efficiency will be 
higher.
It is important to realise that the network components (hub and router) and computer 
network interface card may not support STP (i.e. Shielded sockets must be specified 
during acquisition). In some instances it may look as if the cable socket is metallic but 
this does not guarantee that the shield is maintained to the enclosure of the network 
component. Without an STP compatible socket the use of STP cable will probably not 
provide any additional protection. The benefit provided by STP is only valid if the shield 
is maintained end to end [Bell, 2004].
Interestingly there were no major differences in susceptibilities for the computers 
themselves in any of the network configurations. It was expected that a network 
configured computer would perhaps be more susceptible because the extra cable lengths 
would mean that the coupling efficiency was higher. However, the data shows that the 
differences are minimal.
For the core computer the network connection does not make the computer more 
susceptible (i.e. lower the susceptibility threshold). However, for a directed plane wave 
threat, (i.e. the types of threat likely to be produced by a mobile EM disruptor) a
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distributed network of computers has more chance of being affected because of the 
enhanced possibility of coupling stress to some point in the network. This is an important 
finding which highlights the value of these tests.











DoS occurs at lower EM stress 
than computer latch up or shutdown
DoS occurs at lower EM stress 
than computer latch up or shutdown
DoS occurs at lower EM stress 
than computer latch up or shutdown
DoS occurs at lower EM stress 
than computer latch up or shutdown
DoS occurs at lower EM stress 
than computer latch up or shutdown
Hub damage
DoS occurs at lower EM stress 
than computer latch up or shutdown
Computer latch up or shutdown occurs 
At the same time as DoS
Table 28: Key features of the network susceptibility test
3.6 Comparison of Susceptibility Results with Published Data 
It is perhaps important to understand how these susceptibility results compare with the 
results discussed in Stage I, Section 2.5. A rough comparison can be achieved by 
comparing the data from the Stage II, Section 3.4.4.4 tests above with the published data. 
However, the modulation type used within this series of experiments is again different to 
the modulation types used for the effects data found in the literature. Nevertheless a 
crude comparison can be made in terms of the average power density as per the previous 
approach.
Figure 53 shows the data from Figure 33 together with the published data set.
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Figure 53: Susceptibility data in terms of effective power density
It can be seen from the graph that in general the average power density values for the 
published data are lower than that observed from the experimental susceptibility test 
campaign conducted as part of this study. However, comparison is difficult since many 
factors regarding the test configuration from the published data are not provided. For 
example the Backstrom data [Backstrom, 2004] is an extrapolation and no details of the 
computer system tested are provided. The LoVetri data [LoVetri, 1999] for the HPM 
(Hypoband) waveform compares fairly favourably with our experimental data whereas 
the LoVetri CW data appears to be an order of magnitude lower than this experimental 
data.
The Nitsch UWB (Hyperband) test data [Nitsch, 2005] appears to demonstrate that the 
bandwidth of the signal (which is related to the pulse rise time and pulse width) could 
have an impact on the average power density required at the target computer system.
For the reasons discussed above and those discussed in Sections 2.3.3.2, 2.3.3.2.1 and 
2.4.3 of this thesis it can be seen that the definition of a susceptibility threshold is 
extremely complex and is dependent upon many factors principally:
o The general inaccuracy or uncertainty associated with the other test methods
o The test conditions (illumination angle, SUT layout, calibration, measurement of 
the peak E-field, shot to shot variation, test repeatability)
o The EUT type and specification
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o The instantaneous bandwidth of the disruptor waveform
These factors amongst others lead to extreme difficulty in assigning a truly deterministic 
susceptibility comparison metric to the data.
It has been shown however that reverberation chamber testing undertaken in this 
experiment provides a solid foundation given that the test conditions are more rigorously 
controlled with a degree of statistical averaging inherent in the test technique.
For the reasons discussed above, the reverberation chamber experimental susceptibility 
data taken here will be used for further analysis and development of EM detection 
concepts.
3.7 Observations of Audit data with respect to Susceptibility 
Throughout the computer susceptibility experimental campaign the event log files were 
examined using Windows Event Viewer and the network Throughput and PER was 
examined using LanMarkPro. Given the variety of effects observed during effects testing 
as shown in Table 25 it is surprising that very little relevant information was found. It has 
already been stated that gradual network degradation was not recorded and that the onset 
of network failure was rapid.
The only relevant information obtained form the event viewer log files throughout the 
test campaign pertained to mouse deflection and upset. The event log window is shown 
in Figure 54.
D Event Viewer
Ffc Action Vtew rtslp 
*   » 15:13 ^ g)






System Los 1 evencfs)
Date Time I Source I Category I Event I User | Computer
11/01/2007 2:52:13PM B042p«t None N/A
Figure 54: Event Viewer window after thorough susceptibility testing
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This error message corresponds to mouse pointer deflection, mouse button operation and 
intermittent slowing of the EMV test software. The error source code i8042 corresponds 
to the ps/2 keyboard and mouse port on the personal computer.
No event logs were created for any of the other susceptibilities observed including 
network susceptibilities. Clearly, then event log files and possibly other audit processes, 
on there own cannot be relied upon to provide indication of susceptibility.
3.8 Stage II - Summary
This series of experiments has principally demonstrated:
o The usefulness of the reverberation chamber susceptibility test technique
o That computer systems and computer networks are susceptible to EM disruption
o That two very broad classes of failure can be observed upset and damage although 
damage was only observed for peripheral components
o The variety and complexity of effects observed 
o The complexity of susceptibility data
o The trend with increasing computer susceptibility threshold with improving 
computer specification
o The potential differences between cyber DoS and EM disruptor induced DoS
The functional aspects i.e. how the hardware will actually be used has not been 
considered as part of this experimental campaign. It is important to note that many types 
of functional disruption may exist and this will add another dimension to the 
uncertainties associated with susceptibility determination.
Consider the impact of EM induced DoS since it has been found that it was necessary to 
re-cycle the power on the hub switch or router this could have variable consequences 
depending on the network function. For a small central office the network administrator 
is likely to be in close proximity to the susceptible device allowing for fast re-instatement 
of network functions. However, there are many scenarios where the susceptible system 
may be inaccessible or at least remote from the administrator for example a remote 
terminal unit which is part of a distributed control system controlling a water pump gate
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valve. For these scenarios where the network cannot be remotely initialised the 
functional impact could be far greater in the above example large areas could be flooded.
Given this data and the speculation about the functional issues it is clear that ITE systems 
and therefore information process and information availability are susceptible to EM 
disruptor action. Further, since traditional techniques such as examination of event logs 
and monitors do not provide indication of susceptibility to EM disruption, the utility of 
detecting EM disruption must be explored.
The data produced through this experimental campaign provides an excellent grounding 
for the development of an EM disruption detection system and assists in the formulation 
of an EM disruption detection threshold.
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4 Stage III - EM Attack Detection and Incident 
Response
4.1 Aims and Objectives
The aim of the third and final stage is to develop concepts for EM detection and to 
develop one of the concepts into a proof of principle demonstrator.
Objectives:
o Develop detection concepts based on conventional threats to INFOSEC 
o To take at least one these concepts through to a proof of principle experiment stage 
o To promote a synergy of understanding between conventional and EM threats 
o To postulate how EM detection can be used for forensics and incident response
4.2 Cyber Intrusion Detection Systems
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief review of the application and utility of 
computer Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and to subsequently use this knowledge to
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derive desirable features for EM detection and diagnostic systems. An overarching aim is 
to produce a specification for an EM detector which is compatible with modern cyber 
IDS. Only those aspects of IDS considered to be most relevant to EM disruption 
detection are discussed.
4.2.1 The Function of IDS
IDS are often compared with sophisticated burglar alarms [Rozenblum, 2001]. They can 
detect threats to computer systems as they occur rather like the Passive Infra Red sensor 
linked to an outside security light can detect the proximity of an intruder. Further, once 
an intrusion has occurred they can subsequently be used to provide evidence of exactly 
how the intrusion was carried out and what was stolen or adversely affected but most 
importantly they alert to the fact that a threat is being perpetrated. In the instance of a 
burglar, and in some instances for cyber threats, this alert may be sufficient to warn off 
the perpetrator or provide sufficient time to allow protection measures to be enacted.
At the very least the IDS alerts the user to the fact that a susceptibility has been 
exploited. Vulnerabilities are therefore identified and countermeasures can thus be 
implemented. For cyber type threats this process is generally achieved by downloading a 
patch for the firewall and an update for the IDS malicious behaviour library for the new 
form of threat. This repair protects the system from the next occurrence of the same 
threat.
Another analogy compares IDS systems with a firewall in a military scenario thus a 
firewall is compared with a soldiers helmet and flak jacket whereas an IDS is compared 
with the medic who provides first aid. It is clear then that IDS systems play a vital but 
not totally comprehensive role in the maintenance of INFOSEC.
4.2.2 Intrusion detection design
Many authors in the field of cyber intrusion detection [Proctor, 2001], [Bruneau, 2001] 
cite the works of Anderson [Anderson, 1980] and Denning [Denning, 1987] as the 
seminal treatise on cyber intrusion detection.
The requirement for intrusion detection seems to have emerged from an 'increasing 
awareness' of computer security problems for the US Air Force (USAF) especially when 
they began to share different levels of classified information over rudimentary computer 
networks.
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The initial IDS design approach attempted to analyse accounting audit files in order to 
detect unauthorised access. This audit process remains as the cornerstone of many 
modern IDS. However, the biggest problem and one that remains to this day was how to 
differentiate between authorised and unauthorised access and subsequently how to define 
threat types and characteristics (behaviour analysis).
Denning's intrusion detection model lead to the development of real-time intrusion- 
detection expert systems that aim to detect:
'a wide range of security violations ranging from attempted break-ins by outsiders to 
system penetrations and abuses by insiders.'
The model is based on the hypothesis that exploitation of systems vulnerabilities involves 
abnormal use and that detection of abnormal behavioural patterns is the key for detecting 
threats. The sorts of threat behaviour considered in the model include:
o Attempted break-in
o Masquerading or successful break-in
o Penetration by legitimate user
o Leakage by legitimate user
o Inference by legitimate user
o Trojan horse
o Virus
o Denial of Service
Some of these behaviours could be non-malicious and even accidental. The model, which 
is essentially a rule based pattern matching algorithm, is designed to be completely 
generic and independent of specific system architectures and vulnerabilities. In essence 
the concept is to monitor standard operations on a computer system such as:
o Log in attempts
o Command execution
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o Program execution
o File access 
o Device access 
o Network traffic
The IDS must therefore compare standard patterns of behaviour against suspicious 
behaviours such as deviations in standard usage. In essence the basic IDS model assesses 
the interactions between subjects and objects and uses rules, profiles and records to 
indicate anomalous behaviour. This model is fundamentally the same as that used for 
modern day IDS. The sorts of processes enacted by modern IDS are:
o Monitoring and analysing user and system activity
o Auditing of system configurations and vulnerabilities
o Assessing the integrity of critical system and data files
o Statistical analysis of activity patterns based on the matching to known attacks
o Abnormal activity analysis
o Operating system audit
4.2.3 Implementation
IDS can be described as host based and network IDS. The essential difference between 
these two types of IDS is that host based systems analyse activity on the computer core 
system such as file access, application execution etc. Network based IDS analyse the 
traffic on the network. For network IDS there is further sub categorisation these are 
known as promiscuous mode network IDS and distributed or network node IDS. Both 
types deploy 'sensors' which 'sniff packets on the network with the aim of detecting 
abnormal behaviour. However, network node IDS only sniff those packets bound for a 
single destination computer which is likely to be a node having some critical function.
A block diagram of a typical Network intrusion detection system [Proctor, 2001] is 
shown in Figure 55.
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Figure 55: Typical Network IDS configuration/function
The network sensor in this Figure can be software based running on an appropriate host 
or a hardware implementation such as a router.
4.2.4 Problems Associated with IDS
One of the biggest problems with IDS is in differentiating between truly malicious or 
unacceptable behaviour and accidental or acceptable behaviour. Any alarm type system 
quickly loses credibility if too many false alarms are produced [Northcutt, 2003]. Four 
outcomes are considered possible from IDS systems which can be described by the 







An alarm was 
activated 
and tlie behaviour 
was unacceptable
TRUE-NEGATIVE
An alarm was NOT 




An alarm was 
activated 
and the behaviour 
was acceptable
FALSE-NEGATIVE
An alarm was NOT 
activated and the 
behaviour was 
unacceptable
Figure 56: True/false negative/positive diagram
False-positives are seen to be the most problematic because alarms require analysis and 
therefore a false alarm requires nugatory activity which has an inherent time penalty 
which may slow down processing functions. False-negative alarms are perhaps the most 
serious since unacceptable behaviour was allowed and not detected. However, false- 
positives are the most likely to cause degradation of user confidence of an IDS system.
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4.2.5 Summary
IDS provide an essential INFOSEC function by alerting to the fact that unacceptable or 
undesirable behaviour is taking or has taken place. Since many cyber type threats can 
manifest in very subtle ways some form of alarm system is essential. Once an alarm has 
been raised recovery or repair strategies and even preventative action for the next time 
the threat occurs can be put in place. The utility of detection/indication in an INFOSEC 










Figure 57: Utility of detection for understanding INFOSEC risks
It has been discussed earlier that EM disruptive threats have some similar characteristics 
with cyber/CNA type threats and in particular DoS. Given that the traditional IDS 
approach of detecting abnormal behaviour through audit processes is not applicable to 
EM disruptive threats (see Section 3.7) it is clear that detection/indication of EM 
disruptive threats may be a very useful step in understanding the risks posed to 
INFOSEC from EM threats. Therefore, the feasibility of providing EM disrupter threat 
detection will be addressed.
4.3 EM Disrupter Detection System (EMDDS) Development 
It is clear from the above discussions that computer systems and network system 
components are susceptible to EM disruption and it is also clear that effective 
countermeasures/mitigation exists. However, the crux of the matter is that potentially 
costly mitigation measures will not be employed if those responsible for implementing 
INFOSEC do not believe that the risk from EM disruption is real or at least of a 
sufficient magnitude to warrant action.
The aim of this section is to develop a specification of an EM Disruption Detection 
System (EMDDS). The primary function that this system will fulfil is detection.
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indication and alerting of the fact that the source of computer system malfunction is EM 
in origin. A secondary function is for the detector to provide evidence that can be tested 
by forensic scrutiny. Once this indication has been provided other stages such as 
recovery, analysis and response can be enacted.
The objectives are therefore, to:
o Identify a set of desirable and essential requirements of an EMDDS
o Create a set of detection system specification parameters based upon known 
threats and the susceptibility data gathered through the experiments discussed in 
Stage II
o Identify candidate technologies
o Summarise the technical issues involved with the development of detection 
systems
o To take at least one detection system concept through to a proof of principle 
experiment stage
4.3.1 EMDDS Requirements
Drawing upon the discussion concerning cyber IDS above, Table 29 has been developed
which describes requirements/desirable features of an EMDDS.
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The manifestation of EM disruption and the actual disruption mechanism are 
not well known, extremely variable and imbued with high uncertainty. 
Analysis of the computer function alone (e.g. through audit processes using 
traditional IDS) is not sufficient. The EMDDS must incorporate an EM sensor 
to sense the EM stress
From published susceptibility data the frequency response of the EM sensor 
must cover the frequency range from 1 MHz to 10 GHz and be able to sense 
very narrow impulsive waveforms (such as UWB with rise times of the order 
100 ps and pulse widths down to 200 ps). The frequency range from 1 MHz to 
100 MHz is best detected with a cable sensor which detects coupled stress. The 
frequency range from 100 MHz to 10 GHz is best detected by a radiated stress 
sensor
The sensor must be capable of detecting EM stress levels with magnitudes 
below the onset of upset through to damage. This corresponds to an amplitude 
dynamic range of approximately 50dB given published evidence
Since a perpetrator is likely to use an EM stress level significantly above the 
threshold required for disruption to guarantee success, the sensing element and 
any event logging hardware or command console must be extremely robust to 
the EM stress or at least provide indication of failure
The EM sensing element of the detector must be sensitive to EM disruption 
from any direction i.e. the primary sensing element must be omni-directional
Providing an indication of the location (direction finding) of the EM disrupter 
source would be a very useful feature
The EM detection system should provide detailed information on the 
characteristics (frequency, magnitude, pulse parameters, etc.) of any identified 
disrupter waveforms. The disruptor types should also be logged
The system should be compact, self-contained, low maintenance and offer 
long-term operation independent from power sources which may be affected 
by EM disruption i.e. battery powered.
The cost of employing detection is a very important factor and must at least be 
less than the cost of mitigation. Studies have shown that the cost of mitigating 
EM disruption depends on the stage of the system design process in which it is 
considered. Shielding a small facility with a volume of 1 000m3 is expected to 
cost £120,000 using inflation adjusted 1991 figures [ETL91-2, 1991] A target 
maximum cost for supply of the EMDDS of 5% of the cost of shielding (i.e. 
£6,000) is considered reasonable expenditure for a facility
EM disruptor detection based only on sensing EM stress has no false positive 
since EM threshold detection indicates that the threat is of a sufficient 
magnitude to produce alarms (the origin of the disruption could be malicious 
or non malicious, intentional or un-intentional). However, it may be difficult to 
justify alarms based on EM stress only if no disruption to the information 
process was encountered. A detection mechanism which correlates the EM 
stress level with information process malfunction is clearly the most robust 
detection mechanism with the lowest false alarm rate
The EM detector should be able to seamlessly integrate with conventional IDS 
and be understandable to non EM specialists
The detection system should detect EM disruption before the susceptibility 
impacts on the function of the system or process. However, this could 
potentially lead to a greater number of false alarms (see RIO)
For application to expedient incident response and to facilitate successful 
criminal prosecutions the EMDDS should time and date stamp any alarm and 
this data should be stored in non-volatile memory and be capable of being 
authenticated, thus providing forensic evidence
Table 29: Technical and Functional Requirements of the EMDDS
Some of the elements are subjective and based upon reasonable estimates based on 
interpretation of available data. Requirements (Rl), (R2), (R3), (R4), and (R9) are
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considered essential for the EMDDS concept prototype. The remaining requirements 
identified are considered desirable but not essential for the initial prototype.
A block diagram of the potential functional structure of the EMDDS is given in Figure 
58.
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Figure 58: Functional structure of an EMDDS 
The relevance and importance of each of the functional elements can be described thus:
4.3.1.1 The EM Sensor
The EM sensor comprises two elements a radiated threat sensor (1) and a conducted threat 
sensor <4) . The purpose of the radiated threat sensor is to respond to the EM field 
impinging on the victim/receptor system. The purpose of the conducted threat sensor is to 
respond to transients injected on cables or conductors, or to respond to transients induced 
in cables or conductors from radiated fields which are attached to the victim system. In 
some instances it could be useful that the two sensors are used to correlate with each 
other reducing the number of false-positive alarms. An essential requirement of the 
sensor is that it must be extremely robust to the EM stress (R4), i.e. must not fail to alarm 
as a result of the stress as this is likely compromise subsequent detection. The other 
requirements which the sensor in particular should feature are listed as (R2 and R3).
4.3.1.2 The Detection Engine
As with conventional IDS correctly assigning the threshold for detection is the key to
achieving a low false alarm rate. The function of the threshold detector <2) is to set a
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threshold for detection above which the EM stress is of sufficient magnitude to disrupt 
system function. The selection of the threshold is critical to reduce false-positives and 
false-negatives. The usefulness of the detailed susceptibility analysis (3> is now evident as 
this can be used to inform the detection threshold level.
The function of elements (5) and (6) is to further reduce the number of false alarms, 
requirement (RIO). Within the normal operating environment there may well be benign 
radiated and conducted transients occurring most of the time due to switch contact 
bounce, industrial machinery operation or mains spikes and surges for example. The 
function of these elements is to detect these normal unintentional behaviours and thereby 
discount them from the threat space (malicious behaviours).
The function of elements (7) and (8) is also to reduce the number of false alarms, 
requirement (RIO). User confidence in the EMDDS will be severely compromised if the 
EMDDS indicates that a disruptive event is taking or has taken place and there is no 
corroborating evidence of disruption to the information process. On the other hand 
detection before the onset of EM disruption must be desirable. Correlating the EMDDS 
output with other IDS sensor outputs will therefore be useful for improving confidence to 
INFOSEC professionals that abnormal behaviour is taking place.
The function of elements (9) is simply to interpret the output of the detection engine as an 
alarm. In the simplest physical sense this could be an audible sound or visual alarm. For 
Cyber IDS 'pop-up' alert messages are often displayed on the computer monitor.
4.3.1.3 The Command Console
The command console for cyber IDS is generally a computer system. The IDS can be 
resident in the background on a users computer which therefore acts as the command 
console or it can be hosted on a computer dedicated to INFOSEC processes. For the 
EMDDS the command console could feasibly be any data logging device with sufficient 
processing capability together with the ability to interface with conventional IDS, 
requirement (Rl 1).
4.3.1.4 Minimum Essential EMDDS
In order to provide a condensed and tractable solution the first prototype will comprise of 
a minimum set of functional requirements principally elements (1) , <21 and |9> only. This 
will fulfil some minimum alerting function. The conducted threat element will not be
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considered in the initial prototype development because the additional effort required is 
considerable and there is much less information available to accurately set a detection 
level. The minimum essential EMDDS to be taken forward for prototype development is 






Figure 59: Minimum essential EMDDS
4.3.2 EM Sensor Candidate Technologies
The EM sensor element must act as a transducer such that the electric field stress is 
converted to some other parameter (e.g. voltage or current) for comparison with 
threshold data. It is an essential requirement for the sensor to have a very wide frequency 
response (R2), and a desirable requirement that it is omni-directional (R5).
From reviewing published literature on detection of highly stressing electromagnetic 
fields several options are initially considered and subsequently discussed in greater detail 
with a view to down selection of candidate technologies. These options include:
o Conventional RF receivers




Page 159 of 253
UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN ____________ ______ PHD THESIS 
4.3.2.1 Conventional RF Receivers
This category covers most conventional types of radio frequency receiver primarily 
consisting of an antenna and a broad band receiver made from electronic components. 
The antenna essentially acts as the sensing element with the receiver performing the 
transducer and detection function.
There are very many types of RF receivers commercially available which vary from 
handheld scanners to full-scale Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM) receivers. 
However, an essential requirement of the EMDDS is that it has a very wide instantaneous 
bandwidth to cope with impulsive signals (R2). Most RF receivers are narrowband 
receivers and step or sweep through a broad frequency range. This renders them 
unsuitable for this application. An instantaneous bandwidth of at least 500 MHz is 
necessary to capture an UWB waveform. Examples of very wide instantaneous 
bandwidth receivers are those used for TEMPEST, EW, and UWB communications 
applications [DSI 1550A, 2006], [Collins, 1981], [Reed, 2005]. Generally these systems 
are very expensive (tens of thousands of pounds) and can therefore be discounted 
because of essential requirement (R9). TEMPEST receivers are export controlled so that 
only authorised users such as national security agencies can obtain them.
Another limiting factor for this technology is the bandwidth and the transient response of 
the antenna. In general very wide band antennas have a linear frequency response over 
one decade of frequency. Requirement (R2) requires two decades of frequency response. 
Whilst it would be possible to employ several antennas covering the required frequency 
range this complicates the design and goes against the requirement for a compact system 
(R8). However, there is one specialist antenna system known to have a linear frequency 
response over the required range this is known as a D-Dot sensor [IEC 61000-4-33, 
2005].
D-Dot sensors actually measure electric displacement which is related to electric field by 
Equation 8.
V -R*A ° "
Where V0 is the output voltage from the sensor
R is the sensor characteristic load impedance 
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Aeq is the sensor equivalent area (m2)
and dD/dt is the time rate of change of the magnitude of the displacement vector 
D which is related to the electric field by Equation 9:
Where SQ is the permittivity of free space
A schematic diagram of a D-Dot sensor is shown in Figure 60.
Figure 60: Schematic of the D-Dot sensor
Employing an electronic RF receiver, together with a D-Dot as the sensor element for an 
EMDDS has the following advantages:
o Available technology, proven for RF reception
o Ease of integration with computer network equipment (in some cases)
o Possibility of waveform characterisation (R7) although this would require 
development
However, there are also several disadvantages to employing an EM sensor based on this 
technology:
o EM disrupters are designed to attack electronic circuits RF receivers are known to 
be particularly prone to damage [Jonsson, 2004]
o A receiver is very difficult to protect given the scope and variety of EM disruptor 
waveforms [Radasky, 2006], [Delsing, 2006]. Whilst it is not an essential
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requirement that the receiver should not be damaged after exposure to disruption 
the sensor should at the very least provide indication that damage has occurred 
(R4). This function does not appear to be available for proprietary systems.
o The monetary cost of a typical RF receiver is very likely to exceed that of 
requirement (R9).
o A family or suite of receivers/antennas would be required since the threat 
waveforms cover an extremely wide bandwidth. This leads to increased 
complexity, cost and overall an increase in physical dimensions of the EMDDS.
4.3.2.2 Electromagnetic Field (EMF) detectors
EMF detectors are commercially available for the purpose of detecting and monitoring 
EM environments which are hazardous for human health. International limits for the 
exposure of humans from non-ionising radiation [ICNIRP, 1998] (EMF's) exist to 
protect those working in risk areas and the general public. To this end several 
manufacturers have produced EMF detectors for personal dosimetry or for area 
monitoring [Holaday, 2006], [Narda, 2006].
EMF detectors generally comprise of a diode detector coupled together with a 
thermocouple based sensor which detects the energy deposited in the sensor. This is 
because the human exposure limits are related to the magnitude of the RF energy 
deposited in the human body.
Employing an EMF detector as the sensor element for an EMDDS has the following 
advantages:
o Available technology, proven for EMF detection
o Ease of integration with computer network equipment (in some case)
o Personal dosimetry devices are compact and battery operated
However there are several disadvantages to employing an indicator based on this 
technology:
o Since exposure limits are based on body heating effects the EMF detector 
essentially averages exposure over a period of time (6 minutes). Impulsive signals 
such as those characterised by Hyperband waveforms may not exceed the human
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exposure limit and therefore will be undetected even though exposure to 
electronics can induce disruptive effects
o It may be difficult to adjust or tailor the detection threshold for a proprietary 
device
o The EMF detectors available do not in general characterise the detected EM field
o The cost per unit of even a basic personal dosimeter is an appreciable portion of 
the budget, requirement (R9). Significant development effort may be required to 
adapt the technology for EM disruption detection
4.3.2.3 Diode Detectors
Diode detection is the fundamental process by which amplitude demodulation is 
achieved in an RF receiver and is part of the detection mechanism for EMF monitors. 
Diode detection exploits the process of rectification. Rectification is also a significant 
part of the process which induces the undesirable effects in electronics (demodulation via 
rectification by intentional or parasitic non linear elements).
A diode is a non linear semiconductor device which conducts current in one direction 









Figure 61: Typical diode V-I curve
In the forward direction (right hand side of this Figure) the diode conducts current after 
some minimum threshold (commonly 0.6 Volts). In the reverse direction the diode will
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not conduct (although there will inevitably be some leakage current), until a breakdown 
voltage is reached when the diode can conduct potentially damaging currents.






Figure 62: Diode detection process and circuit
Essentially the circuit is a half wave rectifier whereby the envelope or modulation of the 
input signal 5{t} is stripped off of the higher frequency 'carrier' component. The 
remaining output signal m{t] is representative of the envelope of the signal and is 
sometimes referred to as the baseband or video signal. The amplitude of the output signal 
is roughly proportional to the power in the input signal.
The capacitive reactance of the diode junction but principally the capacitor C in the 
circuit effectively determines the upper frequency limit and therefore bandwidth of the 
detector. This in turn limits the minimum rise and fall time of the detector circuit and 
therefore the minimum duration of RF pulse that can be detected. Both the upper and 
lower frequency limits described in requirement (R2) may be challenging to achieve.
Examples of using this technical approach for achieving an EM field sensor/detector 
have been found [Dybdal, 1992], [Bassen, 1983] and to some extent are commercially 
available [Credence, 2005]. However, these existing examples do not meet the other 
essential requirements for a minimal essential EMDDS.
A bespoke design of a diode detection circuit would be necessary to achieve a workable 
solution. The detection circuit must comprise of a diode with a very low turn on voltage, 
low capacitance and high breakdown strength. The other circuit elements must also 
feature very low capacitance and high impedance to maximise pulse with response and
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sensitivity, respectively. Some form of rudimentary ultra broad band antenna will be 
required to capture the RF signal.
Although this device is primarily electronic in design the simplicity and therefore low 
costs involved make this a viable candidate. There is no doubt that if threshold levels (i.e. 
the breakdown voltage) are exceeded then this device could be damaged by EM 
disruption. However, since the cost of a basic diode detector circuit is likely to be low (a 
few tens of pounds) then a simple replacement scheme could be used. Significant 
developmental work is required to investigate whether this simple design is effective 
with all types of EM disrupter waveforms.
4.3.2.4 Electro-optic detectors
The category of electro optic detectors covers any device that changes some property of 
light (modulation, intensity, wavelength, etc.) when an external electromagnetic field is 
applied. The light source is commonly a laser and the electro-optic device is usually a 
crystal although polar liquids are also found to exhibit the phenomenon. Electric field 
detectors based around bi-refringent crystals which exhibit the Pockel's effect have been 
found in the literature [Kanda, 1992], [Zaldivar, 2004], [Deibel, 2003] and commercial 
sensors are also available [Torihata, 2003].
A detector which is based on electro-optic technology such as an Integrated Optical 






Figure 63: Electro-optic detection system components
EM Detectors based on this technology generally employ an optical fibre to connect the 
sensitive detection electronics to the electro-optical crystal sensor. The sensor and 
polarising elements form a unit the size of a matchbox which is placed in the electric
Page 165 of 253
UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN_____________________PHD THESIS 
field. The laser and detection circuits may then be placed at up to 50 m away and coupled 
via fibre optic cable. The main application of these devices appears to be for measuring 
electric fields in cavities or close to structures (near field scanning) where conventional 
sensor types would either be too physically large or would perturb the field they are 
trying to measure.
Employing an electro-optic detector for an EMDDS has the following advantages: 
o Available technology although not proven for this application
o Robustness, the sensing element (crystal) can withstand a large electric field 
without damage up to the dielectric breakdown voltage of the crystal. There is also 
inherent electrical isolation between the sensing element and the detection engine 
electronics via optical fibre
o Very wide instantaneous bandwidth of the sensing element 
o Ease of integration with computer network equipment
However there are several disadvantages to employing a detector based on this 
technology:
o Most of the research in this area has concentrated on increasing the measurement 
sensitivity of the devices whereas the requirement is for a robust and fairly 
insensitive device. The feasibility of an indicator based on this technology is not in 
doubt but some development would be required to tailor the technology to this 
application
o The cost per unit of the necessary components is an appreciable portion of the 
budget. For example a high power diode laser alone can cost greater than £5,000
4.3.2.5 RF Transducers
This is a broad category covering detectors which make use of some indirect physical
property to detect electric fields. Examples of this are:
1) Neon or other inert gas lamps [Thickpenny, 1971 ], [Yamamoto, 1995]
2) Liquid crystals [Giannini, 1977], [Sato, 1998]
3) Fuses [Seregelyi, 1999], [Eriksson, 2002] 
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All of these technologies are inexpensive (a few tens of pounds at most) and therefore 
meet essential requirement (R9). For this point alone and given the discussion above 
these technologies warrant some further investigation.
Neon and fluorescent lamps (both examples of gas discharge tubes) are known to 
fluoresce or produce a glow discharge in the presence of high electric fields. A range of 
conventional commercially available lamps were selected and a crude experiment was 
conducted to evaluate the suitability of this method of detection. The lamps were 
illuminated with Hyperband electromagnetic fields of varying amplitude and repetition 
frequency. The Hyperband waveform was selected for this test because it was suspected 
that the lamps would respond to energy deposition (heating) to initiate the glow 
discharge. Hyperband was therefore chosen because of the characteristic low average 
power density of this waveform type. The lamps failed to illuminate even with 
application of an external bias current. It is postulated that the pulse duration and average 
power density of the incident fields were too low to cause a glow discharge. This 
approach does not seem feasible at this stage.
Liquid crystal detectors have also been rejected as it was ascertained that the primary 
mechanism (colour change) is an average power phenomena whereby the heating caused 
by an incident electromagnetic field causes a change in colour of the liquid crystal 
material. Given the very low average power content of a Hyperband waveform there is 
insufficient energy deposition (heating) for this type of sensor.
Fuses are primarily used as protection devices for electronic systems exposed to over 
voltage or excess currents. It is postulated that the fusing (vaporisation of a thin 
conductor) can be initiated by high intensity electric fields as a means of detection. In a 
very simple design fuses are formed on thermal paper or micron thin p.c.b.'s and coupled 
to a planar antenna structure such as a Vivaldi antenna which provides RF signal gain. 
From the data available these devices appear to have insufficient sensitivity to detect 
Hyperband waveforms. The antenna also has to be tuned (i.e. narrowband) to optimally 
convert the electric field to a voltage or current stress of sufficient magnitude to vaporise 
the fuse. On a functional level the fuses generally require microscopic analysis after 
exposure to ascertain the failure method and it is known that they can be prone to damage 
from electro static discharge. These factors severely limit the application of fuses as 
transducer technologies for application to the EMDDS.
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4.3.3 Summary and Down Selection
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Table 30: EMDDS sensor element down selection
The detection of impulses such as those produced by Hyperband EM disrupters appears 
to be a key limitation for many of the candidate technologies. Cost is also a significant 
limiting factor.
Development of an EMDDS based on diode detection was selected for further 
consideration. On the basis that the essential concept and principal of using diode 
detection for detecting EM disruptive threats to INFOSEC and given that no other
Page 168 of 253
UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN PnD THESIS
concepts of this type were found in the literature a patent application was filed for the 
concept at the outset of this study [Hoad, 2002].
The realisation of the concept together with potential disadvantages of this technique and 
especially the lack of robustness of the detector to very high power transients were 
subsequently evaluated.
4.3.4 Minimum Essential EMDDS Phase 1 Prototype
The diode detection principle was selected for development. An essential design driver 
was detection of Hyperband waveforms for the reasons discussed above. In principle the 
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Figure 64: Block diagram of a diode based detector
Many circuit options and components are possible for each sub-system however, the 
essential requirement was to keep the design simple in order to keep costs manageable 
(R9).
4.3.4.1 Battery Conditioning / Power Supply
It is a desirable requirement (R8) that the detector should function from a battery supply. 
This is principally because the detector must continue to provide detection in the event of 
a power outage since power outage may be a consequence of EM disruptor action. Also 
power cables or any other conductive cables connected to the EMDDS would require 
careful decoupling or filtering. Cables can act as antennas coupling EM stress directly
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into the system and this could skew the detector response or worse create a direct path for 
inducing damage to the detector.
Generally the size and longevity of the battery pack has a large influence on the 
packaging dimensions of the device as can be witnessed from mobile phone technology. 
It was therefore reasonable at this stage of the development to base the design on a single 
+9V supply based on a single PP3 cell.
The design also included a regulator to stabilise the battery supply output and a low 
power battery status monitor which provides indication of the condition of the batteries.
4.3.4.2 The Antenna
The function of the antenna is to convert the EM disruptive stress (E field / power 
density) into a bias voltage at the diode to enable detection. Proprietary Hyperband 
(UWB) antennas are not particularly compact as has been discussed. In any case the 
antenna should not be a separate component but ideally an integral part of the EMDDS. 
Perhaps the most challenging feature required is that the antenna bandwidth should 
ideally extend down to 100 MHz. The antenna physical length or other geometrical 
feature governs the resonant frequency range and therefore the effective bandwidth. A 
half wave dipole (a very common resonant antenna type) would need to be 1.5 m long for 
maximum efficiency at 100MHz. An antenna with this dimension would significantly 
limit the compactness (R8) of the EMDDS.
However, periodic antennas [Mayes, 1992] and in particular fractal and bent wire 
antennas [Werner, 2003] have been shown to offer very broadband performance in a very 
compact form. Fractal antennas exploit replication of geometric patterns to improve the 
bandwidth of the antenna.
A crude fractal or bent wire antenna design based on a square loop geometry was 
identified as the most practical solution. The square loop design was chosen because it 
was simple to implement in Veroboard (a circuit prototyping board) and p.c.b. layouts. 
The geometry of the antenna design is shown in Figure 65.
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Figure 65: Nested square periodic antenna design
The overall aim of the antenna design was to utilise as many p.c.b. traces as possible to 
maximise the antenna wire length in a compact manner. The circuit board as a whole acts 
as an antenna and therefore the lengths of track between components act as resonant 
structures that also contribute to the length of the different antennas.
4.3.4.3 The Diode Detector
The diodes selected for the prototype was from the Agilent technologies 5082-2800 
series [Agilent, 1999]. These diodes possess a very low turn on voltage (V» to maximise 
sensitivity, a very low junction capacitance to maximise the detection bandwidth and a 
very high reverse breakdown threshold to improve the robustness of the component. 
These are Schottky barrier type diodes which are the preferred types for detector 
applications and incorporate a 'guard ring' design implemented to increase the 
breakdown threshold. The 5082-2835 diode was selected for this application having the 





Turn on Voltage VF
(V)
0.34
Max. Capacitance CF 
(pF)
1.0
Table 31: Detector diode 5082-2835 specification values
4.3.4.4 The Buffer Amplifier
In order to convert the very small diode bias voltage into a more usable voltage/current
and to maximise the high frequency cut-off and impulse response of the EMDDS a buffer
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amplifier circuit was used. The buffer amplifier must therefore possess a very high input 
impedance, very low input capacitance and very broad bandwidth. Operational 
Amplifiers (Op-amps) are devices which are particularly suited to these requirements. 
Many different types of Op-amp are available however, given that for simplicity the 
device should operate from a single supply rail this limits the choice of available devices.
The TLC 27 series of LinCMOS low power operational amplifiers has the following 








The Op-amp was required to produce an output swing to the positive supply rail when 
there is sufficient rectified voltage across the detector diode. The Op-amp was configured 




Figure 66: Buffer amplifier circuit
The feedback resistor Rf was set to a very high value so that some feedback is provided 
for stability of the device without compromising the very high input impedance.
The diode detector and the amplifier together formed the primary detector circuit 
elements.
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4.3.4.5 The Threshold Comparator
The function of this circuit element is to compare the detected voltage received at the
input with a pre-set reference voltage (derived from susceptibility threshold data) and to
send an output signal to the alarm circuit element when the voltage from the detector
exceeds the reference voltage. Many options for the threshold comparator circuit element
were possible but in the interest of simplicity a 555 timer integrated circuit device was
chosen.
The threshold comparator design is shown in Figure 67 and comprises a 555 timer 
integrated circuit configured in monostable mode.
Vcc
-o
Figure 67: The threshold/comparator circuit element
The comparator circuit comprises of a variable potentiometer Rv and a fixed resistor Rl 
arranged in series for setting an adjustable limit for the reference voltage against which 
the output of the diode detector/buffer amplifier is compared. The potentiometer level is 
manually adjusted or calibrated to provide threshold detection at the level informed by 
the susceptibility test data discussed in Stage II.
The 555 timer circuit comprises a trigger pin (TR), a control voltage pin (CV) and an 
output pin (O/P). The TR pin acts as an input for the comparator and is connected to the 
output of the buffer amplifier circuit element. The CV pin is connected to Rv and Rl, and 
the output pin is connected to the alarm circuit element. When a negative going voltage 
pulse is applied to the TR pin the 555 timer emits a pulse at the output pin.
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The time duration of the output pulse is roughly calculated using Equation 10.
'" =LIR* C .......(Eq. 10)
Where tw is the output pulse width
RA is the fixed timing resistor 
And C is the fixed timing capacitor
For a 40 ms pulse width (necessary for the alarm circuit element) values for RA of 18 kQ 
and a value for C of 2.2 u.F were chosen. A shorter or longer output pulse can be 
obtained by varying these components.
The threshold comparator circuit element also comprises a latching and reset circuit. The 
function of the latch is to continue to provide an output signal to the alarm circuit 
element so that the alarm is maintained after the EM disruptive stress has subsided. This 
is important since it has been shown that EM disruption may comprise of a short 
(microsecond) burst of broadband pulses. Without a latching means an alarm generated 
by the EMDDS might be missed. The reset switch is also necessary to reset the output of 
the latch.
The latching circuit comprises of a NAND gate arranged so that once triggered the output 
stays at a non zero voltage.
4.3.4.6 The Alarm
As with the other circuit elements a simple, compact, and low power solution was 
required. It was therefore decided not to have an output which could be automatically 
stored or logged at this stage of the prototype development. A simplistic visual and 
audible alarm output was therefore chosen which was deemed adequate to facilitate 
testing of the prototype. A Light Emitting Diode (l.e.d.) and/a piezoelectric buzzer which 
are activated when an output signal from the threshold comparator/latch is received was 
therefore selected as the preferred solution.
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4.3.4.7 Implementation
A physical prototype of the Phase 1 EMDDS implemented on Veroboard was 
manufactured. This prototype comprises all of those elements described as the minimum 
essential EMDDS and is shown in Figure 68.
Figure 68: Phase 1 prototype minimum essential EMDDS implementation
The first prototype was implemented on Veroboard because it was cost effective, simple 
to modify and more convenient for diagnostic testing than p.c.b. The antenna diode 
element comprises of several loops implemented in vertical orientation on a daughter 
board above the main circuit board and connected to the main circuit board via a short 
cable.
4.3.5 Testing of the Phase 1 Prototype
The aims of the test campaign for the first prototype were to:
o Discover whether the EMDDS can detect the principal disruptor waveform types 
(microwave Hypoband, Hyperband, Mesoband and EMP)
o Find design flaws and weaknesses
o Ascertain the sensitivity/threshold of the EMDDS
o Develop a simple repeatable test protocol for evaluation of the EMDDS
o Identify improvements to the design
Page 175 of 253
UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN___________________ PHD THESIS 
4.3.5.1 UWB Testing of the Phase 1 Prototype
As discussed Hyperband disruptor waveforms are considered to be the most difficult to 
detect because of the very high peak power, very low average power, and very wide 
instantaneous bandwidth. Due to the coupling efficiency factor Hyperband waveforms 
appear to demonstrate the lowest threshold for inducing susceptibility to computer 
systems compared to other waveform types. It seemed reasonable therefore to begin the 
test and evaluation of the EMDDS by evaluating it with a Hyperband waveform.
The data discussed previously from Nitsch et al [Nitsch, 2005] suggests that the threshold 
for effects to computer systems from Hyperband type waveforms can occur with a 200 
Hz p.r.f. with a 2.5 ns pulse width and a peak E field of 3 kV/m. This has been equated to 
an effective average power density of 12 W/m2.
It was not possible to locate a Hyperband source which provided the same pulse 
characteristics as the Nitsch UWB source but fortunately a laboratory UWB Avalanche 
pulse generator manufactured by Kentech Instruments [Kentech, 2007] became available 
for a short time. This pulse generator produces a bipolar Hyperband impulse with a 
risetime of 100 ps approx. and a Full Width Half Max (FWHM) of 250 ps approx. With 
this pulse generator it was possible to vary the p.r.f. from a few Hz up to 50 kHz.
The UWB pulse generator has a fixed output of 4 kV into the antenna. Calibration of the 
pulse generator system demonstrated that it was capable of producing up to 1.5 kV/m 
peak radiated E field at 1 m from the antenna. The field strength can be reduced by 
adding attenuation into the transmitting path.
The peak E field is lower than that of the Nitsch Hyperband pulse generator and the pulse 
width is markedly shorter. However, using the principle of effective average power 
density it is possible to calculate the range of p.r.f's available from the Kentech UWB 
pulse generator which are equivalent to or exceed the Nitsch Hyperband pulse generator. 
Given the parameters discussed, Figure 69 shows the p.r.f range where the Kentech pulse 
generator reaches the same effective average power density as the Nitsch Hyperband 
(UWB) computer susceptibility threshold.
Page 176 of 253































































100 1000 10000 
Pulse Repetition Frequency [Hz]
100000
Figure 69: Minimum UWB Effective average power density curve compared with Kentech
output capability
This graph shows that at the maximum output of the Kentech UWB pulse generator 1.5 
kV/m the required p.r.f. must exceed 8 kHz to achieve the same effective average power 
density as the Nitsch Hyperband generator to achieve the susceptibility threshold.
The first prototype EMDDS was placed within the Hyperband E field generated by the 
Kentech UWB pulse generator. The p.r.f. was carefully controlled by triggering the 
UWB pulse generator from a pulse synthesiser. The test configuration is shown in Figure 
70.
Figure 70: UWB Test Configuration
The EMDDS was placed on a polystyrene block within a shielded room at 1 m from the 
UWB transmitting antenna. The magnitude of the electric field was adjusted using fixed
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coaxial attenuators. At fixed magnitudes (up to the maximum 1.5 kV/m) the p.r.f. of the 
UWB pulse generator was increased until an audible and visual alarm was produced by 
the EMDDS. The magnitude of the peak E field and the p.r.f at which the EMDDS 


















































Table 32: Hyperband (UWB) test results for the Phase 1 prototype
The peak E field strength and p.r.f where the EMDDS produced an alarm has been 
plotted in Figure 71 together with the required detection threshold level derived from the 
Nitsch data.
—— Required detection threshold 
* EMDDS alarm threshold
100 1000 10000 
p.r.f[Hz]
100000
Figure 71: Phase 1 prototype EMDDS Hyperband (UWB) detection threshold in terms of
peak E field
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This graph shows that the Phase 1 prototype EMDDS has sufficient sensitivity to detect 
Hyperband disrupter waveforms. In fact the EMDDS sensitivity is below that which is 
required by at least an order of magnitude. The required detection threshold curve (solid 
dark blue line) represents the average power required to induce susceptibility to computer 
systems from Hyperband disrupters. Detection of disruption below this curve could lead 
to false alarms from the EMDDS. The threshold level potentiometer was adjusted until 
the detection threshold approximately coincided with a point 6dB below the required 
detection threshold (i.e. at half the magnitude of the required detection threshold). The 
figure of 6dB below the required threshold was selected as a balance between providing 
detection before the onset of susceptibility whilst trying to minimise false alarms. It is 
anticipated that if the EMDDS is deployed the threshold can be adjusted to suit the 
particular requirements of scenario.
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Figure 72: Phase 1 EMDDS alarm threshold adjustment
4.3.5.2 Microwave Hypoband Testing of the Phase 1 Prototype
Unfortunately it was not possible to gain access to a very high power full threat 
microwave Hypoband simulator such as the Orion HPM simulator at the required time 
largely because of the very high cost involved in conducting trials of this nature. It was 
therefore not possible to carry out extensive sensitivity threshold and damage testing with 
an HPM simulator which is representative of the state of the art.
The reverberation chamber used for the susceptibility tests discussed in Section 3.2 was 
also unavailable for threshold/sensitivity testing of the Phase 1 prototype. An acceptable
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alternative was to make use of the QinetiQ Farnborough GTEM cell. This test facility 
was in lower demand because only smaller test objects (test object dimensions less than 
0.5 m3) can be tested within the cell. The GTEM cell is shown in Figure 73.
Figure 73: GTEM cell
The GTEM cell is a simple bounded wave simulator with a coaxial feed whereby RF 
voltage applied to the cell generates an electric field between two tapered parallel 
conductors (antenna elements) within the cell. The cell is loaded at the ends of the 
antenna elements and the sides are shielded so that there is no radiation outside of the 
cell. However, the GTEM cell cannot support very high power RF inputs and the 
capability to apply complex wave-shapes such as those typified by Hyperband EM 
disrupters is not possible. However it is possible to simulate Hypoband (HPM) 
waveforms at low power and CW input is also possible.
A 20 Watt Amplifier Research Inc. amplifier was used with the capability of generating a 
maximum E field strength in the test volume of 100 V/m at the 1 m separation point. A 
Hewlett Packard synthesiser was used to drive the input of the amplifier.
Figure 74 shows the frequency response of the EMDDS in terms of electric field 
strength.
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Figure 74: Frequency response/sensitivity plot of the Phase 1 prototype EMDDS to 
Hypoband waveforms in terms of peak E-Field
This graph demonstrates that the Phase 1 prototype was capable of detecting Hypoband 
waveforms across the required frequency range. However, it is necessary to define the 
required sensitivity of the detector for this waveform type so that the performance of the 
detector can be qualified.
4.3.5.3 Definition of the Required Sensitivity
The required sensitivity for the EMDDS for Hypoband waveforms required careful 
consideration. It was decided that a 'required sensitivity' curve should be generated from 
the susceptibility data for the 2.6 GHz Celeron computer shown in Figure 33 and 
discussed in Stage II, Section 3. This particular data set was selected from the total 
susceptibility data set including those data from other authors for two reasons:
1. The specification of computer (2.6 GHz) was considered to be broadly 
representative of the higher specification of computers found in most businesses 
at this time and therefore has some longevity as a benchmark
2. The data from the other authors discussed earlier has many inherent unknown 
factors such as, the modulation used, the BUT conditions and configuration, the 
accuracy of magnitude of the susceptibility threshold data and the overall 
uncertainty of the measurement as discussed in Section 3.6
Figure 75 shows the 2.6 GHz Celeron susceptibility data together with a curve fitted to 
the mean of the data set and a 'required sensitivity curve' which is 6 dB below the fitted 
curve.
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Figure 75: Fitted (red dashed line) and required sensitivity curves (solid red line)
The fitted curve is flat in the frequency range from 100 MHz to 400 MHz. This is due to 
the fact observed from the network test data (Section 3.5.6) that cable coupling starts to 
dominate the susceptibility threshold level at around these frequencies whereas aperture 
coupling appears to dominate at around 400MHz and above. The fitted curve from 100 
MHz to 400 MHz is an average of the susceptibility values recorded in this frequency 
range. The fitted curve above 400 MHz is a linearly increasing 10 dB/decade change in 
frequency fit to the actual data. The fitted curve shape is broadly representative of the 
canonical coupling curve discussed in Appendix A, Section 6.5.
The actual victim system response is known to have highly resonant features. In the 
100 MHz to 400 MHz region these will be due to the impinging disruptor wavelength 
becoming comparable with specific cable lengths on the victim system. Some of these 
resonant features can be seen in the graph above. However, as discussed the geometry 
and layout of the cable will have a large impact on the frequency at which the resonance 
will occur. It is therefore necessary to allow for this variance. The same variance must 
also be considered for the aperture coupling region. The required sensitivity curve is 6 
dB below the fitted values and represents a range of likely susceptibility values which 
may occur whilst attempting to achieve a balance between detection before the onset of 
susceptibility and the creation of false alarms, as discussed earlier.
Figure 76 shows the detection threshold achieved by the Phase 1 prototype EMDDS 
together with the required sensitivity level.
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Figure 76: Frequency response/sensitivity plot of the Phase 1 prototype EMDDS compared
with the 'required sensitivity' curve
It can be seen from this graph that the detection threshold of the EMDDS is below the 
fitted required sensitivity curve. This demonstrates that the detector is broadly capable of 
detecting Hypoband waveforms within the range 100 MHz to at least 2.5 GHz. Detection 
was actually observed up to 8 GHz but the GTEM cell is out of calibration above 2.5 
GHz so calibrated values were not recorded. It should be noted that detection below 100 
MHz and even down to 10 MHz was also achieved. However, detection over the 10 MHz 
to 100 MHz frequency range is not a requirement for the radiated EM disruption sensor. 
This frequency range will be addressed through the conducted detector requirement 
specification.
There was an apparent desensitising of the EMDDS at 300 MHz where detection was 
only just achieved at the maximum output of the amplifier in use (~ 20 W/m2 ). It was 
assumed likely that this was a peculiarity of the prototype EMDDS antenna geometry. 
The antenna loop dimensions were modified in an attempt to shift this null point to below 
100 MHz. The antenna elements required re-design in any case since a 'daughter board' 
and cable arrangement was more complicated and costly to achieve for a packaged 
detector. The Ideal design would be to incorporate the antenna on to the main p.c.b.
4.3.5.4 Hypoband Simulator Full Threat Testing
An opportunity arose to test the Phase 1 prototype EMDDS using the Orion HPM 
simulator located at QinetiQ Pershore. This simulator was discussed in Section 2.3.4.2.4 
and produces an Hypoband waveform.
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The simulator is very expensive to operate and consequently only half a day of test time 
was available at the end of another trial.
The Phase 1 prototype detector was placed in the Orion test range and exposed to five 
200 ns pulses in a one second burst. The carrier frequency of the Hypoband waveform 
was 1.3 GHz and the peak E field was measured as 8 kV/m. It was found that this level 
was sufficient to cause damage to the detector. The failure manifested as a continuous 
audible and visual alarm that could not be reset.
The average power density of the burst was 170 mW/m2 which was well within the 
detection range of the EMDDS, as can be seen by considering Figure 76. No damage was 
sustained to the detector during low power Hypoband laboratory experiments with 
average power density magnitudes up to 20 times greater than this level. However, the 
peak power density of the Orion Hypoband pulse equates to 170 kW/m2 per pulse over 
200 ns. This result indicates that the failure mechanism is likely to be related to the rate 
of energy deposition.
The primary detection diodes were subsequently analysed. Measurements were made of 
the forward resistance of the diodes which was found to be zero Ohms (specification 
value ~ 300 Ohms). The diodes had effectively failed short circuit indicating that the high 
rate of energy deposition effectively caused the diode to weld across the semiconductor 
junction.
It was expected that the diodes would fail open circuit through vaporisation of the bond 
wires or the junction. This short circuit failure mode was in fact considered to be 
advantageous since at least an alarm was provided of the failure. An open circuit failure 
mode would result in the EMDDS appearing to be functional but effectively being deaf 
to EM disruptive threats.
Whilst the EMDDS still provides indication of EM disruption even through failure 
replacement of the diodes every time the EMDDS detects severe EM disruption is 
considered undesirable (although the actually cost of the components is only a few 
pounds). Given that the detector may be exposed to a wide variety of hostile disruptive 
environments and because of the essential requirement for the detector to be cost 
effective (R9) some form of diode protection is deemed necessary to improve the 
resilience of the EMDDS.
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4.3.6 Phase 1 Prototype EMDDS Performance Summary
The Phase 1 prototype EMDDS meets requirements (Rl), (R2) and (R3) of the minimum 
essential EMDDS. The prototype was demonstrated to detect Hyperband waveforms with 
sufficient sensitivity margin and this was considered to be a key challenge.
The Phase 1 prototype also performed satisfactorily in laboratory based experiments 
easily achieving the desired sensitivity level for Hypoband waveforms. However, some 
form of protection mechanism for the primary detection diodes was deemed necessary 
following full threat Hypoband simulator testing although advantageously the detector 
provides detection of very high power disruptive events and alarm of failure. The 
robustness of the Phase 1 prototype and the engineered design must be substantially 
improved. The EMDDS must also incorporate a data logging function to meet essential 
requirement (R4).
4.3.7 Minimum Essential EMDDS Second Phase
Figure 77 and Figure 78 show the re-designed minimum essential EMDDS p.c.b. and
enclosure respectively.
Figure 77: Phase 2 EMDDS showing the redesigned p.c.b. implementation a) topside and b)
underside
Figure 78: Phase 2 EMDDS photograph of the complete assembly
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The Phase 2 EMDDS featured the following improvements: 
o Full p.c.b. layout
o Surface Mount Technology (SMT) design to reduce package dimensions 
o Incorporation of a protection circuit and 'Hi' / 'Lo' alarms 
o A single event BMP monitor 
o A very low power battery status monitor circuit 
o A robust enclosure 
o Lower power consumption
4.3.7.1 The Protection Circuit
Following full threat HPM testing ways to improve the failure threshold were researched. 
This is a complex problem because many standard protection schemes (shielding, 
limiting etc. as discussed in Section 2.8) would affect the sensitivity or responsiveness of 
the detector. The chosen approach was to incorporate a more robust diode in parallel with 
the highly sensitive primary detection diode together with a fast semiconductor switch 
which removes the sensitive diode from the circuit when the more robust diode is 
activated. This approach is similar to circumvention techniques used for hardening and 
allows for two levels of alarm indication denoted 'Hi' level and 'Lo' level to be 
provided.
A more robust series of diodes were identified. The 5082-2800 diode was selected for 





Turn on Voltage VF
(V)
0.41
Max. Capacitance CF 
(pF)
2.0
Table 33: Detector diode 5082-2000 specification values
Importantly this diode has a much higher reverse break down voltage than the sensitive 
primary detector diode having a VBR of 70V compared with a VBR of 8V for the 5082- 
2835.
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When the more sensitive diode (5082-2835) produces the detection response a 'Lo' alarm 
is generated, when the more robust diode (5082-2800) produces the detection response 
(at higher EM stress thresholds) a 'Hi' alarm is generated. Thus the alarms provide a 
qualitative indication of the severity of the EM stress.
Unfortunately it was not possible to get access to the ORION Hypoband simulator to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the protection circuit.
4.3.7.2 The Battery Status Monitor and Power Consumption
It was considered necessary to incorporate a visual battery status monitor within the 
detector. The function of this monitor was to alert the user that the batteries required 
replacement since the EMDDS would fail to alarm if the batteries were below a certain 
threshold. Therefore a simple blinking l.e.d. and level detection circuit was incorporated 
in to the second phase design.
A clear aim for this phase was reduction in power consumption. The Phase 1 prototype 
was found to require 80mA in quiescent (no alarm) mode. Considering a good quality 9 
Volt PP3 battery with 120 mA h rating, the expected lifetime of the prototype circuit was 
only 2 to 3 hours. The Phase 2 design reduced the current consumption to 1mA, 
facilitating the use of four 1.5V AAA cells and effectively extending the lifetime by 120 
times. These cells have a very compact profile, are commonly available and can have a 
battery life rating of up to 1200 mA h.
4.3.7.3 BMP Monitor
An BMP monitor was incorporated in order to provide detection of single non-repetitive 
high peak power pulses. This detector comprises of a single 5082-2800 diode and 
dedicated amplifier with a latching circuit. This development was deemed necessary 
because the Hyperband sensitivity tests indicated that there was a limit on the minimum 
p.r.f. that could be detected.
A limited performance test was carried out with the EMDDS within the QinetiQ NEMP 
simulator. The EMP detector element was found to detect a single non-repetitive BMP 
pulse (tr ~ 5 ns, FWHM ~ 150 ns) at a peak E field magnitude of 25 kV/m. The IEC EMP 
waveform standard has a magnitude of 50 kV/m. Therefore, this demonstrates the 
effectiveness of the design.
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4.3.8 Performance of the Phase 2 EMDDS
The Hyperband and low power Hypoband frequency sensitivity response of the Phase 2 
design was evaluated and compared to the initial prototype. The Hyperband sensitivity 
was found to be nominally identical to the Phase 1 prototype. The results of the 
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Figure 79: Sensitivity of the Phase 2 EMDDS compared with the Phase 1 prototype
4.3.9 Phase 2 EMDDS Summary
The second phase EMDDS meets the minimal essential EMDDS requirements (Rl), 
(R2), (R3), (R4) and (R9). It is robust, portable, and proven in the laboratory 
experiments. The predicted build cost per unit is £1000 approx. which could be reduced 
significantly with volume production of the detector enclosure. This cost is well within 
the budgetary cost. The Phase 2 design differentiates between 'Hi', 'Lo' and EMP types 
of EM disruptive events.
This embodiment of the EMDDS is deployable as a standalone detector which could be 
positioned adjacent to potential victim computer systems to provide detection of EM 
disruptive threats of sufficient magnitude to disrupt computer systems. This system has 
the functionality to provide alarms for EM disruptive attacks which could facilitate 
expedient incident response and recovery.
However, the EMDDS in this embodiment does not have the utility to store data and only 
performs a simple alarm function. Valuable evidential information could possibly be 
extracted manually for example in the form of manual recording of alarm incidents by a 
recognised security professional.
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In order to test the hypothesis of this thesis however it is necessary to expand on the 
minimum essential EMDDS as identified by requirements (Rll) and (R13) to 
incorporate some form of secure data logging.
4.3.10 Minimum Essential EMDDS Third Phase
4.3.10.1 Aims for the Phase 3 Design
The primary aim of the Phase 3 implementation of the EMDDS was to provide a simple 
data logging feature. In the simplest form the minimum data requirement is an event time 
and date stamp. The type of event ('Hi', 'Lo', and BMP) would also be a useful 
parameter to record.
Dedicated data loggers are available but given requirement (Rl 1) the use of a computer 
to act as the data logger and command console was considered to be the most suitable. 
The detector and computer command console can then be easily integrated with a 
computer network using conventional network architectures and appear like any other 
IDS sensor. However, one problematic issue that this concept presents is that the host 
computer will be susceptible to EM disruption. Specific hardening measures are therefore 
necessary for the computer host element of the EMDDS. This is not considered to be too 
onerous as many mitigation methods are well established.
A Laptop computer was used for the command console. This allows for the Phase 3 
EMDDS design to be powered from the host command console thus removing the 
requirement for batteries since battery back up is available from the Laptop.
The Universal Serial Bus (USB) protocol [USB, 2000] allows for powering of peripheral 
systems components from the computer host however insufficient details of the protocol 
and a lack of commercially available components meant that other options must be 
explored. The RS 232 serial port [RS232, 2006] was selected. Whilst this port is not 
traditionally used to power peripherals sufficient current can be drawn from the serial 
port for the EMDDS application.
Finally another aim for the Phase 3 design was to completely seal the EMDDS sensor 
element such that there were no manual controls or indicators of any kind. Detection will 
be provided by the sensor as a control word using the RS232 protocol. This control word 
should be interpreted by the software to give status and indication information. This
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design aim reduces the possibility of tampering with the hardware to affect the result 
which is a desirable requirement from the forensic perspective.
Obviously the Phase 3 EMDDS should have the same functionality as earlier standalone 
designs. A concept drawing of the Phase 3 design connected to a Laptop host/command 
console via the serial port is shown in Figure 80.
Powei and output via serial or USB pott.
Figure 80: EMDDS Phase 3 concept drawing
4.3.10.2 Phase 3 hardware implementation
In order to assist with implementing the Phase 3 concept into a reasonable packaged 
design a company Laplace Instruments Ltd. were contracted to manufacture this 
implementation. Laplace Instruments Ltd. have a good reputation in the design and 
manufacture of EM test equipment including sensors [Laplace, 2007].
The Phase 3 EMDDS circuitry was implemented entirely in simple hard logic rather than 
more densely populated i.e. devices. A deliberate effort was made not to use micro- 
processors, micro-controllers or highly integrated components such as Application 
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC's) and Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA's) in 
an attempt to avoid the problems that may occur due to the susceptibility of such devices 
to EM disruption.
When the EMDDS is connected to the command console it appears as a standard serial 
port device. Power is drawn from the Data Terminal Ready (DTK) and Request to Send 
(RTS) lines of the RS 232 Serial interface. The other status/control lines are monitored 
by the host computer to ensure that the sensor is properly connected. The EMDDS alarm 
data outputted on the Received Data (RxD) line and the Transmitted Data (TxD) line is
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used by the host computer to check the correct operation of the sensor. Figure 81 shows a 
simplified block diagram of the circuitry.
EM 
detectors Quad latch











Figure 81: Simplified circuit diagram of the Phase 3 implementation
The Phase 3 design uses the standard RS 232 interface fitted to most Personnel 
computers. The format is 1200 baud, 8 data bits, 1 stop bit and no parity.
On an alarm event condition the sensor sends one data word (byte) containing 
information on the alarm event or events that triggered the transmission. There is a hold 
off timer incorporated within the sensor hardware which prevents the sensor from 
repeating a transmission for the duration of a pre-defined 100 ms timeout period. This 
timeout is necessary to prevent multiple system interrupts which could crash the host 
computer.
The byte structure of the output data word has the format shown below:
MSB X X X D4 D3 D2 DI 1 LSB
Where, MSB = Most Significant Bit 
LSB = Least Significant Bit
x = not used - default 0
DI = Low alarm
D2 = High alarm
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D3 = BMP alarm
D4 = Serial port requested alarm status.
The data bits are active low, e.g. '0' equals an active alarm. The top three MSB's are 
unused and could be used as a location identifier tag if multiple detectors were to be 
deployed. Examples of single fault and multiple fault codes are given in Table 34 and 
Table 35 respectively.
Binary














Table 34: Example Single Fault codes
Binary








Serial Request and EM Pulse
EM Pulse, High and Low Alarm.
High and Low Alarm
Table 35: Example Multi Fault codes
The alarm data word is stored on the host computer/command console hard disk in a 
simple text file format as shown in Figure 82.
File Edit Format View Help
X, X, x, D4, D3, D2, Dl,l|
Figure 82: Simple Text file output
4.3.10.3 Hardware Protocol
The sensor draws its power from two of the RS 232 handshake lines so these lines have 
to be configured to the correct levels for the detector to function. The remaining 
handshake lines are configured so that the presence of an external peripheral device can 
be detected by the computer host/command console. The sensor status is reported to the 
host computer via the RxD line. Any character transmitted down the TxD line will 
trigger the EMDDS to respond with its current status.
The RS 232 protocol designations for the Phase 3 EMDDS sensor are given in Table 36.
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Transmit data to the host computer
Receive status report command from host
Power to the EMDDS
Shielding
Enable EMDDS
Power to the EMDDS
Enable EMDDS
Enable EMDDS
Table 36: RS232 Interface Port pin designation
4.3.10.4 Hardware Implementation
Figure 83 shows the Phase 3 prototype p.c.b. layout and Figure 84 shows the complete 
implementation connected to a host computer/command console.
(a) (b) 
Figure 83: Phase 3 EMDDS showing the p.c.b. implementation a) topside and b) underside
Figure 84: Phase 3 computer linked EMDDS and hosl computer/command console
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4.3.10.5 Phase 3 Software Implementation and Functionality
A Visual Basic software application was developed to interpret the EMDDS output word 
and display a time stamped visual warning. This software automatically loads and 
becomes active every time the host computer/command console is switched on. As the 
software loads a message window appears briefly to remind the user that the EMDDS 
system has been activated. It then becomes dormant in the background although the task 
bar shows a small icon to show it the EMDDS is armed as shown in Figure 85.
EMDDS icon -' 
Figure 85: EMDDS icon on taskbar
When the sensor detects a disruptive EM event a pop up message window appears mid 
screen on the host computer/command console. This pop up message is always 'on top' 
and can only be cleared by acknowledging the message. If the disruptive stress persists 
then the pop up indication message appears again after a 30 second interval. There are 
three types of message displayed in accordance with the functionality with the Phase 2 
design:
o Low level EM disruption 
o High level EM disruption 
o EMP 
These indication messages are shown in Figure 86.













Figure 86: On screen indication messages
In addition to the EM disruption indication messages two other information messages are 
provided:
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o The software automatically checks that the sensor is connected if it is not 
connected a warning is given on the screen
o The software regularly checks that the sensor is operating correctly if a fault is 
detected a message is shown
4.3.11 Performance Testing of the Phase 3 EMDDS
The sensitivity of the Phase 3 design was evaluated in the QinetiQ Farnborough GTEM 
cell over the frequency range 10 MHz to 8 GHz in the same manner to the earlier Phase 1 
and 2 designs. Initial tests indicated that the Serial cable acted as an antenna and the 
detector demonstrated abnormally high sensitivity at certain frequencies. Ferrite beads 
were fixed along the cable outer and on the individual wires of the cable at the p.c.b. 
These ferrite beads increase the loss of the cable and therefore reduce the amount of 
coupling. This solution solved the sensitivity problem.
Figure 87 shows the sensitivity of the Phase 3 design compared with the Phase 2 design 
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Figure 87: Sensitivity of the Phase 3 EMDDS compared with the Phase 2 prototype
It can be seen that the sensitivity of the Phase 3 design meets the sensitivity requirements 
for EM disruption detection. Whilst it was not possible to evaluate the performance of 
this design with a Hyperband waveform (a Hyperband pulse generator was not available) 
there is enough commonality between the primary detection circuits of the Phase 1, 2 and 
3 designs to provide confidence that detection of this threat type is achievable.
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The Laptop computer was also exposed during this testing and no malfunctions to the 
laptop occurred whilst powered via the internal battery. However, in the final 
implementation of the Phase 3 design it will be necessary to provide hardening measures 
for the laptop in the form of shielding and filtering to reduce the risk of the 
laptop/command console malfunctioning during an EM disruptive event.
4.3.12 Phase 3 EMDDS Summary
The Phase 3 prototype EMDDS has been developed and evaluated. This detector has all 
of the functionality of the standalone Phase 1 and 2 designs but has improved 
functionality in the form of:
o Link to computer host enabling remote interrogation
o Event log file generation
o On screen indication of disruption
The Phase 3 design meets all of the requirements of a minimum essential EMDDS, i.e. 
Requirements (Rl), (R2), (R3), (R4), and (R9) and some of the desirable requirements 
(Rll) and (R13). It is robust, portable, and proven in the laboratory experiments. The 
predicted build cost per unit is approximately £1000 (excluding the laptop/command 
console) which could be reduced significantly with volume production of the detector 
enclosure.
4.4 The Application of the EMDDS to Incident Response
4.4.1 Introduction
The primary aims for developing the EMDDS prototype are to provide detection of EM 
disruption and as a requirement of the hypothesis to provide diagnosis. Diagnosis of 
failure is useful if it can be used to respond in a timely and directed manner to malicious 
EM incidents and further for forensic purposes.
According to the SANS institute [Murray, 2007] there are six steps to incident 
Handling/Response; Prepare, identify, contain, eradicate, recover, lessons learned. The 
preparation step involves the setting up of an appropriate incident response policy and 
plan which is considered to be a vitally important stage. An expanded form of the above 
with respect to EM disruptive attack could be:
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o Set appropriate policies - Need to understand the types of incidents that can be 
perpetrated using EM disruption
o Verify that an incident has occurred - EM phenomena detected as well as effects 
observed
o Limit the impact of the incident - Containment, isolation 
o Maintain/restore/recover business continuity
o Diagnose how the attack was executed - The need for an evidence collection 
mechanism
o Prevent future attacks or incidents - Inform a risk assessment to identify 
countermeasures
o Improve security and incident response time - Lessons learned
o Prosecute illegal activity - The need for an evidence collection forensic tool
o Keep management informed of the situation and response
In order to understand the applicability of EM disruption detection to expedite incident 
response it is therefore necessary to understand the types of incident which could be 
perpetrated using EM disruption and understand forensic processes.
4.4.2 EM Disruptive Threats - Types of incident
In the context of EM disruptive threats it is perhaps important to understand the types of 
incident which could be perpetrated using the technology. In the context of criminal 
incidents then the types of crime [Home office, 2007] which could be instigated with the 
use of this form of technology could include:
o Criminal damage
o Arson
o Robbery of business property
o Blackmail
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Of these the threat to business and business process rather than the threat to domestic 
situations is clearly the most interesting largely because the magnitude of the risk grows 
with increasing use and reliance on computer based hardware, computer based processes 
and electronic systems. A 2003 report by Axa business insurance services [Axa, 2003], 
claimed that business crime cost UK pic £8.7bn in 2002. The three most prolific crime 
types were criminal malicious damage, robbery and arson. All of these crime types could 
be committed using EM disruptors.
The business and business process in this context could refer to anything from a central 
government function, financial institution or manufacturing industry, through to retail 
industry.
In terms of High Tech crime [Kovachich and Jones, 2006] the manifestation of EM 
disrupter action has most in common with the end effects of DoS types of attack and 
perhaps logic bombs i.e. the temporary or permanent disruption of a business process or 
service as discussed in Stage I, Section 2.7.
Five reported [DHS, 2006], [Siniy, 2006] criminal usages of EM disruptors have been 
found in the literature several of these were discussed in Section 2.5:
1. In the Netherlands an individual disrupted a local financial institutions computer 
network because he was refused a loan - Type of crime: blackmail/criminal 
damage
2. In Japan two Yakuza criminals were caught using an EM disruptor on a Pachinko 
(gaming) machine to trigger a false win - Type of crime: robbery
3. In St. Petersburg, Russia a criminal used an EM disruptor to disable a security 
system on a Jewellery store, so that he could commit a robbery - Type of crime: 
robbery
4. In London a city financial institution was the target of blackmail attempt whereby 
the use of EM disruptors was threatened to be used against the financial 
institutions systems - Type of crime: blackmail
5. In Moscow, Russia a Telecommunications centre was targeted and was put out of 
commission for 24 hours denying service to 200,000 customers - Type of crime: 
blackmail/criminal damage
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4.4.3 The Forensic Process 
Forensic science can be defined as:
'...the application of science to the law... involved in the search for and examination of 
physical traces which might be useful for establishing or excluding an association 
between someone suspected of committing a crime and the scene of the crime or victim' 
[FSS, 2007].
And computer forensics can be defined as:
'...the preservation, identification, extraction, and interpretation of computer media for 
evidentiary and/or root cause analysis' [Kruse and Heiser, 2002].
A forensic investigation is primarily initiated after a crime is perceived to be committed 
and starts at the crime scene. The primary aim is to gather evidential information in 
support of a legal case against the criminal party which is prosecuted in a court of law. 
Each part of the forensic process must be carefully documented and this documentation 
forms part of the evidential information and are known as the chain of custody [Vacca, 
2002].
For computer forensics the techniques can also be used to determine the root cause of an 
event i.e. a diagnostic process in order to identify vulnerabilities so that they can be 
protected from future exploitation.
The simplified process is:
1. Acquire evidence
2. Authenticate evidence - this stage has some specific attributes when applied to 
digital evidence
3. Analyse evidence
IDS and system log files are an important tool in the computer forensic examiners 
toolbox since they can identify that a malicious event has occurred and provide a log of 
events before and subsequent to the event.
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4.4.4 The Use of EMDDS as a Forensic Tool
For computer forensics the computer can be the instrument of the crime (i.e. the hackers 
machine or the paedophiles storage media) or the victim (i.e. the hacked network). For 
the case of EM disrupters the computer or electronic process is the victim only.
In his book Kruse [Kruse and Heiser, 2002] identifies a forensic process comprised of the 
essential steps, Acquire, Authenticate and Analyse. For EM disruptive threats and the 
application of an EMDDS the techniques which could be used are discussed in the 
following sections.
4.4.4.1 Acquire
The process of acquisition to some extent depends on the type of crime committed
however, two indicators are necessary:
1. Indication that an EM event has occurred
2. Indication that the system was in some way compromised i.e. indication that a 
crime has been committed
Given the discussion about the manifestation of the threat point 1 can only be provided 
through the use of an EMDDS. The first forensic use of EMDDS is precisely in that it 
aids the security professional in the detection of an EM attack. Without an EMDDS the 
cause of the compromise (point 2) is likely to be misdiagnosed. The second forensic use 
of an EMDDS then is that it aids the security professional in the diagnosis of EM attack. 
Misdiagnosis could potentially lead to prolonged problems this is discussed in the 
following section.
The EMDDS event log, time and date stamp is therefore a key piece of evidential 
information. Of course in order to provide a log of the event the EMDDS detector and 
the command console must be impervious to EM disruption hence requirement (R4). The 
time stamping of the EMDDS Log files of each affected system may provide evidence of 
the progression of the attack.
It is likely that the EM disrupter source will be mobile. Correlating the timing interval of 
disruption together with the physical layout of affected devices may identify the path of 
the mobile disrupter. For instance if several devices close to the windows on the ground
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floor are affected this could indicate that the disrupter was perhaps in a vehicle moving 
along the street outside of the installation.
It is most likely that the indication of system compromise (point 2) will be in the form of:
o Temporary disruption of monitors, blackouts, whiteouts, flickering, banding or 
loss of image stability
o Temporary disruption of a single electronic device, computer reboot, 'blue screen', 
Latch up, loss of input functions (i.e. mouse or keyboard latch), loss of output 
function (i.e. no printer availability)
o Temporary disruption of multiple devices (not necessarily interconnected), denial 
of network services
o Persistent, repetitive temporary disruption, perhaps at random intervals
o Functional damage to devices, loss of operating environment, permanent loss of an 
essential input device
o Damage, permanent physical damage of components, component burn-out, may 
escalate to smoke and fire.
Witness statements, appropriately collected and documented should be a part of the 
evidential information.
Photographic evidence of the hardware device status is essential. Photographs of the 
visual display are important but perhaps of more value are photographs of the orientation 
of the affected device with respect to windows, doors, and access ways. Photographic 
evidence of the system cabling configuration is also very important. This evidence will 
provide clues to the potential location of the EM disruptor source.
The hardware device itself may provide some evidence only if there has been some 
physical damage. Again without the EMDDS alarm a burnt out resistor could be 
misdiagnosed as being caused by a routine electrical fault such as a power surge. For 
temporary disruption and functional damage where the software has been compromised 
there will be no physical evidence.
Computer log files for example the Windows Application and System event log files 
[Mee, 2005] may be another form of evidence. However, during the extensive
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susceptibility testing of computer systems outlined in Section 3 the event log files were 
routinely examined and very little relevant information was found. This was discussed in 
Section 3.7. However, the event log files must be captured since they may help 
corroborate evidence from obscure data sets.
Given the indiscriminate nature of EM disruption other supporting evidence may be 
obtained in the form of non targeted electronics being affected i.e. the innocent 
bystander. Examples could include:
o CCTV camera malfunction
o Fire alarm and potentially fire suppression system activation
o Telecommunications outage
o RF receiver disruption or damage (e.g. Wifi, W-LAN)
o Electronic access failure including biometric devices
o Air conditioning malfunction (through disruption of electronic sensors)
o Nuisance Residual Current Circuit Device (RCCD) tripping and fuse failures
o Erratic traffic signalling
Again the locations of these incidents could provide clues to the location and mobility of 
the EM disruptive source.
Of course in order to preserve the chain of custody it is important to document every 
evidential item including but not limited to:
o Where was the information collected
o Who took possession
o How was it stored and protected in storage
4.4.4.2 Authenticate
The key point of the authentication process with respect to an EMDDS is making sure of
the integrity of the alarm, the event log and the time-stamp.
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A well established technique used for computer forensics is the 'Hash' function. A Hash 
function is essentially a cryptographic key calculated using a mathematical algorithm. 
The Hash function is generated from the parameters of the input file to be protected and 
is therefore absolutely unique to the file to be protected. Thus alteration of the protected 
file leads to the hash function being altered which provides incontrovertible evidence of 
tampering.
The forensic examiner therefore uses the hash function to demonstrate to a court of law 
that data obtained as evidence is absolutely authentic and has not been altered throughout 
the chain of custody.
A common Hash function algorithm is MD5 [Rivest, 1992] which outputs a 128 bit hash 
value sometimes referred to as a message digest as a 32 digit hexadecimal number.
There are several freeware MD5 algorithm generators available [Whitsoft, 2007], 
[DiamondCS, 2007] and these allow the user to assign a file to the generator for 
generation of the Hash number.
The EMDDS log file shown in Figure 82 which comprises of an 8-bit data byte together 
with a time and date stamp stored in a text file can be uploaded to the generator. A 
typical Hash number generated by an EMDDS log file is:
1 b009a1 a223bf8821 cc21 a3757c579e7
For the EMDDS there is no perceived need to protect the evidential detection data from 
tampering during or shortly after an EM disruptive event. It would require a very 
sophisticated attack involving EM disruption and cyber intrusion to affect the evidential 
data. The encryption is still useful however, because it authenticates the data showing 
that it has been preserved intact since detection through collection and finally through to 
presentation in a court of law.
4.4.4.3 Analyse
The analysis element of the forensic process for cyber crimes generally involves a very 
thorough piece by piece analysis of the evidence generally conducted in a laboratory 
environment. For example Back-ups of the drive (bit stream clone) are created and a 
detailed search for further evidence is undertaken.
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For an EM disruptive event most of the useful evidence will be located at the crime scene 
as discussed in the sub-section 4.4.4.1. Analysis of the affected hardware in a laboratory 
may be useful if there is physical damage however, this is unlikely to help to trace the 
source of the attack. Evidence of damage may be useful for prosecuting some types of 
crime.
In all it is difficult to comment on which analysis steps will be necessary since crimes 
involving the use of EM disruption have not been prosecuted. Of course the credibility of 
the evidence and the expert witness who presents the evidence are critical as with any 
high tech crime.
4.4.5 Responding to an EM Disruption Incident
It has been discussed that the manifestation of EM disruptor action may in some 
instances appear to be similar to cyber type DoS attack. Kruse [Kruse and Heiser, 2002] 
proposes an incident handling process for investigating a DoS attack this flow chart is 
reproduced in Figure 88.
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Figure 88: Process for handling a cyber DoS incident
The key point of this Figure with respect to an EM disruptive event is the first decision 
box. If the source of the incident is not quickly identified as being EM in origin then the 
disruption will be misdiagnosed and significant time, effort and resource could be 
expended. Consider the following fictional scenario and event history:
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The victim business: A small data processing facility (32 networked terminals 
connected to a server, administered remotely) which could be a financial institution 
sorting office carrying out some time critical activity located within a larger host office 
type installation.
The situation: A disgruntled employee has been refused the afternoon off and decides to 
take matters into his own hands. He is in possession of a very rudimentary microwave 
oven based disruptor and decides to use it being fairly confident that it will go 
undetected. Rather than phone in sick or start a fire he powers up the Low Tech EM 
disruptor.
4.4.5.1 Condition 1 - EMDDS not deployed














Users start to experience strange and unexpected effects at their computer 
terminals. These may include monitor malfunctions, some terminals freeze, others 
shut down, some are unaffected. All networking operations are suspended
The remote central administrator or Information Security Manager (ISM) is alerted 
to the network outage by alerts generated from IDS or other status monitors. The 
ISM attempts to reboot the network remotely
The users within the data processing facility attempt to reboot the systems that 
have shut down by powering the terminals on and off. The terminal malfunctions 
continue to persist
Some users call the remote information services helpdesk, multiple and different 
calls are logged at the helpdesk. The helpdesk dispatches a hardware technical 
support person to the office
The ISM is unable to re-instate the network remotely. The ISM immediately starts 
backing-up data. Given the information available, the ISM believes that a Denial 
of Service attack is in progress. As per the flowchart in Figure 88 the ISM 
examines all external facing ports and tries to identify the source of the attack. 
Port scans fail to reveal an external source
The technical support person arrives at the scene many systems are now 
inoperative, permanently shutdown and it is not possible to re-boot. The technical 
support person suspects an electrical power fault. Telephone calls are made back 
to the helpdesk trying to obtain an electrician. The technical support person also 
asks the helpdesk supervisor to contact the utilities provider
The data centre staff are unable to work. The manager tells them to take the 
afternoon off. The perpetrator of the attack (the disgruntled employee) achieves 
their objective
An investigation is initiated by the ISM together with the utilities provider over 
the next couple of weeks. There is permanent physical damage to some terminals 
and some other electronic hardware. Some electronic hardware appears to function 
satisfactorily
New hardware is procured. The incident report blames power surge and power 
quality issues (although this is not corroborated by the utilities company)
The disgruntled employee repeats the successful attack several limes, over the next 











Table 37: Fictionalised incident response EMDDS not deployed
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4.4.5.2 Condition 2 - EMDDS deployed











Users start to experience strange and unexpected effects at their computer 
terminals. These may include monitor malfunctions, some terminals freeze, others 
shut down, some are unaffected. All networking operations are suspended
The remote central administrator or ISM is alerted to the network outage by alerts 
generated from IDS or other status monitors. The ISM is also alerted by an EM 
disruptive event alarm. A single EMDDS is located within the data centre
The ISM telephones the office manager who in turn informs all users to stop 
whatever they are doing and re-locate to a nearby office
The ISM arrives at the data centre and quickly identifies the hardware which is 
most affected. A physical search reveals a Low Tech microwave oven based EM 
disrupter located under an employees desk
Photographic evidence is taken and the Low Tech disruptor is taken away and 
logged as evidence. The authenticated EMDDS event log together with other 
systems event logs are used to corroborate the fact that the employee was at his 
desk when the EM Disruptor was activated






Table 38: Fictionalised incident response EMDDS deployed
4.4.6 Summary
Forensics is a crucial element for gathering evidential information. Forensic evidence 
may be used to successfully prosecute criminal activity or to provide detailed diagnosis 
such that appropriate controls and countermeasures can be put in place.
Given the nature of EM disruptive events an EMDDS which can be used to produce 
authenticated evidence of a disruptive event will become useful for diagnosing the cause 
of malfunctions, for responding to incidents and for the prosecution of High Tech crimes 
involving EM disruption.
4.5 Stage III - Summary
Conventional 'cyber' IDS provides an essential INFOSEC function, alerting to the fact 
that unacceptable or undesirable behaviour is taking, or has taken, place. This alerting 
mechanism may deter some malicious attacks but is perhaps more useful for expediting 
incident response and developing and instigating mitigation and recovery strategies.
EM threats have some similar characteristics with cyber/CNA type threats and therefore 
concepts for the detection/indication for EM threats in a similar manner to conventional 
IDS have been developed.
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The feasibility of providing EM disrupter threat detection has been addressed and a set of 
essential and desirable requirements have been produced. A technology down selection 
process was used and a candidate technology was selected based upon the essential 
requirements. An EMDDS prototype has been developed and evaluated. The prototype 
EMDDS meets the essential requirements and several of the desirable requirements 
identified.
The incident response processes, the types of EM disruptive incident and the forensic 
processes for gathering evidential information have been discussed. The prototype 
EMDDS which has been developed can be used to produce authenticated evidence of an 
EM disruptive event. This will become useful for attributing the cause of the malfunction 
to EM disruption, for responding to incidents and for the prosecution of High Tech 
crimes involving EM disruption. A fictionalised incident has been created to illustrate the 
potential effectiveness of the EMDDS for detection, diagnosis, incident response and 
forensics.
Page 207 of 253
UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN __ PHD THESIS
5 Conclusions
5. 1 General Conclusions
The hypothesis tested by this study was:
'It is useful and possible to develop detection and diagnostic concepts analogous to those 
used to defend against conventional cyber or CNA threats for electromagnetic attacks' 
Section 1.1
The study has been broken down into three stages to address this hypothesis:
Stage I (Section 2) encompassed a detailed review of open literature sources and analysis 
of the effectiveness of EM threats from a technical capability perspective.
Stage II (Section 3) reported on extensive EM susceptibility tests carried out on computer 
systems and networks in order to understand information security vulnerabilities and to 
derive an EM disruptive threat detection threshold.
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Stage III (Section 4) discussed the utility of conventional intrusion detection, 
demonstrated the feasibility of developing an EM Disruption Detection System 
(EMDDS) and reported on the potential utility of an EMDDS for incident response.
The results of the three stages above have supported the hypothesis, except perhaps that 
usefulness is very difficult to quantify. The usefulness (utility) of the EMDDS was 
discussed in Section 4.4 and in the following recommendations section.
The following sub-sections highlight specific conclusions.
5.2 Specific Conclusions
5.2.1 EM threats
It has been shown through this study that the EM (specifically the RF) spectrum can be 
used to exploit the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information systems. 
Whilst this is clearly the case EM threats are not explicitly considered in the INFOSEC 
guidelines largely because the risks are poorly understood.
EM disruptive threats which are a threat to the availability of information systems and 
processes were down selected from the other EM threat types (interceptors and electronic 
warfare) discussed for more detailed study. This was because the potential risk from EM 
disruptive threats to INFOSEC was qualitatively assessed as greater than for the other 
threat types and also to make the problem space more manageable.
It was also shown through analysis and discussion that a Low Tech perpetrator (well 
funded amateur) would possess the technical capability to produce an effective9 EM 
disruption system.
5.2.2 EM disrupter vulnerabilities
A technically rigorous series of susceptibility experiments has shown that computer 
systems are susceptible to EM disruption and that the effects can manifest in a variety of 
complex modes. The vulnerability and impact that the induced susceptibility has on 
information processes is intrinsically dependent upon the information system function. 
Certainly, time critical processes are most at risk from EM disruption. It has been shown
9 Analysis has also shown that the effectiveness of disruplor threats is very difficult to quantify and is 
dependant on many uncertain factors __________________________
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that the resultant effects or manifestation of EM disrupter attacks on information systems 
and processes have some commonalities with 'cyber' DoS attacks.
It is postulated that in the future as society's reliance on technology grows and as 
technology advances (higher speed microelectronic devices operating at ever lower 
voltage levels) that information systems and processes and indeed society as a whole will 
become more vulnerable to EM disrupters. EM disrupters themselves will become more 
effective because of technological advances such as powerful compact prime power 
systems for example.
At the present time however, there is limited, clear, convincing and documented evidence 
of disrupter action and effects in 'real world' scenarios. It is speculated that this is likely 
to be in part due to the lack of understanding from INFOSEC professionals of this form 
of threat, the difficulty associated with human perception of this threat, and a lack of 
deployed detection systems.
5.2.3 EM disruption detection
Conventional 'cyber' Intrusion Detection Systems provide an essential INFOSEC 
function by alerting to the fact that unacceptable or undesirable behaviour is taking, or 
has taken place.
An EM Disruption Detection System (EMDDS) prototype based upon similar concepts 
of use as conventional IDS has been developed built and evaluated. The prototype 
EMDDS can be used to produce authenticated evidence of an EM disruptive event in 
order to facilitate incident response processes.
The utility of an EMDDS and indeed this thesis can be explained by referring back to the 
risk model shown in Figure 1 and reproduced here as Figure 89.
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Figure 89: Risk model informed by an EMDDS
This study has shown that the threat from EM disruption is tangible (through analysis of 
open source references and rigorous susceptibility testing) although the impact on 
information processes is difficult to quantify and dependent upon the information system 
function. Whilst effective countermeasures (Section 2.8) for EM disruption exist it is 
difficult to recommend their installation as part of a balanced security approach for risk 
mitigation since the risk is poorly understood given current evidence.
The EMDDS system developed through this study provides detection, diagnostic and an 
evidence collection mechanism which will inform the risk analysis process above. An 
International Patent for the EMDDS has been applied for.
The EMDDS therefore allows for balanced and cost effective countermeasures to be put 
in place which will in turn lead to the minimisation of the potential impact of EM 
disruptive threats to INFOSEC.
5.3 Contribution to Science
This research has already been accepted as a contribution to the scientific community. 
This has principally been achieved through peer reviewed publications. A list of 
published peer reviewed papers is given in Section 9. Two scientific communities the
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Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) community (Section 9, [Hoad 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
and 10]) and the computer security/INFOSEC community (Section 9, [Hoad 1, 4 and 
11 ]) have published papers on this topic.
The first stage of this thesis has provided a comprehensive summary of open source 
discussion of EM disruptive threats. This level of detail and the subsequent analysis of 
the available data have not been found published elsewhere.
The second stage of this thesis has used novel experimental techniques to conduct 
rigorous susceptibility experiments. The results of these susceptibility experiments and 
the expertise gained through their conduct have assisted in the formulation of 
International standards for the protection of systems from high power transient 
phenomena through International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Sub Committee 
77C (See Section 9, [Hoad 9]).
The third stage of this thesis details the development of a novel EM Disruption Detection 
System (EMDDS) for which a patent application was filed at the outset of this study. A 
business model for the future commercial exploitation by QinetiQ of the EMDDS for 
security and safety applications is under development.
5.4 Limitations
A fundamental limitation of this research has been the limited amount of susceptibility 
data found in the open literature. This data is essential for the accurate setting of 
detection thresholds. Even the experimental data produced through this research (Section 
3) is sparse and insufficient to draw very clear conclusions, to estimate statistically 
meaningful relationships, or to develop an all encompassing theory or model. However, 
each item tested required the use of the reverberation chamber facility and a test engineer 
for approximately two weeks. The total experimental time therefore was in the order of 
24 man weeks or half a man year.
The age of the technology evaluated through this study was also limited due primarily to 
budgetary constraints. As time progresses from publication of this thesis the relevance of 
the data to modern technologies is likely to be very difficult to interpret.
A fairly severe, though necessary cost limitation was placed on the EMDDS concept. 
Over time, EM disruptive events are likely to occur more frequently and thus the
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available funding to support EMDDS development should improve allowing a variety of 
state of the art technical solutions to be incorporated.
It was not possible during this research to explore the real utility of EM disruption 
detection. It is postulated that this is best measured once the detector is deployed to 
support INFOSEC requirements i.e. in 'real world' operational scenarios.
5.5 Recommendations
Fundamental limitations in the availability of significant quantities of susceptibility data 
could be overcome by the development of an all encompassing theory or model which 
enables the prediction or estimation of susceptibility thresholds. However, given the 
nature of EM disruptive effects it is likely that this would require an extensive test and 
evaluation program to support and validate the theory.
At present effects data produced for government research is classified and cannot be 
published in the open. However, this limits the sharing of knowledge and the gearing that 
could be achieved from sharing data.
For the EMDDS prototype several technical improvements should be considered:
o A separate sensor for detection of conducted threats was proposed as part of the 
functional structure shown in Figure 58. The aim of this element will be to detect 
EM disruptive threats which propagate along cables these can be from a source 
which injects energy directly into the cable or for radiated threats (with frequency 
content below 100 MHz) which optimally couple to cables. As a minimum a set of 
essential requirements for the conducted threat sensor element should be derived 
ideally based on rigorous conducted susceptibility test results
o The USB standard is now well adopted and is a convenient method for powering 
the EMDDS. A USB version of the EMDDS should therefore be developed 
although some EM hardening (filtering) of the port may be necessary
o The command console used for the prototype EMDDS is a laptop computer. 
However, the minimum functionality required for the command console is a 
limited data processing capability and Ethernet compatibility. The minimum 
connectivity required is an Ethernet port and a USB port to power the sensor. 
Proprietary solutions are available that provide the minimum functionality and
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connectivity required for example OpenBrick [OpenBrick, 2007]. This system is 
an x86 compatible single board computer with two USB ports and an Ethernet 
port. A compact command console of this nature could also be hardened against 
EM disruption by placing it within a simple shielded enclosure and filtering the 
power and network ports
o The other EMDDS elements shown in Figure 58 and discussed in Section 4.3.1.2 
should be incorporated to limit the number of false alarms generated by the 
EMDDS and to assist with fine tuning of the detection threshold
o A scheme for deployment of the EMDDS should be developed. This would 
primarily take into account the optimum physical location of the detector within an 
installation. A network of deployed EMDDS sensors would perhaps provide the 
optimum configuration but this would need to be studied
o Ideally the EMDDS detection software should be incorporated within standard 
proprietary IDS software and appear like any other sensor node. This would 
improve INFOSEC professionals understanding of the EM disruption phenomena.
o The real utility of an EMDDS will be best assessed through deployment of the 
system in a 'real world' scenario over a period of time. Deployment opportunities 
should therefore be sought out. A business model is being developed to facilitate 
this
The main thrust of the EMDDS development contained within this thesis is for the 
application of the EMDDS to INFOSEC. However, a potential application of the 
EMDDS has unexpectedly arisen due to new work in the area of EMC for Functional 
Safety [IET Guidance, 2000]. EMC for functional safety is concerned with the growing 
number of safety related incidents which can occur due to unintentional or at least non- 
malicious EM disruption of embedded technologies. An example of this is provided 
below.
'Medical technicians taking a heart-attack victim to the hospital in 1992 attached her to 
a monitor/defibrillator. Unfortunately, the heart machine shut down every time the 
technicians turned on their radio transmitter to ask for advice, and as a result the woman 
died. Analysis showed that the monitor unit had been exposed to exceptionally high fields 
because the ambulance roof had been changed from metal to fihreglass and fitted with a
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long-range radio antenna. The reduced shielding from the vehicle combined with the 
strong radiated signal proved to be too much for the equipment.' [Armstrong, 2006]
An EMDDS could have utility in several potential areas with respect to safety related 
functions, for example by:
1. Helping to define whether EM disruption was the stimulus which lead to a safety 
related incident and thereby improving with the accuracy of accident reporting 
statistics
2. Acting as a safety device similar in function to a limit switch or fuse for example 
by removing power to a potentially dangerous electronic process when EM 
disruption above a pre-defined threshold is detected
As an example, consider the EMC linked safety related incident discussed above. An 
EMDDS deployed within the ambulance vehicle could have been used to automatically 
switch the heart machine to a 'safe mode'. At the very least the EMDDS could have been 
used to indicate that and EM disruptive event was occurring thereby providing a warning 
to the medical technicians.
The application of the EMDDS system to safety related incidents involving EM 
disruption should therefore be more thoroughly explored.
5.6 Final Summary
The results of the thesis have supported the hypothesis. A thorough literature review and 
the subsequent analysis and experimentation have demonstrated the threat potential from 
EM Interceptors and EM disrupters from the perspective of technical capability. An EM 
disruption detector has successfully been developed and evaluated.
The usefulness or utility of EM disruption detection is very difficult to quantify although 
indications of utility in terms of risk assessment, incident response and forensic process 
have been discussed. However, the real utility of EM disruption detection may only be 
revealed once EM detection systems are deployed to support INFOSEC requirements. It 
is speculated that as technology becomes even more prolific the need for EM disruption 
detection and protection will emerge.
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6 Appendix A - Fundamental EM concepts
The purpose of this section is to describe some essential EM concepts which are relevant 
to the topics discussed within this thesis. This section will consider:
o EM Hierarchy





6.1 Source - Victim Hierarchy - EM interaction
In the context of this thesis it is useful to break down the typical source - victim/receptor 
complexity into sizes relevant to their geometry. This is useful because it is explained 
throughout this thesis that the geometry or dimensions of the source and victim/receptor 









Figure A1 - Hierarchy
Infrastructure - A large National level interconnected electrical network of installations 
and systems, for example the National electrical power grid, Telecommunications 
infrastructure or a Metropolitan area Network
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Installation - An office building, data centre, or other physical structure, which houses all 
of the elements of an information system network. The Installation may be considered as 
a passive element in this hierarchy in that it cannot be affected by the EM emission or 
interference. It can, however, modify the propagation of the EM waveform through 
attenuation or coupling
Network - A local area network (LAN) of interconnected information systems within an 
installation. This could also represent the electrical power network electrical main), or a 
building services network such as a fire control system within an installation
System - A collection of information system components which can be used together to 
deliver an information processing function such as a computer with a mouse, keyboard 
and power cables
System component - An individual physical element of the systems such as a keyboard 
or a mouse or a display
Circuit - A typical printed circuit board (p.c.b.) i.e. a Computer Mother board, a 
collection of circuit components
Circuit component - For example a microprocessor
This terminology has been used throughout the thesis to promote understanding of the 
concepts. For the purpose of this thesis the main consideration is an information system 
which is part of a network located within an installation.
6.2 RF Propagation Loss
6.2.1 Free Space propagation loss
The magnitude of the EM emission or RF signal propagated through the air (paths 1, 2 
and 3 of Figure 3) decreases with distance from the source. In air the magnitude of the 
Electric Field (Symbol £", Unit Volts per metre (V/m)) will decrease at a rate 
proportional to the distance defined by the Equation Al below.
Where, E is the Electric field strength at a distance r from the source
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Figure A2: Graph of normalised E-field amplitude verses distance in the 'far field'
For plane waves, (a condition which is met in the far field see Section 6.2.2) the power 
density (Symbol S, Unit Watts per square metre (W/m2)) and electric field strength E are 
related by the impedance of free space, ZQ (= 377Q) via Equation A2:
.(Eq. A2)
Where, S is the power density in Watts per square metre (W/m2) 
And Z0 is the impedance of free space equal to 120rc or = 377Q
It can be seen from Equation A2 above that the power density falls at a rate of the inverse 
square compared to the electric field.
For the purpose of this thesis this means that increasing the distance between the source 
and the victim/receptor reduces the effectiveness of EM interaction.
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6.2.2 Near field / Far field
These equations are only valid for 'far-field' conditions. The 'far-field' is a region where 
the electric field behaves in a predictable manner with distance from the source, i.e. the 
free space impedance equals 12071 (377Q) as shown in Figure A3.










Spherical Waves • Plane Waves 
E/H not equal ;' E/H equal 
to 377Q ; .' to 377D
Figure A3: Near field/Far field
The zones closer to the antenna or radiating structure are known as the near field and 
Fresnel zones [Al: Krauss]. Within the near field the electric field strength can vary 
considerably and perhaps more importantly structures such as other equipment, detectors, 
and cables can interact and even modify the magnitude of the RF signal. The 'near field' 
therefore represents an unstable space.
The transition or distance from the source between the 'near field' and 'far field' 
boundaries is not precisely definable, but Equations A3 and A4 are used as rules of 
thumb [A2: Kodali]
Near I FarBoundary . A3)
or;
T ~ .(Eq. A4)
Whichever is the greater.
Where, r is the distance from the source
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D is the largest aperture dimension
And A, is the wavelength of the signal frequency in metres related to the 
frequency of the RF signal by Equation A5:
xl=/
' * ..........(Eq. A5)
Where c = 3x108 metres per second
And / is the frequency
For the purpose of this thesis this means that:
a) Measurements of the magnitude of RF signals made in the near field are 
likely to have a high degree of error since the wave front is not properly 
formed and the measuring system may perturb the field. Extrapolation to 
greater ranges is therefore made very difficult.
b) Victim/receptor systems within the near field may experience different 
potentials across the system and may also perturb the field. Extrapolation of 
susceptibility threshold data for example to greater ranges is therefore made 
very difficult.
6.2.3 Cable Propagation Loss
The magnitude of the EM emission or RF signal propagated along a cable or along 
conductors (path 4 of Figure 3) also decreases with distance from the source. Again the 
propagation loss is proportional to the wavelength but here the situation is far more 
complex. This is largely because of the variety of cable types and conductor materials 
and the influence of the geometry or orientation of the conductor.
The typical bulk propagation loss of a normal three core mains voltage power cable 
found within most installations is shown in Figure A4 [A3: Eupen].
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Figure A4: Power cable loss per metre verses frequency
At frequencies below 10MHz the attenuation of a typical power cable is very low, at 
higher frequencies the path loss increases exponentially.
A conductor such as a cable is very unlikely to have a continuous path free from 
junctions and connectors from outside of an installation to a given victim system. 





o Residual current devices
o Junction bonds
o Connectors
Will attenuate (see Section 6.3) the RF signal. However, the magnitude of the attenuation 
is variable and complex and is difficult to ascertain although it has suggested that for 
typical domestic an light industrial installations the attenuation is between 2 and 40dB at 
150kHz [A4: 50065].
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For the purpose of this thesis this means that increasing the distance between the source 
and the victim reduces the effectiveness of EM interaction especially for frequencies 
exceeding 10MHz.
6.3 Attenuation
Attenuation can be defined as a reduction in magnitude of a signal as it passes through a 
transmission medium. Attenuation is usually quoted in decibels (Symbol dB). The dB is 
a logarithmic unit used to describe a ratio i.e. the ratio of the received magnitude divided 
by the applied magnitude. Attenuation is a useful concept when considering the 
penetration of EM energy through solid materials or structures. The mechanism of 
attenuation can be either reflection or absorption and will in practice consist of both 
factors but the magnitude of each contribution is not revealed by the concept of 
attenuation.
For an installation or the enclosure of a system, structures or barriers in the path of the 
RF emission signal such as the wall of the installation will reduce or attenuate the 
magnitude of the RF signal. However, not all materials have the same attenuation and the 
level of attenuation can vary with frequency. Some materials such as plasterboard, 
general partition materials, and window glass are virtually transparent to EM energy [A5: 





-£- Unfired Clay brick
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Frequency (Hz)
10.OE+9
Figure A5: Attenuation of common construction materials
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In this graph it is clear that materials such as brick and concrete provide superior 
attenuation to plasterboard and chipboard. For most frequencies the attenuation provided 
by the brick and concrete materials is 10 to 40 dB greater than for the other sample 
materials. For a barrier with an attenuation of 20dB the magnitude of the Electric field of 
an RF signal will be reduced a factor of 1 0.
It should be noted that penetrations or apertures, such as windows or doors, into a 
installation may offer an un-attenuated path for the signal to propagate through. 
However, this is again complex because the 'pass band' of an aperture will be dependent 
on the size of the aperture and the wavelength of the RF signal.
Apertures will pass RF energy without attenuation when the wavelength of the RF 
waveform is a factor smaller than the aperture dimensions. It is generally accepted that 
Ott's Equation (Equation A6) [A6: Ott] for aperture penetration gives an approximate 
measure of the attenuation provided by a regular rectangular shaped aperture (i.e. 
acceptable for windows and doors).
Where SE Refers to the Shielding Effectiveness in dB
/ is the longest dimension of the aperture in metres
And /I is the wavelength in free space in metres
Effectively, this equation is only relevant for an aperture in a conductive sheet such as 
steel, in practice materials such as concrete used for installation will cause the frequency 
peak to shift, however, the amount of shift is difficult to predict for a generic case. The 
angle of incidence of the impinging field will also skew the effective aperture size. A plot 
of the shielding effectiveness of a 1.5 m aperture (typical office window size) is given in 
Figure A6.
Page 223 of 253
UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN PHD THESIS
50 -
40 -














1.0E+6 10.0E+6 100.0E+6 1.0E+9 10.0E+9 
Frequency [Hz]
Figure A6: Application of Ott's aperture equation for a 1.5m aperture
An installation will have many apertures such as windows perhaps with complex 
geometries, apertures may be formed by the crossing of steel construction members and 
re-bar, so for a complete installation the attenuation of the structure is rather more 
complex. Figure A7 shows the measured attenuation [A7: Hoad] (green curve) of a three 
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Figure A7 Measured Installation attenuation compared with published data
Note 1: The IEEE data [A8: IEEE] is based on a sample of three multi-storey office 
buildings
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Note 2: The Stone data [A9: Stone] represents bulk attenuation of a concrete sample slab 
thickness = 305 mm
Note 3: The Pauli data [A5: Pauli] represents bulk attenuation of a lightweight concrete 
sample slab thickness = 300 mm
Note 4: The White data [A10: White] is representative of a building with a steel frame 
construction with facades of brick, concrete, stone and glass
It can be seen that the data from White represents the most pessimistic case when 
compared with the other data sets. The peak at 100MHz in this data is most likely due to 
propagation through apertures such as windows or through constructive interference from 
the vertical components of the steel frame at Xfl spacing used for construction of the 
installation. The White data is obviously smoothed to remove resonances in coupling due 
to multiple apertures. These resonances can be seen in the measured experimental data.
For the purpose of this thesis this means that the installation construction materials and 
composition may reduce the effectiveness of EM interaction.
6.4 Antennas
An intentional antenna is a resonant structure with a defined geometry set to efficiently
radiate or receive RF power. To quote Krauss [A 1: Krauss]
'an antenna is a region of transition between a radio wave guided by a transmission line 
and a free space wave'
Apertures and conductors can form unintentional antennas which efficiently radiate or 
receive RF power at there 'natural' or resonant frequency.
The simplest antenna is the half wave dipole or doublet, where the length of the antenna 
arms are equal to (resonant with) a half wavelength of a specific frequency. More 
complex antenna types are discussed throughout this thesis the main design aim of an 
antenna is to efficiently match the impedance of the source or the receiver to free space.
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6.4.1 Antenna gain and directivity
Gain is a measure of an antennas ability to capture energy from a free space RF signal or 
to deliver RF energy to a particular point in free space. The gain value for an antenna is 
described by the ratio in Equation A7:
G = Maximum radiation intensity of actual antenna
Radiation intensity of a lossless isotropic 
antenna with the same power input .(Eq. A7)
Where, the lossless isotropic antenna is a perfect (and therefore not realisable) antenna 
which radiates the same power in all directions with the same efficiency. Measurement of 
the power density at any point on the surface of a sphere centred on the antenna would 
yield exactly the same result as any other point on the sphere.
Consider the normalised radiation pattern plot, Figure A8 of two fictitious antennas a) an 










Figure A8: Normalised radiation pattern for (a) an isotropic radiator and (b) a fictitious
aperture antenna
It can be seen that for the aperture antenna the power density on the surface of the sphere 
on boresight i.e. directly on the line of sight of the antenna aperture is much greater than 
for the isotropic case.
Directivity is a function related to the gain function of the antenna. The gain value takes 
into account the losses (thermal, reflection, etc.) of the antenna whereas the directivity 
function is described in Equation A8:
D =
Maximum radiation intensity
Average radiation intensity ........ .(Eq. A8)
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The directivity is an important function of the antenna because ultimately it limits the 








Figure A9: Implication of directivity for (a) an aperture antenna (b) a low gain antenna
Antenna gains at microwave frequencies can be of the order of 30dBi. For a radiation 
source this represents an increase in the power density at a point in space of 1000 times 
compared with an isotropic radiator.
6.4.2 Antenna Factor
The term antenna factor is often used to simplify the gain equation to a ratio of the 
electric field strength at a specific distance divided by the voltage supplied to a matched 
load, Equation A9.
Where, AF is the antenna factor in units of m~
E is the electric field at some specific distance 
And V is the load voltage 
A large AF is equivalent to a high gain.
For the purpose of this thesis this means that antenna gain is a useful function for EM 
disrupters as it potentially helps deliver more power to the victim and for EM
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interceptors as it helps in converting more of the available RF power into signal. 
However, this is at the expense of directivity as discussed.
6.4.3 The radar equation
Equation A 10, commonly termed the radar equation describes a way of deriving the 
power density at a point in space distance r from an antenna, with a given source power 
Pt and a known antenna gain G.
The denominator of this equation describes the volume of a sphere, which is a perfect 
loss less omni-directional (isotropic) antenna. This sphere is modified by the antenna 
gain G, described above. The numerator for this equation can be used alone and is 
known as the Equivalent Radiated Power (ERP).
The E-field equivalent of the radar equation is given in Equation All.
For the purpose of this thesis this equation has been used to derive the power density at a 
distance when the source power and antenna gain are known or can be assumed. As 
discussed power density is a useful parameter for describing the propagated power from 
the source or experienced by the victim/receptor system.
6.4.4 Figures of merit (r.Efar r.Sfar)
The 'EFar' value is used as a figure of merit to describe the equivalent antenna drive
voltage from a far field measured value of the electric field. Given by Equation A 12.
r.E far = E/..........(Eq.M2)
Where, Er is the electric field measured in the far field at some distance r
An 'Sfar' value has also been used in this thesis as a figure of merit describe the 
equivalent antenna drive power. The 'Sfar' and 'Efar' values are simply related by 
Equation A2 since far field values are used.
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6.5 Coupling/Radiation efficiency
It is important to realise that not all frequencies couple or are radiated from all apertures 
and cables with the same efficiency. In general the coupling efficiency (i.e. the amount of 
energy absorbed into a system) is increased when the wavelength of the impinging RF 
field is comparable with the dimensions of the coupling structure. Where the wavelength 
coincides with some geometrical dimension (L) this is known as the resonance region 
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Figure A10: Canonical Resonance model
From this figure it can be seen that outside of the resonance region the coupling 
efficiency falls away very steeply. It should be noted that the effective length (L) is a 
complex quantity. For information systems the main coupling paths are cables, apertures 
or enclosures which effectively act as antennas or conduits [A12: Carter].
For a cable the effective length (L) can be affected by many factors including but not 
limited to;
o The orientation of the cable with respect to the direction of propagation of the 
disrupter waveform
o The orientation of the cable with respect to other conductive and non-conductive 
elements (e.g. other cables in a bundle)
o The proximity of the cable with respect to other conductive and non-conductive 
elements (e.g. the ground)
o The position of a cable within a conductive or high Q cavity
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For the radiation efficiency of an unintentional antenna the same factors apply. This 
process is known as reciprocity.
6.5.1 Reciprocity
The law of reciprocity states that 'for linear and bi-lateral networks and devices, reverse 
performance will be the same when operated under identical conditions'. In this context 
for example the coupling efficiency of a cable (i.e. the efficiency with which an emission 
couples to the victim system) approximates the radiation efficiency of the cable (i.e. the 
efficiency of an unintentional antenna at the source which radiates the emission).
6.6 Signal Theory
A large proportion of the signal types considered within this thesis are not continuously 
radiating at a fixed frequency many are characterised as a pulse with some specific shape 
which may occur repetitively. See Section x of thesis, for example.
It is perhaps important to understand how pulse waveforms appear in the frequency 
domain and which pulse parameters influence the frequency content. This is particularly 
important since coupling efficiency, attenuation and other important parameters are 
expressed as a function of the wavelength/frequency. These features can be explained by 
considering Figure All [A 13: Paul].
Time Domain Repetitive (Periodic) Function
A = Amplitude
tr = Rise time
T= Pulse Width
T = Pulse repetition interval
* t
Equivalent Frequency Domain Repetitive (Periodic) Function
2Ad




Figure A11: Time domain and frequency domain functions
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With this figure it is possible to show via Equations A13 and A14
/2 = ..(Eq.A14)
that:
Increasing the pulse width will result in shifting the knee point // up in frequency, 
increasing the bandwidth of the signal, increasing the power spectral density and 
therefore the energy density.
Increasing the pulse risetime will result in shifting the knee point/2 up in frequency, 
increasing the bandwidth of the signal and to a lesser extent the energy density.
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FWHM Full Width Half Maximum
GPR Ground Penetrating Radar
GTEM Gigahertz Transverse Electromagnetic Mode
HARM High Speed Anti Radiation Missile
HEMP High altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
HERF High Energy Radiated Field
HF High Frequency
HIPDI Hardware Invariant Protocol Disruptive Interference
HIRA Half Impulse Radiating Antenna
HIRF High Intensity Radiated Field
HPEM High Power Electromagnetic
HPM High Power Microwaves
Hz Hertz
1C Integrated Circuit
ICNIRP International Commission for Non Ionising Radiation Protection
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IEE Institution of Electric Engineers (UK)
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (US)
IEMI Intentional Electromagnetic Interference
IET Institution of Engineers and Technologists (UK)
IGBT Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistor
INFOSEC Information Security
IP Internet Protocol
IRA Impulse Radiating Antenna
ISM Information Security Manager
ITE Information Technology Equipment
IT Information Technology
ITRS International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors
JEC Joint Economic Committee
LAN Local Area Network
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
l.e.d. Light emitting diode
LEMP Lightning Electromagnetic Pulse
LinCMOS Linear Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor
LISN Line Impedance Stabilising Network
LSB Least Significant Bit
MCG Magneto Cumulative Generator
MHD Magneto Hydrodynamic
MILO Magnetically Insulated Linear Oscillator
MoD Ministry of Defence
MSB Most Significant Bit
MTF Microwave Test Facility
NAWCWD Naval Air Warfare Centre Weapons Division
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEMP Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse
NLW Non Lethal Weapons
NNEMP Non Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse
NSA National Security Administration
NSA Non State Actor
NY New York
PIII/P3 Pentium Three
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